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SPEECH

ON

LEGISLATION & POLICY FOR INDIA,

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

ON THE

SECOND READING OF THE INDIA BILL,

June 24th, 1858.

28017

BY

JOHN BRIGHT, ESQ., M.P.

RR-2-1

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SPEECH.

Mr. BRIGHT—I do not rise for the purpose of opposing the second reading of this Bill. On the contrary, if any hon. member thinks proper to divide the House upon it, I shall vote with the noble lord. I must say, however, that there are many clauses in the Bill to which I entertain serious objections. Some of them will, I hope, be amended as the Bill passes through Committee; but if that is not the case I can only hope that, as the Bill of 1853 is abandoned in 1858, within the next five years the House of Commons will take some further steps with regard to this question, with a view of simplifying the government of India as carried on in England. I wish to take this opportunity of making some observations upon the general question of Indian government, which it might have been out of place to have made during the discussion of the various resolutions which have been agreed to by the House. I think it must have struck every hon. member that, while two Governments have proposed great changes with regard to the government of India, no good case has really been made out for such changes in the speeches of the noble lord and the right hon. gentleman by whom the two India Bills have

been introduced. ("Hear, hear.") That opinion, I know, will meet with a response from two or three hon. gentlemen on this (the Opposition) side of the House. (Hear, hear.) It occurred to me when the noble lord at the head of the late Government introduced his Bill—and I made the observation when the present Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward his measure—that if the House knew no more of the question than they learned from the speeches of the Ministers, they could not form any clear notion why it was proposed to overthrow the East India Company. The hon. member for Guildford (Mr. Mangles) has expressed a similar opinion several times during the progress of these discussions. The right hon. member for Carlisle has also said that the East India Company was being dealt with in the manner in which animals intended for sacrifice were treated in Eastern countries, and in ancient times,—they were decked with garlands when they were led out for immolation. That is true; but it does not therefore follow that the House is not quite right in the course it is taking. It must be clear that the moment the House of Commons met this session, there was only one course which the then Government could adopt with reference to this question. A feeling existed throughout the country—I believe I may say it was universal—that for a long time past the government of India had not been a good government; that grave errors —if not grievous crimes—had been committed in that country. (Hear, hear.) I think the conscience of the nation had been touched on this question, and they came

by a leap, as it were—by an irrepressible instinct—to the conclusion that the East India Company must be abolished, and that another and, as the nation hoped, a better government should be established for that country. There was a general impression, arising from past discussion in Parliament, that the industry of the people of India had been grievously neglected; that there was great reason for complaint with respect to the administration of justice; and that, with regard to the wars entered into by the Indian Government, there was much of which the people of England had reason to be ashamed. (Hear, hear.) It has been said by some that these faults are to be attributed to the Board of Control; but I have never defended the Board of Control. I believe everything the East India Company has said of the Board of Control—to its discredit (a laugh), and I believe that everything the Board of Control has said to the discredit of the East India Company is perfectly true. (Cheers and laughter.) There was also a general impression that the expenditure of the East India Government was excessive, and that it had been proved before more than one Committee that the taxes imposed upon the people of India were onerous to the last degree. These subjects were discussed in 1853, at which time, in my opinion, the change now proposed ought to have been effected. Subsequently, the calamitous events of 1857 and 1858 occurred, and the nation came at once to the conclusion—a conclusion which I think no disinterested person could resist—that it was impossible that India and its vast population could any longer be retained under the form of government

which has existed up to this period. If then, a change was inevitable, the question was, how it should be accomplished, and what should be done. I think it is quite clear that the course the noble lord has pursued is right—namely, that of insisting that during this present session, and without delay, the foundation of all reform in the government of India should be commenced at home; because we cannot take a single step with regard to any real and permanent improvement in the Indian government, until we have reformed what I may call the basis of that government, by changes to be effected in this country. What, then, is the change which is proposed, and which ought to be made? For my own part, in considering these questions, I cannot altogether approve the Bill now before the House. What we want with regard to the government of India is that which in common conversation is called "a little more daylight." We want more simplicity and more responsibility. (Hear, hear.) I objected to the scheme originally proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because it did not provide these requisites. That scheme so closely resembled the system we were about to overthrow that I could not bring myself to regard it favourably. In considering the subject before Parliament met, I asked myself this question:—"Suppose there had never been an East India Company or any such corporation,—suppose India had been conquered by the forces of the Crown, commanded by Generals acting under the authority of the Crown,—how should we then have proposed to govern distant dominions of vast extent, and

with a population that could scarcely be counted?" I believe such a system of government as has hitherto existed would never have been established; and if such a system had not existed, I am convinced that no Ministry would have proposed the plan now submitted to the House. I think the government would have been placed in the hands of a Secretary of State, with his secretaries, clerks, and staff of officers, or of a small Board, so small as to prevent responsibility from being diffused and divided, if not actually destroyed. I suspect that the only reason why the country or Parliament can be disposed to approve the large Council now proposed is that they have seen something like a Council heretofore—formerly of 24, and subsequently of 18 members; and I believe there is something like timidity on the part of the House, and probably on the part of the Government, which hinders them from making so great a change as I have suggested to the simple plan which would probably have existed had no such body as the East India Company ever been established. I am willing to admit candidly, that if the government of India at home should be so greatly simplified, it will be necessary that very important changes should be made in the government in India. (Hear, hear.) I agree with the noble lord (Stanley) that the representatives of the Crown in India must have power as well as responsibility; that they should be enabled to deal with emergencies (hear, hear), and to settle the hundred or the thousand questions that must arise among 100,000,000 of people, without sending 10,000 miles to this country

to ask questions which ought to be settled at once by some competent authority on the spot. (Hear, hear.) There are two modes of governing India, and the hon. member for Leominster (Mr. Willoughby), who has been a very distinguished servant of the East India Company, has publicly expressed his views upon this question. I have been very much struck with a note attached to the published report of his speech, referring to the multifarious duties discharged by the Directors of the East India Company. That note states that

"A despatch may be received containing 60, or 100, or 200 cases; and the despatch, in itself voluminous, is rendered more so by collections attached to it, containing copies of all former correspondence on the subject or subjects, and of all letters written thereon by various local officers, and all papers relating thereto. There has, not long since, been in the Revenue Department a despatch with 16,263 pages of collections. In 1845 there was one in the same department with 46,000 pages, and it was stated that Mr. Canning some years since in the House of Commons mentioned a military despatch to which were attached 13,511 pages of collections."

The hon. gentleman did not say in his speech that anybody at the India House ever read all these things. (Hear.) It is quite clear that if the Directors were to pretend to go through a waggon-load of documents coming to Leadenhall Street every year it must be only a pretence, and if they want to persuade the House that they give attention to only one-tenth part of these papers they must think the House more credulous than it is

in matters of this kind. (Cheers.) That is one mode of governing India. It is the mode which has been adopted, and the mode which has failed. If we are to have the details settled here, I am perfectly certain we can have no good government in India. (Hear, hear.) I have alluded on a former occasion to a matter which occurred in a committee upstairs. A gentleman, who was examined, stated that he had undertaken to brew a wholesome beer and quite as good as that exported for the supply of the troops, somewhere in the Presidency of Madras, for one-sixth of the price paid by Government for that exported to India from England; that the experiment was completely successful; that the memorandum or record with regard to it was sent home, no doubt forming part of the thousands of pages to which reference has been made; and that it was buried in the heap in which it came; because for years nothing was heard of a proposition which would have saved the Government a very large amount annually, and opened a new industry to the population and capital of India. (Hear, hear.) I believe this system of government is one of delay and disappointment—one, actually, of impossibility—one which can by no means form a complete theory of government as held by any persons in the House (hear); and that the other, the simpler system, which I wish the House to undertake, would be one of action, progress, and results, with regard to India, such as we have never yet seen, and never can see, until there is a complete simplification of the Indian government in this country. (Hear, hear.) I come now to the question—

and it is for this question that I have wished principally to address the House—if at any time we obtain the simplicity which I contend for with regard to the government at home, what changes will it be desirable to make in the government in India? And I would make one observation at this point, that in all the statements and arguments which I hope to use, I beg the House to believe that I use them with the greatest possible deference, with the feeling that this is a question upon which no man is at all entitled to dogmatize, that it is a vast question which we all look at as one we are scarcely capable of handling and determining. (Cheers.) I submit my views to the House because I have considered the subject more or less for many years, and I believe I am actuated by the simple and honest desire of contributing something to the information and knowledge of Parliament with regard to its duty upon this great question. (Cheers.) What is it we have to complain of in India? What is it that the people of India, if they spoke by my mouth, have to complain of? They would tell the House that, as a rule, throughout almost all the presidencies, and throughout those presidencies most which had been longest under British rule, the cultivators of the soil, the great body of the population of India, are in a condition of great impoverishment, of great dejection, and of great suffering. (Hear, hear.) I have, on former occasions, quoted to the House the report of a committee which I obtained 10 years ago, upon which sat several members of the Court of Directors, and they all agreed to report as much as I

have now stated to the House—the report being confined chiefly to the presidencies of Bombay and Madras. If I were now submitting the case of the population of India, I would say that the taxes of India are more onerous and oppressive than the taxes of any other country in the world. I think I could demonstrate that proposition to the House. I would show that industry is neglected by the Government to a greater extent probably than is the case in any other country in the world which has been for any length of time under what is termed a civilized and Christian Government. (Hear, hear.) I should be able to show, from the notes and memoranda of eminent men in India, of the Governor of Bengal, Mr. Halliday, for example, that there is not and never has been in any country pretending to be civilized, a condition of things to be compared with that which exists under the police administration of the province of Bengal. (Hear, hear.) With regard to the courts of justice, I may say the same thing. I could quote passages from books, written in favour of the Company with all the bias which the strongest friends of the Company could have, in which the writers declare that precisely in proportion as English courts of justice have extended, have perjury and all the evils which perjury introduced into the administration of justice prevailed throughout the presidencies of India. (Hear.) With regard to public works, if I were speaking for the natives of India, I would state this fact, that in a single English county, there are more roads—more travelable roads—than are to be found in the whole of

India; and I would say also that the single city of Manchester, in the supply of its inhabitants with the single article of water, has spent a larger sum of money than the East India Company had spent in the 14 years from 1834 to 1848 in public works of every kind throughout the whole of its vast dominions. (Cheers.) I would say that the real activity of the Indian Government has been an activity of conquest and annexation (hear)—of conquest and annexation which, after a time, has led to a fearful catastrophe which has enforced on the House an attention to the question of India, which but for that catastrophe I fear the House would not have given it. (Cheers.) If there were another charge to be made against the past Government of India it would be with regard to the state of its finances. Where was there a bad Government whose finances were in good order? Where was there a really good Government whose finances were in bad order? Is there a better test in the long run of the condition of a people and the merits of a Government than the state of the finances? And yet not in our own time, but going back through all the pages of *Mill* or of any other history of India, we find the normal condition of the finances of India has been that of deficit and bankruptcy. I maintain that if that be so, the Government is a bad Government. It has cost more to govern India than the Government has been able to extract from the population of India. The Government has not been scrupulous as to the amount of taxes or the mode in which they have been levied; but still, to carry on the government of India according

to the system which has heretofore prevailed, more has been required than the Government has been able to extract by any system of taxation known to them from the population over which they have ruled. It has cost more than £30,000,000 a-year to govern India, and the gross revenue being somewhere about £30,000,000, and there being a deficit, the deficit has had to be made up by loans. The Government has obtained all they could from the population. It is not enough, and they have had to borrow from the population and from Europeans at a high rate of interest, to make up the sum which has been found to be necessary. They have a debt of £60,000,000, and it is continually increasing. They always have a loan open, and while their debt is increasing their credit has been falling, because they have not treated their creditors very honourably on one or two occasions, and chiefly, of course, on account of the calamities which have recently happened in India. There is one point with regard to taxation which I wish to explain to the House, and I hope that, in the reforms to which the noble lord is looking forward, it will not be overlooked. I have said that the gross revenue is £30,000,000. Exclusive of the opium revenue, which is not, strictly speaking, and hardly at all, a tax upon the people, I set down the taxation of the country at something like £25,000,000. Hon. gentlemen must not compare £25,000,000 taxation in India with £60,000,000 taxation in England. They must bear in mind that in India they could have 12 days' labour of a man for the same sum in silver or gold which they had

to pay for one day's labour of a man in England; that if, for example, these £25,000,000 were expended in purchasing labour, that sum would purchase 12 times as much in India as in England—that is to say, that the £25,000,000 would purchase as many days' labour in India as £300,000,000 would purchase in England. [An Hon. Member.—How much is the labour worth?] That is precisely what I am coming to. If the labour of a man is only worth 2*d.* a-day, they could not expect as much revenue from him as if it were 2*s.* a-day. That is just the point to which I wish the hon. gentleman would turn his attention. We have in England a population which, for the sake of argument, I will call 30,000,000. We have in India a population of 150,000,000. Therefore, the population of India is five times as great as the population of England. We raise £60,000,000 taxation in England. We raise in India, arguing by the value of labour, taxation equivalent to £300,000,000 which is five times the English revenue. Some one may probably say therefore, that the taxation in India and in England appears to be about the same, and no great injury is done. But it must be borne in mind that in England we have an incalculable power of steam, of machinery, of modes of transit, roads, canals, railways, and everything which capital and human invention can bring to help the industry of the people, while in India there is nothing of the kind. (Hear, hear.) In India there is scarcely a decent road, the rivers are not bridged, there are comparatively no steam engines, and none of those aids

to industry that meet us at every step in Great Britain and Ireland. Suppose steam engines, machinery, and modes of transit abolished in England, how much revenue would the Chancellor of the Exchequer obtain from the people of England? Instead of £60,000,000 a-year, would he get £10,000,000? I doubt it very much. If the House will follow out the argument, they will come to the conclusion that the taxes of the people of India are oppressive to the last degree, and that the Government which has thus taxed them, can be tolerated no longer, and must be put an end to at once and for ever. I wish to say something about the manner in which these great expenses are incurred. The extravagance of the East India Government is notorious to all. I believe there never was any other service under the sun paid at so high a rate as the exclusive civil service of the East India Company. Clergymen and missionaries can be got to go out to India for a moderate sum—private soldiers and officers of the army go out for a moderate remuneration—merchants are content to live in the cities of India for a percentage or profit not greatly exceeding the ordinary profits of commerce. But the civil service, because it is bound up with those who were raised by it, and who dispense the patronage of India, receive a rate of payment which would be incredible, if we did not know it to be true, and which, knowing it to be true, we must admit to be monstrous. The East Indian Government scatters salaries about at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Agra, Lahore, and half a dozen other cities, which are up to the mark of those

of the Prime Minister and Secretaries of State in this country. These salaries are framed upon the theory that India is a mine of inexhaustible wealth, although no one has found it to be so but the members of the civil service of the East India Company. (Hear, hear.) The policy of the Government is at the bottom of the constant deficit. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has twice recently declared that expenditure depends upon policy. That is as true in India as in England, and it is the policy that has been pursued there which renders the revenue liable to this constantly recurring deficit. I have come to the conclusion, which many hon. members probably share with me, that the edifice we have reared in India is too vast. There are few men now, and least of all those connected with the East India Company, who, looking back to the policy that has been pursued, will not be willing to admit that it has not been judicious but hazardous—that territories have been annexed that had better have been left independent, and that wars have been undertaken which were as needless as they were altogether unjustifiable. (Hear.) The immense empire that has been conquered, is too vast for management, its base is in decay, and during the last 12 months it has appeared to be tottering to its fall. Who or what is the instrument—the Cabinet, the Government, or the person—by whom this evil policy is carried on? The greatest officer in India is the Governor-General. He is the ruler of about one-fifth, certainly more than one-sixth, of the human race. The Emperors of France and Russia are but the governors of provinces compared with the power, the dignity, and the

high estate of the Governor-General of India. Now, over this officer almost no real control is exercised. If I were to appeal to the two hon. gentlemen who have frequently addressed the House during these debates (Colonel Sykes and Mr. Willoughby), they would probably admit that the Governor-General of India is an officer of such high position that scarcely any control can be exercised over him, either in India or in England. Take the case of the Marquis of Dalhousie for example. I am not about to make an attack upon him, for the occasion is too solemn for personal controversies. But the annexation of Sattara, of the Punjab, of Nagpore, and of Oude, occurred under his rule. (Hear.) I will not go into the case of Sattara, but one of its princes, and one of the most magnanimous princes that India ever produced, suffered and died most unjustly in exile, either through the mistakes or the crimes of the Government of India. This, however, was not done under the government of Lord Dalhousie. As to the annexation of Nagpore, the House has never heard anything about it to this hour. There has been no message from the Crown, or statement of the Government relative to that annexation. Hon. members have indeed heard from India that the dresses and wardrobes of the ladies of its Court have been exposed to sale, like a bankrupt's stock, in the haberdashers' shops of Calcutta—a thing likely to incense and horrify the people of India who witnessed it. Take, again, the case of the Burmese war. The Governor-General entered into it, and annexed the province of Pegue, and to this day there has been no treaty with the

King of Burmah. If that case had been brought before the House, it is impossible that the war with Burmah could have been entered upon. I do not believe that there is one man in England who, knowing the facts, would say that this war was just or necessary in any sense. (Hear, hear.) The Governor-General has an army of 300,000 men under his command; he is a long way from home; he is highly connected with the governing classes at home. There are certain reasons that make war palatable to large classes in India, and he is so powerful that he enters into these great military operations almost uncontrolled by the opinion of the Parliament and people of England. He may commit any amount of blunders, or crimes against the moral law, and he will still come home loaded with dignities and in the enjoyment of pensions. Does it not become the power and character of this House to examine narrowly the origin of the misfortunes and disgraces of the grave catastrophe which has just occurred? The place of the Governor-General is too high—his power is too great—and I believe that this particular office and officer are very much responsible—of course under the Government at home—for the misfortunes that have taken place. Only think of a Governor-General of India writing to an Indian prince, the ruler over many millions of men in the heart of India —"Remember, you are but as the dust under my feet." Passages like these are left out of despatches when laid on the table of the House of Commons. It would not do for the Parliament, or the Crown, or the people of England to know that their officer addressed language

like this to a native prince. (Hear, hear.) The fact is, that a Governor-General of India, unless he be such a man as is not found more than once in a century, is very liable to have his head turned, and to form ambitious views, which are mainly to be gratified by successful wars, and the annexation of province after province during the period of his rule. The services are always ready to help him in these plans. I am not sure that the President of the Board of Control could not give evidence on this subject, for I have heard something of what happened when the noble lord was in India. When the Burmese war broke out, the noble lord could no doubt tell the House that, without inquiring into the quarrel or its causes, the press of India, which was devoted to the services, and the services themselves, united in universal approbation of the course taken by the Governor-General. Justice to Pegue and Burmah, and the taxes to be raised for the support of the war, were forgotten, and nothing but visions of more territory and more patronage floated before the eyes of the official English in India. I contend that the power of the Governor-General is too great, and the office too high to be held by the subject of any Power whatseever, and especially by any subject of the Queen of England. I should propose, if I were in a position to offer a scheme in the shape of a Bill to the House, as an indispensable preliminary to the sound government of India in future, such as would be creditable to Parliament and advantageous to the people of India, that the office of Governor-General should be abolished. (Hear, hear.) Perhaps some gentlemen

may think this a very unreasonable proposition. Many people thought it unreasonable in 1853 when it was proposed to abolish the East India Company; but now Parliament and the country believe it to be highly reasonable and proper (hear, hear); and I am not sure that I could not bring before the House reasons to convince them that the abolition of the office of Governor-General is one of the most sensible and one of the most Conservative proposals ever brought forward in connexion with the government of India. (Hear, hear.) I believe the duties of the Governor-General are far greater than any human being can adequately fulfil. He has a power omnipotent to crush anything that is good. If he so wish, he can overbear and overrule whatever is proposed for the welfare of India; while, as to doing anything that is good, I could show that with regard to the vast countries over which he rules, he is really almost powerless to effect anything that those countries require. (Hear, hear.) The hon. gentleman behind me (Colonel Sykes) has told us there are 20 nations in India, and that there are 20 languages. Has it ever happened before that any one man governed 20 nations, speaking 20 different languages, and bound them up together in one great and compact empire. [An hon. member here made an observation.] My hon. friend mentions a great Parthian monarch. No doubt, there have been men strong in arm and in head, and of stern resolution, who have kept great empires together during their lives; but as soon as they went the way of all flesh, and descended, like the meanest of their subjects, to the tomb, the provinces they had

ruled were divided into several States, and their great empires vanished. (Hear, hear.) I might ask the noble lord below me (Lord J. Russell), and the noble lord the member for Tiverton (the noble lord the member for King's Lynn has not as yet experience on this point), whether, when they came to appoint a Governor-General of India, they did not find it one of the most serious and difficult duties they could be called on to perform? (Hear, hear.) I do not know at this moment, and I never have known, a man competent to govern India (hear, hear); and if any man says he is competent, he sets himself up at a much higher value than those who are acquainted with him are likely to do. (A laugh.) Let the House look at the making of the laws for 20 nations, speaking 20 languages. Look at the regulations of the police for 20 nations, speaking 20 languages. (Hear, hear.) Look at the question of public works as it affects 20 nations, speaking 20 languages, where there is no municipal power and no combinations of any kind, such as facilitate the construction of public works in this country. (Hear, hear.) Inevitably all those duties that devolve on every good Government must be neglected by the Governor-General of India, however wise, capable, and honest he may be in the performance of his duties, because the duties laid upon him are such as no man now living, or who ever lived, can or could properly sustain. (Hear, hear.) It may be asked, what I would substitute for the Governor-Generalship of India. Now, I do not propose to abolish the office of Governor-General of India this session. I am not proposing any clause in the

Bill, and if I were to propose one to carry out the idea I have expressed, I might be answered by the argument that a great part of the population of India was in a state of anarchy, and that it would be most inconvenient, if not dangerous, to abolish the office of Governor-General at such a time. (Hear, hear.) I do not mean to propose such a thing now, but I take this opportunity of stating my views, in the hope that when we come to 1863, we may perhaps be able to consider the question more in the light in which I am endeavouring to present it to the House. (Hear, hear.) I would propose that, instead of having a Governor-General and an Indian empire, we should have neither the one nor the other. (Hear, hear.) I would propose that we should have presidencies, and not an empire. (Hear, hear.) If I were a Minister—which the House will admit is a bold figure of speech (a laugh)—and if the House were to agree with me—which is also an essential point—I would propose to have at least five presidencies in India, and I would have the governments of those presidencies perfectly equal in rank and in salary. The capitals of those presidencies would probably be Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Agra, and Lahore. I will take the presidency of Madras as an illustration. Madras has a population of some 20,000,000. We all know its position on the map, and that it has the advantage of being more compact, geographically speaking, than the other presidencies. It has a Governor and a Council. I would give to it a Governor and a Council still, but would confine all their duties to the Presidency of Madras, and I would treat it

just as if Madras was the only portion of India connected with this country. I would have its finance, its taxation, its justice, and its police departments, as well as its public works and military departments, precisely the same as if it were a State having no connexion with any other part of India, and recognized only as a dependency of this country. (Hear.) I would propose that the government of every presidency should correspond with the Secretary for India in England, and that there should be telegraphic communication between all the presidencies in India, as I hope before long to see a telegraphic communication between the office of the noble lord (Lord Stanley) and every presidency over which he presides. (Hear, hear.) I shall no doubt be told that there are insuperable difficulties in the way of such an arrangement, and I shall be sure to hear of the military difficulty. Now, I do not profess to be an authority on military affairs, but I know that military men have often made great mistakes. I would have the army divided, each presidency having its own army, just as now, care being taken to have them kept distinct; and I see no danger of any confusion or misunderstanding, when an emergency arose, in having them all brought together to carry out the views of the Government. There is one question which it is important to bear in mind, and that is with regard to the Councils in India. I think every Governor of a presidency should have an assistant council, but differently constituted from what they now are. I would have an open council. The noble lord, the member for

London, used some expressions the other night which I interpreted to mean that it was necessary to maintain in all its exclusiveness the system of the civil service in India. In that I entirely differ from the noble lord. [Lord J. Russell here indicated dissent.] The noble lord corrects me in that statement, and therefore I must have been mistaken. What we want is to make the Governments of the Presidencies Governments for the people of the Presidencies; not Governments for the civil servants of the Crown, but for the non-official mercantile classes from England who settle there, and for the 20,000,000 or 30,000,000 of natives in each presidency. (Hear, hear.) I should propose to do that which has been done with great advantage in Ceylon. I have received a letter from an officer who has been in the service of the East India Company, and who told me a fact which has gratified me very much. He says:—

"At a public dinner at Colombo, in 1835, to the Governor, Sir Wilmot Horton, at which I was present, the best speech of the evening was made by a native nobleman of Candy, and a member of Council. It was remarkable for its appropriate expression, its sound sense, and the deliberation and ease that marked the utterance of his feelings. There was no repetition or useless phraseology or flattery, and it was admitted by all who heard him to be the soundest and neatest speech of the night."

This was at Ceylon. It is not, of course, always the best man who can make the best speech; but if what I have read could be said of a native of Ceylon, it could

be said of thousands in India. We need not go beyond the walls of this house, to find a head bronzed by an Indian sun, equal to the ablest heads of those who adorn its benches. (Hear, hear.) And in every part of India we all know that it would be an insult to the people of India to say that it is not the same. There are thousands of persons in India who are competent to take any position to which the Government may choose to advance them. (Hear, hear.) If the governor of each presidency were to have in his council some of the officials of his Government, some of the non-official Europeans resident in the presidency, and two or three at least of the intelligent natives of the presidency in whom the people would have some confidence, you would have begun that which will be of inestimable value hereafter—you would have begun to unite the government with the governed; and unless you do that, no government will be safe, and any hurricane may overturn it or throw it into confusion. (Hear.) Now, suppose the Governor-General gone, the Presidencies established, the Governors equal in rank and dignity, and their Councils constituted in the manner I have indicated, is it not reasonable to suppose that the delay which has hitherto heen one of the greatest curses of your Indian government would be almost altogether avoided? Instead of a Governor-General living in Calcutta or at Simla, never travelling over the whole of the country, and knowing very little about it, and that little only through other official eyes, is it not reasonable to suppose that the action of the Government would be more direct in all its duties, and

in every department of its service, than has been the case under the system which has existed until now? Your administration of the law, marked by so much disgrace, could never have lasted so long as it has done, if the governors of your presidencies had been independent governors. So with regard to matters of police, education, public works, and everything that can stimulate industry, and so with regard to your system of taxation. You would have in every presidency a constant rivalry for good. (Cheers.) The Governor of Madras, when his term of office expired, would be delighted to show that the people of that presidency were contented, that the whole presidency was advancing in civilization, that roads and all manner of useful public works were extending, that industry was becoming more and more a habit of the people, and that the exports and imports were constantly increasing. The Governors of Bombay and the rest of the presidencies would be animated by the same spirit, and so you would have all over India, as I have said, a rivalry for good; you would have placed a check on that malignant spirit of ambition which has worked so much evil (hear, hear)—you would have no governor so great that you could not control him, or who might make war when he pleased; war and annexation would be greatly checked, if not entirely prevented; and I do in my conscience believe you would have laid the foundation for a better and more permanent form of government for India than has ever obtained since it came under the rule of England. (Cheers.) But how

long does England propose to govern India? (Hear, hear.) Nobody answers that question, and nobody can answer it. Be it 50, or 100 years, or 500 years, does any man with the smallest glimmering of common sense believe that that great country, with its 20 different nations, and its 20 languages, can ever be bound up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire? I believe such a thing to be utterly impossible. We must fail in the attempt if ever we make it, and we are bound to look into the future with reference to that point. The presidency of Madras, for instance, having its own government, would, in 50 years, become one compact State, and every part of the presidency would look to the city of Madras as its capital, and to the Government of Madras as its ruling power. If that were to go on for a century or more, they would have their five or six Presidencies of India built up into so many compact States; and if at any future period the sovereignty of England should be withdrawn, we should leave so many presidencies built up and firmly compacted together, each able to support its own independence and its own government, and we should be able to say we had not left the country a prey to that anarchy and discord which I believe to be inevitable if we insist on holding those vast territories with the idea of building them up into one great empire. But I am obliged to admit that mere machinery is not sufficient in this case, either with respect to my own scheme, or to that of the noble lord (Lord Stanley). We want something else than mere clerks, stationery, despatches, and so forth. We want, what I

shall designate as a new feeling in England, and an entirely new policy in India. (Cheers.) We must in future have India governed, not for a handful of Englishmen (cheers), not for that civil service whose praises are so constantly soundedin this House. You may govern India, if you like, for the good of England, but the good of England must come through the channel of the good of India. (Hear, hear.) There are but two modes of gaining anything by our connexion with India. The one is by plundering the people of India, and the other by trading with them. I prefer to do it by trading with them; but in order that England may become rich by trading with India, India itself must become rich (hear, hear), and India can only become rich through the honest administration of justice, and through entire security for life and property. Now, as to this new policy, I will tell the House what I think the Prime Minister should do. He ought, I think, always to choose for his President of the Board of Control, or his Secretary of State for India, a man who cannot be excelled by any other man in his Cabinet, or in his party, for capacity, for honesty, for attention to his duties, and for knowledge adapted to the particular office to which he is appointed. If any Prime Minister appoint an inefficient man to such an office he will be a traitor to the Throne of England. (Cheers.) That officer, appointed for the qualities I have just indicated, should, with equal scrupulousness and conscientiousness make the appointments, whether of the Governor-General, or, should that office be abolished, of the Governors of the Presidencies of India. Those

appointments should not be rewards for old men simply because such men have done good service when in their prime, nor should they be rewards for mere party service (hear, hear), but they should be appointments given under a feeling that interests of the very highest moment, connected with this country, depend on those great offices in India being properly filled up. The same principles should run throughout the whole system of government, for unless there be a very high degree of virtue in all these appointments, and unless our great object be to govern India well, and to exalt the name of England in the eyes of the whole native population, all that we have recourse to in the way of machinery will be of very little use indeed. I admit that this is a great work; I admit also that the further I go into the consideration of this question the more I feel that it is too large for me to grapple with, and that every step we take in it should be taken as if we were men walking in the dark. We have, however, certain great principles to guide us, and by their light we may make steps in advance, if not fast, at any rate, sure. But we start from an unfortunate position. We start from a platform of conquest by force of arms extending over a hundred years. There is nothing in the world worse than the sort of foundation from which we start. The greatest genius who has shed lustre on the literature of this country has said, "There is no sure foundation set on blood;" and it may be our unhappy fate, in regard to India, to demonstrate the truth of that saying. We are always subjugators, and we must be viewed with hatred and suspicion. I say we must

look at the thing as it is if we are to see our exact position, what our duty is, and what chance there is of our retaining India and of governing it for the advantage of its people. Our difficulties have been enormously increased by the revolt. The people of India have only seen England in its worst form in that country. They have seen it in its military power, its exclusive civil service, and in the supremacy of a handful of foreigners. When natives of India come to this country they are delighted with England and Englishmen. They find themselves treated with a kindness, a consideration, a respect, to which they are wholly strangers in their own country, and they cannot understand how it is that men who are so just, so attentive to them here, sometimes, indeed too often, appear to them in a different character in India. (Hear, hear.) I remember that the Hon. F. Shaw, who wrote some 30 years since, stated, in his able and instructive book, that even in his time the conduct of the English in India towards the natives was less agreeable, less kindly, less just than it had been in former years; and in 1853, before the committee, presided over by the hon. member for Huntingdon, evidence was given that the feeling between the rulers and the ruled in India was becoming every year less like what could be desired. It was only the other day there appeared in a letter of *The Times* correspondent an anecdote which illustrates what I am saying, and which I feel it necessary to read to the House. Mr. Russell, of *The Times*, says,—

"I went off to breakfast in a small mosque, which

has been turned into a *salle à manger* by some officers stationed here, and I confess I should have eaten with more satisfaction had I not seen as I entered the enclosure of the mosque a native badly wounded, on a charpoy, by which was sitting a woman in deep affliction. The explanation given of this scene was, that '—— [the name of the Englishman was left blank (hear),] had been licking two of his bearers (or servants), and had nearly murdered them.' This was one of the servants, and, without knowing or caring to know the causes of such chastisement, I cannot but express my disgust at the severity—to call it by no harsher name—of some of our fellow-countrymen towards their domestics." The reading of that paragraph gave me extreme pain. People may fancy that this does not matter much, but I say it matters very much. (Hear, hear.) Under any system of government you will have Englishmen scattered all over India, and conduct like that I have just read, in any district, must create ill-feeling towards England, to your rule, to your supremacy; and when that feeling has become sufficiently extensive any little accident may give fire to the train, and you may have calamities more or less serious, such as we have had during the last twelve months. (Hear, hear.) You must change all this if you mean to keep India. (Hear, hear.) I do not now make any comment upon the mode in which this country has been put into possession of India. I accept that possession as a fact. There we are; we do not know how to leave it, and therefore let us see if we know how to govern it. (Hear, hear.) It is a problem such as,

perhaps, no other nation has had to solve. Let us see whether there is enough of intelligence and virtue in England to solve the difficulty. In the first place, then, I say, let us abandon all that system of calumny against the natives of India which has lately prevailed. (Hear, hear.) Had that people not been docile, the most governable race in the world, how could you have maintained your power for 100 years? (Hear, hear.) Are they not industrious, are they not intelligent, are they not—upon the evidence of the most distinguished men the Indian service ever produced—endowed with many qualities which make them respected by all Englishmen who mix with them? I have heard that from many men of the widest experience, and have read the same in the works of some of the best writers upon India. Then, let us not have these constant calumnies against such a people. Even now, there are men who go about the country speaking as if such things had never been contradicted, and talking of mutilations and atrocities committed in India. (Hear, hear.) The less we say about atrocities the better. (Hear, hear.) Great political tumults are, I fear, never brought about or carried on without grievous acts on both sides deeply to be regretted. At least, we are in the position of invaders and conquerors—they are in the position of the invaded and the conquered. Whether I were a native of India, or of England, or of any other country, I would not the less assert the great distinction between their position and ours in that country; and I would not permit any man in my presence, without rebuke, to indulge in the calumnies and expressions of

contempt which I have recently heard poured forth without measure upon the whole population of India. (Hear, hear.) There is one other point to which I wish to address myself before I sit down, and in touching upon it I address myself especially to the noble lord and his colleagues in the Government. If I had the responsibility of administering the affairs of India there are certain things I would do. I would immediately after this Bill passes issue a proclamation in India which should reach every subject of the British Crown in that country, and be heard of in the territories of every Indian Prince or Rajah. I would offer a general amnesty. (Hear, hear.) It is all very well to talk of issuing an amnesty to all who have done nothing; but who is there that has done nothing in such a state of affairs as has prevailed during the past twelve months? If you pursue your vengeance until you have rooted out and destroyed every one of those soldiers who have revolted, when will your labour cease? (Hear, hear.) If you are to punish every non-military native of India who has given a piece of bread or a cup of water to a revolted trooper, how many natives will escape your punishment and your vengeance? I would have a general amnesty, which should be put forth as the first great act done directly by the Queen of England in the exercise of sovereign power over the territories of India. In this proclamation I would promise to the natives of India a security for their property as complete as we have here at home, and I would put an end to all those mischievous and irritating inquiries which have been going on for years in many parts of India as to the title to landed

estates (hear, hear), by which you tell the people of that country that unless each man can show an unimpeachable title to his property for 90 years you will dispossess him. What would be the state of things here if such a regulation were adopted? (Hear, hear.) I would also proclaim to the people of India that we would hold sacred that right of adoption which has prevailed for centuries in that country. (Hear, hear.) It was only the other day that I had laid before me the case of a native prince who has been most faithful to England during these latter trials. When he came to the throne at ten years of age he was made to sign a document, by which he agreed that, if he had no children, his territories should be at the disposal of the British Government, or what is called the paramount power. He has been married; he has had one son and two or three daughters, but within the last few weeks his only son has died. There is grief in the palace, and there is consternation among the people, for the fact of this agreement, entered into by the boy of ten years old, is well-known to all the inhabitants of the country. Representations have already been made to this country in the hope that the Government will cancel that agreement, and allow the people of that State to know that the right of adoption would not be taken from their prince in case he should have no other son. Let the Government do that, and there is not a corner of India into which that intelligence would not penetrate with the rapidity of lightning. (Hear, hear.) And would not that calm the anxieties of many of those independent princes and rajahs who are only afraid that when these troubles

are over the English Government will re-commence that system of annexation out of which I believe all these troubles have arisen? (Hear, hear.) I would tell them also in that proclamation that, while the people of England hold that their own, the Christian, religion is true and the best for mankind, yet that it is consistent with that religion that they who profess it should hold inviolable the rights of conscience and the rights of religion in others. (Hear, hear.) I would show that, whatever violent, over zealous, and fanatical men may have said in this country, the Parliament of England, the Ministers of the Queen, and the Queen herself are resolved that upon this point no kind of wrong shall be done to the millions who profess the religions held to be true in India. (Hear, hear.) I would do another thing. I would establish a Court of Appeal, the judges of which should be judges of the highest character in India, for the settlement of those many disputes which have arisen between the Government of India and its subjects, some native and some European. I would not suffer these questions to come upon the floor of this House. I would not forbid them by statute, but I would establish a court which should render it unnecessary for any man in India to cross the ocean to seek for that justice which he would then be able to get in his own country without corruption or secret bargain. (Hear.) Then I would carry out the proposition which the noble lord has made to-night, and which the right hon. gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) made when he introduced his Bill, that a commission should be issued to enquire

into the question of finance. I would have other commissions, one for each presidency, and I would tell the people of India that there should be a searching inquiry into their grievances, and that it was the interest and the will of the Queen of England that those grievances should be redressed. Now, perhaps I may be told that I am proposing strange things, quite out of the ordinary routine of Government. I admit it. We are in a position that necessitates something out of the ordinary routine. (Hear, hear.) There are positions and times in the history of every country, as in the lives of individuals, when courage and action are absolute salvation; and now, the Crown of England, acting by the advice of the responsible Ministers, must, in my opinion, have recourse to a great and unusual measure, in order to allay the anxieties which prevail throughout the whole of India. The people of India do not like us, but they scarcely know where to turn if we left them. They are sheep literally without a shepherd. They are people whom you have subdued, and who have the highest and strongest claims upon you—claims which you cannot forget—claims which, if you do not act upon, you may rely upon it that,—if there be a judgment for nations, as I believe there is, as for individuals,—our children at no distant generation must pay the penalty which we have purchased by neglecting our duty to the populations of India. (Hear, hear.) I have now stated my views and opinions on this question, not at all in a manner, I feel, equal to the question itself. I have felt the difficulty in thinking of it, I feel the difficulty in speaking of it (hear, hear), for

there is far more in it and about it than any man, however much he may be accustomed to think upon political questions, and to discuss them, can comprise at all within the compass of a speech of ordinary length. I have described the measures which I would at once adopt for the purpose of soothing the agitation which now disturbs and menaces every part of India, and of inviting the submission of those who are now in arms against you. Now I believe—I speak in the most perfect honesty—I believe that the announcement of these measures would avail more in restoring tranquillity than the presence of an additional army (cheers), and I believe that their full and honest adoption would enable you to retain your power in India. I have sketched the form of government which I would establish in India and at home, with the view of securing perfect responsibility and an enlightened administration. I admit that these things can only be obtained in degree, but I believe that a government such as that which I have sketched would be free from most of the errors and the vices that have marked and marred your past career in India. I have given much study to this great and solemn question. I entreat the House to study it, not only now, during the passing of this Bill, but after the session is over, and till we meet again next year, when in all probability there must be further legislation upon this great subject (hear); for I believe that upon this question depends very much, for good or for evil, the future of this country of which we are citizens, and which we all regard and love so much. You have had enough of

military reputation on Eastern fields; you have gathered large harvests of that commodity, be it valuable or be it worthless. I invite you to something better, and higher, and holier than that; I invite you to a glory not "fanned by conquest's crimson wing," but based upon the solid and lasting benefits which I believe the Parliament of England can, if it will, confer upon the countless populations of India. (Loud cheers.)

THE END.

HOW WARS ARISE IN INDIA.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

MR. COBDEN'S PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED,

"THE ORIGIN OF THE BURMESE WAR."

BY

JOHN CLARK MARSHMAN.

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HOW WARS ARISE IN INDIA.

Mr. COBDEN has recently published a pamphlet entitled "How Wars are got up in India," in which he asserts that "deeds of violence and injustice have marked every step of our progress in India," and that the British authorities in the East have been always actuated by an "insatiable love of territorial aggrandisement." These heavy charges he endeavours to substantiate by a reference to our proceedings in Burmah. In the narrative which he has compiled of the "Origin of the Burmese War," he exonerates the Burmese Court and its officers from all blame, and denounces the conduct of the British Government in every stage of these proceedings as unjust, unscrupulous, and utterly indefensible; and he characterizes Lord Dalhousie's minute, written to explain and justify these transactions, as "an unstatesmanlike, immoral, and illogical production." He adds, these are "strong words, but their truth can, unfortunately, be proved by evidence as strong." The expressions are undoubtedly "strong," but any one who will give the Burmese Blue Book a calm and unbiassed perusal, will perceive that there has seldom been an instance in which strength of language has been so completely in an inverse ratio to the strength of testimony.

Those who have watched the origin and progress of these proceedings will be unable to resist a feeling of surprisè, almost bordering on indignation, to find a man of Lord Dalhousie's high principle and unimpeached character, held up to the execration of the civilized world as having got up a war with a weaker power from an insatiable love of territorial aggrandisement, and defended it by an "immoral" publication. When it is borne in mind that the Blue Book affords irrefragable evidence of his extreme reluctance, from first to last, to engage in any war at all, and of his repeated declaration that "annexation would be a calamity second only to war itself," Mr. Cobden's assertion will admit of but one explanation, that all his Lordship's pacific professions were the result of hypocrisy, and that the spirit of forbearance which he manifested throughout these transactions was only assumed to conceal his ambition. From any imputation so utterly at variance with his established character, an appeal may be made with perfect confidence to those who have watched his career during the last twelve years, in the discharge of duties of the highest importance and responsibility.

Mr. Cobden states in his Preface, that he had not been able to meet with any one, in or out of Parliament, who had read the papers relative to hostilities with Burmah; and the narrative which he has drawn up is intended, therefore, as a popular history of the origin of the war, which will doubtless be received with credulity proportioned to the ignorance which prevails on the subject. Without,

in the smallest degree, questioning Mr. Cobden's innate love of truth, there can be no hesitation in stating that whatever impression his pamphlet may create, injurious to the character of the British functionaries in the East, will be attributable to the undue prominence he gives to immaterial circumstances, the omission or depression of some of the most important points in the series of events, and the general colouring diffused over the whole transaction, in accordance with his own peculiar views. It is thus that the public mind, always more ready to believe evil than good of men in eminent station, becomes warped by prejudices, which, in the case more particularly of India, are too often found to survive the generation in which they were propagated. It becomes, therefore, a matter of some importance to the cause of truth to supply an immediate antidote to the fallacious representations and reasonings contained in Mr. Cobden's publication, and to make an honest attempt to remove the odium they are calculated to create.

To go over the indictment, item by item, and to show how each circumstance has been misapprehended—I do not say misrepresented—would be no difficult task; but perhaps it will be less fatiguing and more satisfactory to the reader to be presented at once with a more faithful and accurate version of these transactions, drawn from the same source from which Mr. Cobden's narrative is derived. Such a recapitulation of these events will explain the cause of that unexampled and extraordinary unanimity which was exhibited by the Indian journals

on the Burmese question, and show the grounds on which editors, always opposed to the Government, united with its friends in commending the course which had been pursued on this occasion. After having endeavoured to vindicate the proceedings of Lord Dalhousie from the censures which have been cast on them, I propose briefly to examine how far Mr. Cobden's assertions, relative to the general progress of the British empire in India, are in accordance with historical fact.

It was at the time when Lord Dalhousie was congratulating himself on the permanence of peace, after a century of warfare, and actively engaged in providing for the extension of railways, the establishment of electric telegraphs, and a uniform rate of three-farthing postage throughout India, that an appeal was unexpectedly made to him against the extortions inflicted by the Burmese authorities on British subjects at Rangoon. Twenty-six years had elapsed since the termination of the first Burmese war, and the remembrance of the ten millions of expenditure which it entailed on the Indian treasury, had led Government, during the whole of this period, to regard a second collision with that slippery and arrogant Cabinet as an event to be above all things avoided. Subsequent to the treaty of Yandaboo, signed in 1826, the conduct of Burmese officials towards the subjects and representatives of the British Government, had been marked by that insolence by which the Burmese Court is so preëminently distinguished. The two Residents who had been deputed to Ava, in conformity

with the provisions of the treaty, had been treated with such contumely as to constrain the Government of India to withdraw the embassy altogether; and the British interests which had been established in Burmah under the guarantee of that engagement, were left without any protection. Complaints had been made from time to time of the oppression to which our merchants were subject in that country, but the Governor-General was anxious to avoid any interference which might possibly terminate in hostilities. This indifference on the part of our Government to the wrongs of its subjects naturally served to embolden the Burmese authorities, and these outrages were increased in number and aggravation. At length, the commanders of two British merchantmen, who had been subjected to the greatest oppression by the Governor of Rangoon, made an official representation of their grievances, and claimed the protection of their own Government, and it appeared impossible to refuse the demand of redress consistently with the duty which it owed to its subjects. There is no civilized Government in Europe or America which could, or would, have remained quiescent under such treatment of those whom it was bound to protect. The injury inflicted on the commanders was, after a careful examination, estimated at a sum within £1,000, and it was resolved by the Government of India to demand the payment of this amount from the Burmese authorities. Lord Dalhousie, considering the contempt with which our ambassadors had previously been treated, was unwilling to have

recourse to another political mission. He availed himself, therefore, of the presence of H.M's ships *Fox* and *Serpent*, in the Hooghly, under the command of Commodore Lambert, and deputed him to Rangoon to make the demand of reparation for the injuries inflicted on the two merchants. He was also furnished with a communication to the King of Ava, which was to be transmitted to him, in case the demand on the Governor of Rangoon was not complied with.

On the arrival of the Commodore off Rangoon, the Governor immediately interdicted all intercourse with him, and threatened to cut off the heads and to break the legs of all the foreigners, British or others, who should venture to go down to the wharf to welcome the frigate. He likewise issued orders for the ships of war to be unmoored, and take their station in the midst of the mercantile shipping; and fined the commander of a Madras vessel, a British subject, for having lowered his flag to the Commodore. Notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, an arrangement was made for an interview between him and the Governor on shore, but before it had taken place the merchants of Rangoon contrived to open a communication with the British representative, and to place in his hands a list of thirty-eight grievances, which they had suffered from the Governor of Rangoon. On the receipt of this document, the Commodore conceived it to be his duty to decline any intercourse with one whose conduct towards British subjects had been so flagitious, and to deal at once with his

master, the King. He was also led to suppose that the Governor-General, when informed of the numerous outrages which had been inflicted, might not be disposed to limit his demand of reparation to the two cases which were originally submitted to him. The Commodore, therefore, transmitted to the Governor of Rangoon, to be despatched to Ava, the letter with which he had been furnished by the Governor-General, together with a communication from himself, stating that "on his arrival at the town of Rangoon he found such an addition of cruelties to the wrongs already named, that he had no alternative but to appeal direct to the Court of Ava." Mr. Cobden considers the list of grievances presented by the merchants absurd, and he quotes the first four on the list to exhibit their absurdity. In one case a man had been unjustly fined Rs. 1,000; in another, Rs. 1,500; in a third, Rs. 5,500; and in a fourth case, flogged to death. It may appear very absurd to Mr. Cobden that men should be found so foolish as to complain of any such acts, but the Governor-General did not consider these grievances so contemptible, for he informed the Commodore that having regard to the additional long list of unwarrantable and oppressive acts committed by the Governor, and the bearing of that functionary, he had exercised a sound discretion in cutting short all discussion with the local Governor, and at once transmitting the letter of the Government of India to the King of Ava. Mr. Cobden lays great stress on what he considers the Commodore's disobedience of orders, which, after all, was only the

exercise of that discretion which an officer intrusted with duties of this nature, is always at liberty to use. But this alleged disobedience had not the slightest influence on subsequent events, nor did it in any measure occasion or accelerate hostilities, and the censure passed on it is deserving of notice, only as it affords evidence of an anxiety to turn the most trivial circumstances to the prejudice of those who were connected with the Burmese war.

The reply of the Court of Ava arrived in Rangoon on the 1st of January. It stated that the Governor of Rangoon had been recalled, and that another functionary would be sent forthwith from Ava to administer the affairs of Rangoon; and that with regard to the merchants who had been unjustifiably insulted and ill-treated, proper and strict inquiries should be made, and it should be decided according to custom. This communication was of so pacific a complexion, that the Commodore began to entertain the most sanguine hopes of the success of his mission, and stated in his letter to Government, that "*he was of opinion that the king was sincere, and that his government would fully act up to what he had promised.*" So strong was this impression on his mind,—Mr. Cobden charges him with having "got up the war,"—that in writing to Mr. Halliday, the Secretary to the Government of India, on this occasion, he said that "he was in great hopes that all would be acceded to, and that amicable arrangements would be made with the Burmese Government." The same con-

fidence of success was also expressed a third time in the letter which he addressed to the new Governor of Rangoon, in which he said that he trusted "his mission might be the means of insuring a permanent and cordial feeling of friendship between the Governments of Great Britain and Ava." Mr. Cobden has printed in large capitals the words placed, as above, in italics, and he begs the especial attention of the reader to this sentence, affirming that "the whole case as between the Governments of Burmah and India may henceforth be said to turn upon this passage." Mr. Cobden is not far from the truth in this assertion, as the question of peace and war did turn upon the sincerity of the king's pacific assurances. If the king was sincere in his desire for peace, and adopted the most obvious and effectual means of avoiding a collision, the odium of the war must rest upon us. But if it was discovered that these expressions were employed only to conceal his intentions, according to the usual tortuosity of Burmese policy, and that our reasonable demands were evaded, the war on our part was perfectly justifiable. In the former war, we had numerous opportunities of appreciating the perfection which the Burmese had attained in the arts of duplicity. To mention only one instance, the Burmese plenipotentiaries at Meeaday asked for a certain number of days for the transmission of our pacific proposal to the Cabinet at Ava, and for the reception of a reply, and then put off the General from day to day, because it had not yet arrived; yet it was

found, on the capture of the stockade, that the communication had never been sent at all. The real intentions of the Court were to be read not in any official communications, but in the conduct of its plenipotentiary. The Commodore was perfectly right in stating his belief on the 1st of January, that the king appeared to be sincere, and that there was every hope of a pacific adjustment; and he is not to be censured, when the hostile appearance of circumstances constrained him, six days after, to renounce this belief, and to act with decision.

The new Governor, the representative of the Court of Ava, deputed to Rangoon to bring the differences which existed to an amicable termination, reached the town on the 3rd of January,—the Commodore has inadvertently given the 4th as the day of his arrival. He came down accompanied by 3,000 soldiers, and a large flotilla of war-junks,—little in keeping with the pacific professions of his master. The first evidence which he gave of his peaceful disposition was to proclaim by beat of drum, and to serve a written notice on the British subjects in Rangoon, that they were not, on pain of death, to hold any intercourse with the Commodore. He remained forty-eight hours in Rangoon without taking the least notice of the British representative whom he had been sent down to conciliate and satisfy; whereas the ex-Governor of Rangoon, the truculent oppressor of British subjects, was repeatedly closeted with him, and so far from being subject to any punishment or degradation, was permitted to take his departure, with a large retinue, and all

the plunder he had amassed. On the 5th of January the Commodore sent Mr. Edwards, his interpreter, to inquire when it would be convenient for him to receive an officer with a letter on the subject of the British claims, informing him at the same time that when the matters in dispute had been adjusted, he, the Commodore, would pay his respects to him in person. The Viceroy replied that he was ready at any time to receive communications from him, and the following day was fixed for this purpose. At the same time, the non-intercourse order which the Viceroy had issued on his arrival was rescinded. On the 6th, Commander Fishbourne was sent on shore with the communication, accompanied by Captain Latter and several other officers. Before he left the vessel, Captain Latter took the precaution to send Mr. Edwards in advance to the Governor to announce their approach. A native at the gate endeavoured to prevent his entrance, and when the circumstance was stated by Mr. Edwards, the man was subjected, by order of the Viceroy, to the severest punishment. The Viceroy then informed Mr. Edwards that he wished to receive the communication through his hands, to which he replied that such a communication could not be made through a person of his subordinate rank, and that the officers intrusted with it were already on their way to his residence. When the deputation reached the outer gate, two under-officials endeavoured to stop them, but they rode into the courtyard. Instead, however, of being allowed to dismount and proceed to the antechamber, they

were kept out in the sun amidst the jeers of a rabble of menials. While they were at the foot of the stairs, the Burmese interpreter and another made their appearance, one of whom said that the Governor was asleep. Captain Latter said that if he were asleep he must be waked and informed that the Commander of one of the ships of war, bearing a letter from the Commodore, was waiting to see him. Both these men then entered the house, and soon after made their appearance again, the one repeating that the Governor was asleep and could not be waked, while the other, the interpreter, called Mr. Edwards aside and asked him to go up and speak with the Governor. This he was not permitted by Captain Latter to do. The men then entered the Governor's palace a second time, and returned again to the deputation; the one again asserted that the Governor was asleep, while the other renewed his request that Mr. Edwards would go up. When this was refused, they proposed that the letter should be sent through them, which, as a matter of course, was declined. At this juncture, a man of somewhat higher though still inferior rank passed by the deputation and entered the house. Captain Latter stopped him and remonstrated with him on the folly of this insolent proceeding, and assured him that Commander Fishbourne was next in rank to the Commodore, and that the indignity to which he was now subjected would unquestionably be resented by his own Government. But no notice was taken of the deputation, no officer of rank was deputed to meet them, nor was any communication

made to the Commander. After waiting a quarter of an hour in the sun, he rode back leisurely and reported the treatment he had experienced to his superior. It is scarcely necessary to state that the Governor was not asleep, and the only light in which it is possible to view his conduct on this occasion, is that it was a gross, intentional, and wanton insult inflicted on the officers of our Government. He had himself appointed this day to receive the communications of the Commodore, and he was fully aware that the officers to whom they were intrusted were on their way to his residence. If, in these circumstances, he turned in to sleep, it was an outrage on all decency; if he was awake, and not ignorant of the fact that the officers of the British Government sent to wait on him had arrived, and still refused to see them, or to hold any communication with them, either in person or through the officers of his Court, it was an act of insolence, intended to show his contempt for the Government whom the officers served.

The Commodore, on being made acquainted with these events, perused again with much care the instructions he had received from the Government of India for his guidance. They stated, that "while it was the imperative duty of this Government to maintain the rights of its people, secured by solemn treaties to them, it was a duty not less imperative that Government should endeavour to obtain redress by the least violent means . . . and that, if the aspect of affairs, on the receipt of the king's reply, should be menacing, British subjects should be brought

away at once, and a blockade of the two rivers of Rangoon and Martaban established." In the judgment of the Commodore, the crisis contemplated by his own Government had arrived. The king's reply had been received. His own accredited representative, deputed to carry out his views, had arrived in Rangoon, and had treated the British officers sent to him with insufferable arrogance, and refused to receive the communication of our demands conveyed by them. The Government of India had informed the Commodore, that while it was most anxious to avoid the "terrible extremity of war, it could not tamely submit to the injury and insult it had received in the persons of its subjects," and he naturally judged that it would be still less disposed to submit tamely to the additional and aggravated insult it had now received in the persons of its own officers. He therefore issued an order for British subjects to retire from Rangoon on board the ships, and declared the ports in a state of blockade, and, in the evening, sent a boat's crew to take possession of an unfinished vessel belonging to the king, intending to hold it in pledge for the property of British subjects which had been confiscated.

The seizure of this vessel convinced the Burmese authorities that the British representative was no longer to be trifled with. The king had, for some time back, been desirous of embarking in foreign trade. The vessel containing his first adventure was stranded on Saugor Sands, and the capture of his second merchantman was likely to be visited with great severity on his servants at Rangoon. Captain

Latter therefore justly remarks that they began to tremble for their heads, and this will account for the extraordinary anxiety they manifested for the restoration of the vessel. Hitherto, all the deputations from the Burmese Government had been studiously composed of men of little or no rank, though with them forms of etiquette are substantial realities, and the omission of them is always considered an insult; but the day after the sequestration of the king's vessel, the Governor of Dalla was sent by the Governor of Rangoon to the frigate, "to see what he could do in the business." The Commodore informed him, that, in consideration of his exemplary conduct while the expedition had been lying in the river, and the great respect which was entertained for him, he, the Commodore, would deviate from his original intention, and again open communications with the Governor, on condition of his coming on board the frigate, and offering an apology for the insults which had been inflicted on the officers of the British Government. Several hours after the Governor of Dalla had left the vessel with this message, the Deputy-Governor of Rangoon came on board with a letter from his superior, stating that he was really asleep when the deputation waited on him,—a falsehood costs a Burmese official no effort,—and that he wished the Commodore to wait on him; but there was not the slightest expression of any regret for the insolence with which Commander Fishbourne had been treated. The Commodore replied that he should not deviate from the terms he had communicated through the

Governor of Dalla, and would give the Governor of Rangoon till noon of the next day to make up his mind. As the Deputy-Governor was leaving the frigate, he complained of the seizure of the king's ship, on which the Commodore said he had taken possession of it with the express intention of showing the Court of Ava, that if the arrogant proceedings of its officers were not "promptly disowned," they would inevitably be visited on those whom they represented; and he distinctly informed the Deputy-Governor, that when his demands had been complied with he would give back the ship, and salute the flag of Burmah with a royal salute. But the Governor of Rangoon, instead of making an apology, made an appeal to the Government of India. On the evening of the 8th, two inferior officers came on board, with a letter from the Governor of Rangoon to the Governor-General, stating that while he was intending to send for the Commodore, the interpreter Edwards came to acquaint him that the Commodore himself wished to have an interview with him; but being anxious to avoid any breach of the rules of etiquette, he decreed that the interpreter might come with the letter or communication; but after some time four inferior officers came in a state of intoxication, and, contrary to custom, entered the compound on horseback, and, while he was asleep, and the Deputy-Governor was waking him, used violent and abusive language; that they then went away, and conveyed an irritating message to the Commodore, who, being desirous of implicating the two countries in a war, secretly, at night, took

away the king's ship. He also stated that although the frigate had taken the ground near Dalla, yet, in consequence of the existence of a treaty of peace between the two countries, he did not re-seize the king's vessel, or molest or destroy the British officers, but "acted worthily to these unworthy men." The last message from the Governor of Rangoon appears to have been delivered on the evening of the 9th, and was simply to the effect, that if the Commodore attempted to take the vessel out of the river he would be fired upon; to which he replied, that as the Governor had appealed the dispute to the Government of India, it would be advisable "to allow matters to remain as they were," until further instructions were received from their respective Governments; but the messenger was distinctly told, that if a shot was fired by the Burmese at either of her Britannic Majesty's ships, it would be returned. The next morning, the Commodore dropped down towards the mouth of the river, to establish the blockade, with the king's ship in tow. The Burmese batteries and war-junks opened fire on the British vessels, which was returned with their accustomed promptitude and success.

Mr. Cobden asserts that the conduct of the Governor of Rangoon is now a subject of minor importance. But, throughout these transactions, which at length terminated in war, it was a matter of the highest consequence; it was the point on which the question of peace and war turned. He had come down from Ava with full powers to make

a complete and final adjustment of all matters in dispute; and it was from his conduct on this occasion, and not from any mere professions of peace by the Court, in which no confidence could be placed, that the intentions of the sovereign he represented could be determined. In his conduct there was nothing pacific, nothing even civil; it was characterized throughout by a spirit of arrogance; and if he had determined to render war inevitable, he could not have adopted surer means to that end. He brought down with him a large armament and all the munitions of war; he remained in Rangoon for more than two days without holding any communication with those whom he was sent to conciliate, but issued an order, by beat of drum, forbidding British subjects, on pain of death, to hold any intercourse with the representative of their own sovereign. When a deputation of officers was sent to him with an official communication, they were treated with the most wanton insult, and the communication was not received. When he was called on to apologize for this insult, he aggravated it by affirming that the officers were drunk. It must not be forgotten that in treating with an Asiatic Court we have a different class of feelings and habits to deal with from that which predominates in European Cabinets, and that our measures must be regulated by our own experience of its character. In Asia, there is none of that feeling of reason and moderation which gives so much confidence in European negotiations. An eastern potentate is always in the extreme of presumption or submission, according

to his own estimate of his power; and the issue of war or peace may always be predicated from the manifest preponderance of the one feeling or the other. The behaviour of the Governor, who represented the person of his master and the views of his Court, exhibited all that Oriental insolence, which afforded the most unequivocal token of his determination rather to go to war than to make any concession. Neither was there anything in our previous intercourse with Burmese officials to afford the hope that any modification of our demand, after a premeditated insult had been offered to our officers, and all apology had been refused, would have produced any beneficial result. In the East, it has been too often found that any overstrained attempt to avoid a war has only served to render it more inevitable. In the present instance, under the circumstances of the case, any relaxation of our firmness would have been mistaken for pusillanimity, and only rendered peace the more difficult.

Mr. Cobden endeavours to justify the conduct of the Governor of Rangoon by a reference to the breach of etiquette with which our officers are charged, upon which he descants with great amplitude; though when Lord Dalhousie alludes to the same subject, he is said to "dwell with a minuteness quite feminine upon details respecting points of ceremonial." In the first place, it appears to Mr. Cobden that the Commodore ought not to have sent inferior officers with his communication; but he appears to overlook the important fact that the Commodore had informed the Governor the previous

day that he intended to send *an officer* with a statement of our claims; and that the Governor had tacitly acquiesced in the arrangement, and fixed the day for the receipt of the communications. Independently of this consideration, it was for the Commodore, who demanded reparation for the violation of a treaty, to select his own mode of communication, and not for the offending party to dictate his wishes. It would appear, however, that the Commodore did, in this case, act in exact conformity with the established usages of the country, when he deputed officers subordinate to himself to communicate with the Governor. It is stated in the Blue Book, that when a letter from the King of Ava was sent to Colonel Bogle through the Governor of Martaban, that functionary selected two officers of rank inferior only to his own ("two tseetkays with gold umbrellas") to convey it, and they were received with all honour. Of this circumstance Lord Dalhousie was not aware, when in his minute of the 12th of February he says, "admitting that there was in the deputation of these officers a neglect of strict form." In the next place, the officers were to blame for riding on horseback into the courtyard of the vice-regal residence; they should, in Mr. Cobden's opinion, have followed the rule established for Burmese officials, and humbly dismounted at the gate, and walked up on foot to the house. But the etiquette established for the subordinate functionaries of a Burmese office, were not assuredly applicable to the representatives of a foreign state, demanding redress of

grievances. They acted in exact conformity with their diplomatic character in riding up to the steps, and they would have been irretrievably degraded in the eye of every Burmese if they had submitted to the humiliating ceremony of crossing the courtyard on foot. But admitting, though only for the sake of argument, that there might have been a more strict attention to the punctilios of Burmese etiquette, this will afford no justification of the disrespect and insolence to which they were subject, and which would have been regarded as ignominious by the meanest subordinate of the Court. Mr. Cobden asserts that "the embarrassment of the Governor arose from his being called on to give audience to visitors who were not his equals in rank, and who yet could not be treated as inferiors or messengers." Then why did he not depute the Deputy-Governor to receive them and their communication? That this was the course which he ought to have pursued is most palpable from the fact, that in the representation which he gave of these transactions to his own sovereign, he stated that the Deputy-Governor did request Commander Fishbourne to deliver the letter to him, and that he refused to do so. This fact comes out incidentally in the letter addressed by the ministers at Ava to the British Government, and it has a very important bearing on the great question of etiquette, on which Mr. Cobden dwells with so much emphasis. From that document we learn that the Governor of Rangoon did not venture to inform his own sovereign of the mode in which our officers had been treated, but

falsely represented to him that they had been introduced to the Deputy-Governor, who offered to take charge of the communication. The attempt to justify the Governor's conduct by any allusion to the defect of ceremonial observances on the part of the Commodore, proves a total failure.

A very strenuous effort is made by Mr. Cobden to throw the entire blame of the war on Commodore Lambert. He says that "had his object in visiting Rangoon been to provoke hostilities, his conduct in first precipitating a quarrel and then committing an act of violence, certain to lead to a deadly collision, could not have been more ingeniously framed to promote that object." He asserts in unqualified terms that the Commodore was the person by whom the Burmese war was got up. Mr. Cobden carefully avoids all allusion to the treatment which the Commodore in the first instance, and subsequently the officers of the deputation, had received from the Burmese; and the gross insult inflicted on them is alluded to only as "an insult alleged to have been offered." But the Blue Book, which Mr. Cobden has taken as his text, affords the most pregnant evidence that during the whole period of the negotiations, and up to the moment when the Commodore heard of the indignity offered to his officers, he not only manifested no intention to provoke hostilities, but made every effort to prevent them, and exulted in every gleam of success which appeared to dawn on his pacific efforts. It was not till after the Governor had refused to receive the demand for redress that he took possession of the

king's ship; it was not till after the Burmese had opened fire upon the squadron, though he had distinctly warned them against such an act of temerity, that he demolished their fortifications.

Mr. Cobden supposes that, instead of Rangoon, the scene of these operations had been Charleston, and asks, "Can any one doubt that one unanimous cry would have been raised for the disgrace and punishment of Commodore Lambert? and why is a different standard of justice applied to the case of Burmah?" But no American functionary would have acted in the face of the civilized world as the Burmese officers acted throughout these transactions; and the comparison has not a leg to stand on. Redress was demanded of the Burmese Government for the violation of a solemn treaty, and the atrocious oppression of our merchants; and what American officers would ever have been a party to such a violation or such oppressions? The King promised reparation, and deputed a minister plenipotentiary to give full satisfaction to our representative, and from that moment the acts of the delegate become the acts of his sovereign. For two days he avoided all communication with the British authorities himself, and forbad all British subjects on shore to hold any communication with them on pain of death. Would any American plenipotentiary have acted in this fashion? When a British officer, whom he had to all intents and purposes consented to receive, waited on him with a statement of our demands, he was treated with insufferable insolence, refused an audience, and told to send in his letter by some

menial. Would any American functionary have pursued such a course? The British representative resented this treatment, blockaded the port, and, as his demand for pecuniary compensation had not been attended to, took possession of a trading vessel belonging to the Government. The Burmese viceroy, finding that he could not obtain the release of the ship except by making an apology, appealed to the Governor-General against the conduct of his envoy, as having exceeded his instructions, taking great credit to himself for having abstained from retaking the vessel, or offering any molestation to the captors. He subsequently sent a message to the Commodore, threatening to fire on him if he attempted to remove the ship. The Commodore replied that the vessel should be restored as soon as our demands were complied with, and advised him, as he had referred the matter in dispute to the Governor-General, to allow matters to remain *in statu quo;* but assured him that if a shot was fired, it would be returned. Would any American plenipotentiary, after having thus appealed to the highest authority in India, have fired upon the British ships, as they were proceeding down the river with the sequestered vessel in tow, to establish the blockade, before any reply had been received to the appeal?

Mr. Cobden charges the Governor-General with an "uncandid evasion of the real question at issue—the seizure of the king's ship." But this vessel was seized because British subjects had been plundered, and the demand for reparation had not been complied with, and the officers sent with the demand

had been treated with the grossest indignity. To affirm that the seizure of the vessel was the real question at issue, is to inverse the relation of cause and effect. But the war did not arise from the sequestration of this vessel, or even from the destruction of the Burmese stockades, after they had opened fire on our ships. From the 6th of January, when the vessel was taken in pledge for the reparation which had been refused, to the 10th of February, when it was resolved to make a military demonstration in Burmah, the war might have been avoided by a suitable apology. Notwithstanding the strong provocation which the British Government had received, it was resolved to make another vigorous effort to avert the calamity of war. In reply to the letter of the Governor of Rangoon, charging Commander Fishbourne and the officers who accompanied him with having been intoxicated, a conciliatory but firm communication was made to him, in which the various hostile measures which had been pursued against us were recapitulated, but no fresh demand was made in consequence of the recent insult,—beyond those previously advanced, and which the Burmese had virtually agreed to,—but one, that the Governor of Rangoon should express to the Government of India, in writing, his deep regret that Commander Fishbourne should have been treated with disrespect, and exposed to public insult at his own residence on the 6th of January. After this apology had been made, the Government of India would depute an officer of rank to adjust a final settlement, and release the king's ship, when entire con-

cord would be restored. That the demand thus made was eminently reasonable, cannot be questioned for a moment. It was that which no government with any regard for its own character and position, or for the honor of its officers, could have neglected to make, and it inflicted no indignity on the Burmese Governor. But he mistook the moderation of our tone for weakness, and evaded compliance with our request. In his reply he abstained from any expression of regret for the insults which had been inflicted on our officers, but required that they should be superseded in their functions by their own Government, and that another officer of rank should be appointed to conduct the negotiations. To have acceded to this request would have been an act of the greatest injustice to the Commodore, and it would only have been followed by other and more insolent demands. On the receipt of this letter, it appeared to the Governor-General that the resources of negotiation had been exhausted, and that no other alternative was left but to obtain the reparation which had been refused by a demonstration of our military power. The war is therefore to be unequivocally attributed to the Burmese authorities, who refused the easiest terms on which an aggrieved and powerful Government has ever offered to renew the relations of amity. The cause of hostilities is very distinctly traced in the able state paper drawn up on this occasion by Lord Dalhousie, which is worthy the particular attention of any one who may be desirous of learning the literal truth in reference to these

transactions:—"The conduct of the Governor of Rangoon towards the British officers, on the 6th of January, would have been felt as ignominious by the lowest subordinate at his Durbar, if he had himself been subject to it. The ignominy inflicted on these officers, if it be not resented, will be, and must be, regarded as the humiliation of the power they serve. The insult has been persisted in to the last. . . . . Were all this to be passed over, and friendly relations renewed, the ground thus gained by the Burmese would be fully taken advantage of. The oppressions and exactions to which British subjects at Rangoon have been exposed would be redoubled; the impracticable discourtesies which have been the steady policy of the Government of Ava since the conclusion of the Treaty of 1826, and which have driven away one British envoy after another from Ava, and subsequently from Rangoon (till for many years past there has been no Representative of this Government in Burmah at all), would be habitually practised towards the Agent who may be placed at Rangoon; and, within a very brief period of time, the Government of India would be reduced to the same alternative which it has now before it, of either abandoning its subjects, and acknowledging its inability to protect them, or of engaging in a war. . . . . The British power in India cannot safely afford to exhibit even a temporary appearance of inferiority. Whilst I should be reluctant to believe that our empire in India has no stay but the sword alone, it is vain to doubt that our hold must mainly rest upon the might of the conqueror,

and must be maintained by that power. The Government of India cannot, consistently with its own safety, appear for one day in an attitude of inferiority; or hope to maintain peace and submission among the numberless princes and people embraced within the vast circuit of the empire, if for one day it give countenance to a doubt of the absolute superiority of its arms, and of its continued resolution to assert it."

To Mr. Cobden, Lord Dalhousie's argument may appear unstatesmanlike, immoral, and illogical, but such are the principles of policy which it has been found necessary to adopt in India, and it is upon this basis that our singular empire rests. As soon as a doubt has been diffused among the various princes and tribes we hold in subjection, of the absolute superiority of our arms, and of our continued resolution to assert it, our dominion will begin to totter, and soon cease to exist. Be that as it may, one fact is evident from this brief Review of the events which led to the Burmese war, and the grounds on which it was undertaken, that it did not originate in that "insatiable love of territorial aggrandizement" which Mr. Cobden charges on the Indian Government.

This assertion is equally as inapplicable to the general progress of our dominion in India, as to the recent acquisition of Pegu; neither is it in accordance with the fact,—as Mr. Cobden affirms, —that "public opinion in England has not hitherto been opposed to an extension of our dominion in the East; on the contrary, it is believed to

be profitable to the nation." It cannot be denied that Parliament has in every instance voted public thanks to the brave armies which have supported the national honour in the East, and to the eminent statesmen who have directed their movements. It could not have done less. To have withheld the accustomed reward of national gratitude from our officers, whether civil or military, who had performed great public services, simply because the scene of their labours lay in the East, would have been to create an invidious and unjust distinction. But the most cursory reference to the history of British India will demonstrate that the empire has grown to its present magnitude, not in accordance with, but in direct opposition to, the wishes of Parliament, of the Ministry, and of the Court of Directors, and not less of the Governors-General themselves, who have been instrumental in augmenting it. It will incontrovertibly establish this remarkable fact, that the most ambitious conquerors have not made more strenuous efforts to enlarge their territories, than the public authorities in England and India have made to prevent the increase of their territories. Such a retrospect, though tedious, may not be without its use at a time when influential members of Parliament deem it their duty to ascribe the establishment of a great empire in the East to an insatiable love of territorial aggrandizement, and to stigmatize the means by which it has been established as involving "deeds of violence, fraud, and injustice." It may also serve in some measure to enlighten the minds of those who have hitherto paid little at-

tention to the subject, and are therefore liable to be carried away by such confident and unscrupulous denunciations.

Clive, the founder of the British empire in the East, after the capture of Chandernagore in March, 1757, having discovered the intrigues of the Nabob of Moorshedabad, and being fully aware of his rancorous feelings towards those who had wrested Calcutta from his grasp, and driven him back to his own capital, pronounced the memorable expression, "We cannot stop here." Within three months after this declaration, he was constrained to make war on the Nabob. The victory of Plassy broke the Mahomedan power in Bengal, and placed the soubahs of Bengal and Behar at our disposal. On his second visit to India as Governor of Bengal, Clive obtained a grant of these two principalities from the powerless successor of the Great Mogul, and immediately made up his mind to "stop" there, and for ever to limit the British dominions in India to these possessions. His sentiments were conveyed in this remarkable language :—"My resolution was, and my hopes will always be, to confine our assistance, our conquests, and our possessions to Bengal, Behar, and Orissa."—Orissa, as then understood, comprised only one Bengal district on the extreme south.—"To go further is, in my opinion, a scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd, that no Governor and Council in their senses can ever adopt it, unless the whole scheme of the Company's interest be first new modelled." Having firmly and conscientiously adopted this principle,

and resolved to avoid all increase of territory, he gave back the province of Oude, which had fallen to us by right of conquest. In these moderate views, the Court of Directors most cordially participated, and considered it a sacred duty to limit their views to the possession and government of these provinces. Warren Hastings, who had been trained up in the school of Clive, adopted the same opinion, and during the twelve years in which he remained at the head of affairs, the province of Benares was the only addition made to our dominions, and this was effected in direct opposition to his wishes, by a resolution of the Supreme Council, under the dictation of Mr. Francis. But he soon found, that in order to protect our settlements and territories in India, and to maintain the position we had attained, it was indispensably necessary to curb the ambition, and prevent the encroachments of the native powers. He was thus drawn into the vortex of "country politics," as they were then designated, and obliged to engage in military operations at Poonah, at Gwalior, and in the neighbourhood of Madras. These expeditions added nothing to our dominions, but they taught the princes of India to regard us as the first and most important military power in the country, always ready and able to enforce our superiority. The efforts which were thus made to maintain a supremacy which had become necessary not only to our political but also to our commercial interests, exhausted the treasury, and created the most violent prejudice against Mr. Hastings; in England he was denounced as

an ambitious despot, "anxious to rival the fame of Tamerlane and Aurungzebe;" and it was determined to withdraw from all political associations and military expeditions beyond the limits of Bengal and Behar, and shut ourselves up within the narrow shell of these provinces. On the 9th of April, 1782, the House of Commons resolved that "the orders of the Court of Directors, which have conveyed to their servants abroad a prohibitory condemnation of all schemes of conquest and enlargement of dominion, by prescribing certain rules and boundaries for the operation of their military force, and enjoining a strict adherence to a system of defence upon the principle of the treaty of Allahabad, were founded no less in wisdom and policy than in justice and moderation." In the India Bill of 1784, which expressed the views of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, the same doctrine was embodied in this emphatic language, "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation." What terms could more clearly exhibit the national determination to resist the expansion of our territories with the whole weight of Parliamentary authority, and to confine our possessions to the two provinces which we had then held for twenty-seven years? But it was not within the power of Parliament to circumscribe our Indian Empire. The native princes permitted us to pursue this pacific policy for six years, at the end of which period Tippoo Sultan, who had inherited from his father "a powerful empire, and an

army of 300,000 men," as well as his insatiable ambition, attacked our ally, the Rajah of Travancore, whom we were bound by treaty to protect. Lord Cornwallis demanded an explanation, which was haughtily refused, on which he declared war against the Sultan, and defeated him; and, with a view to the future peace of the Deccan, deemed it advisable to reduce his resources by depriving him of half his dominions, which were divided between the Company and their allies. The House of Commons, notwithstanding thirteen resolutions moved by Mr. Francis, in condemnation of these transactions, declared by a large majority that the war was founded in policy and justice, and the thanks of both Houses were voted to the Governor-General; but, as if to prevent a misconception of the vote, and its being construed as a relinquishment of the pacific policy enunciated in the resolution of the House, eleven years before, the clause of the Act of 1782, against "extension of dominion in India," was repeated in the Bill which renewed the Charter in 1793. Then followed five years more of tranquillity; but Lord Wellesley, on his arrival in India, in 1798, found that Tippoo Sultan had formed an alliance with the French at the time when Bonaparte was in Egypt, and that he had been making the most extensive preparations for assailing us, with the determination, if possible, to drive us from the soil of India. A second Mysore war therefore became inevitable, and it ended in the destruction of the throne and dynasty of Tippoo, and the absorption of his dominions. The hostility

of the Mahratta powers against us was again developed, and we were brought successively into collision with Holkar, Scindia, the Rajah of Nagpore, and other chiefs. Victory again attended our standard, new territories were added to the empire, and its dimensions were doubled during the administration of Lord Wellesley. On his return to England an effort was made to impeach him, in that "he, actuated by unjustifiable ambition and the love of power, had formed schemes of aggrandisement and acquisition of territory in direct opposition to the established policy of the East-India Company;" but it was supported only by a feeble minority, and the attempt proved abortive. Parliament appreciated the services of a great statesman, who, in the midst of unexampled difficulties, had preserved, enlarged, and consolidated the empire, and refused to inflict a sentence of condemnation on him. On the other hand, the Court of Directors sighed over the increase of our dominion, and gave vent to their feelings of chagrin in the following strain:—"The territories we have recently acquired under those treaties, under others of a similar kind, and by conquest, are of so vast and extensive a nature, that we cannot take a view of our situation without being seriously impressed with the wisdom and necessity of that solemn declaration of the Legislature, that 'to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation.'"

Among the most energetic assailants of Lord Wellesley's Indian policy was the Earl of Moira,

who denounced his proceedings as unjust and indefensible, and deplored the extension of our territories, which had resulted from them. Six years after, he was placed in a position the best adapted for estimating the justice and equity of this censure: he was appointed Governor-General. On his arrival in India, he found that a war with Nepaul, owing to the presumptuous demands and the encroachments of that Court, could no longer be avoided. The war ended in a new accession of territory. Scarcely had the sword been sheathed than he found it necessary to take the field against the Pindarrees, the organized freebooters of India, whose annual ravages, now extended over a thousand miles of territory, had spread dismay and desolation along the line of our frontier from Agra to Ganjam. It was found that they were abetted by all the Mahratta powers, who had, moreover, formed a secret combination to uproot us during a period of profound peace. The Governor-General took the field in person, with an army of 90,000 men, the largest we had ever assembled, extinguished the Pindarrees, broke the Mahratta power beyond the chance of recovery, and made so magnificent an addition to our territories, that he who, as Lord Moira, had reprobated the ambition of Lord Wellesley, as Marquis of Hastings,—to which dignity he had been raised,—announced that the Indus was in future to be regarded as the boundary of our Eastern Empire. He was succeeded by Lord Amherst, the very personification of a mild and pacific policy; but during his incumbency, the

aggressions of the Burmese drew us into a long and expensive war, which terminated in the annexation of new provinces. Then came Lord William Bentinck, whose boast it was to have restored the sword to its scabbard, and placed the army on a peace establishment; but he was obliged, in mercy to an oppressed people, to depose the Rajah of Coorg and absorb that small principality; and even his conduct has not escaped the censure of those who affirm that deeds of violence and injustice have marked our progress in the East. Lord Auckland, mild and peace-loving almost to a fault, found the intrigues of Russia pushed up to the neighbourhood of the Indus, and he felt the necessity of establishing British influence in the regions beyond that river. The expedition into Affghanistan led to no immediate acquisition of territory, but the calamity in which it terminated laid the foundation of new wars and conquests. Lord Ellenborough went out to India with the most pacific intentions. He publicly announced his determination "to restore tranquillity to both banks of the Indus, to give peace to Asia, to create a surplus revenue, and to emulate the magnificent benevolence of the Mahomedan emperors in the great works of public utility." But he soon found that the Government of India could not consistently with its own safety appear for one day in an attitude of inferiority, or hope to maintain peace and submission among the numberless princes and people embraced within the vast circuit of the empire, if for one day it gave countenance to a doubt of the absolute superiority of its arms, and of

its continued resolution to maintain it. The unexampled disgrace of our arms, and the extinction of an entire army in the passes of Affghanistan, had spread this feeling of doubt to a dangerous extent through India, and, after a short struggle between the pacific promises he had made at the London Tavern and the exigences of his new position, Lord Ellenborough yielded to necessity, and sent an army of retribution into Affghanistan to restore the prestige of our power. During the twenty-seven months of his administration, the territory of Scinde was absorbed, and the independence of Scindia finally and irretrievably extinguished. Lord Ellenborough's policy was reprobated in England, and more particularly at the India House, and his successor was expected to reverse it. Lord Hardinge, therefore, went out to India with the firmest resolution to avoid war with any prince or potentate, even under the most threatening aspect of circumstances, and he maintained his resolution to the latest moment of safety. An armed force of sixty thousand Sikhs crossed the Sutlej and burst upon our provinces, to satiate their appetite for plunder with the spoils of our fairest districts. Four great battles were fought before we could drive this host back into the Punjab. The kingdom of Runjeet Sing was dismembered, and two new provinces were added to our empire, and Lord Hardinge returned to England in less than four years, bequeathing to his successor the assurance that it would not be necessary to fire another shot for seven years. But before Lord Dalhousie had been three months in India, the

flames of revolt burst forth at Mooltan, and in a few months the whole of the Punjab was up in arms against us, and it became necessary for our own safety to extinguish the Sikh power altogether, and to extend our dominions to Peshawur. With the humiliation of our last and most formidable opponent in India, it appeared, even to the least sanguine, that war had at length ceased, and that the energies of Government might in future be devoted exclusively to the pursuits of peace. In the midst of these agreeable anticipations, Lord Dalhousie was suddenly summoned to Calcutta, to meet a new crisis which had arisen in Burmah. He posted in haste to the metropolis, with the determination to avoid hostilities, and, if they were inevitable, still to avoid annexation. Before the close of the year, however, the province of Pegu had been conquered, and incorporated with our possessions. This rapid review of the growth of our power in India will be sufficient to disprove the assertion, that it has been owing to "our insatiable love of territorial aggrandisement." At every stage of our progress, territorial acquisition has been submitted to as the least of two evils. Exposed to the incessant machinations and hostilities of the princes of India, to whom war was more natural than peace, we have found it necessary successively to deprive them of power, as the only chance of avoiding interminable warfare. From the period when Lord Clive declared that no governor in his senses would ever think of extending our conquests and possessions beyond Bengal and Behar, to the time when Lord

Dalhousie affirmed that the annexation of any portion of Burmah would be a calamity second only to that of war, there is no instance in which a war can justly and fairly be traced to motives of ambition. That great dominion has been thrust upon us. The same event has happened to all our Indian rulers; and even the most timid and pacific have found themselves, on assuming the responsibilities of government, forced into hostilities by the irresistible current of circumstances. We have been involuntarily led, step by step, to the pinnacle of empire, impelled by influences beyond our control, pursuing a policy we always disapproved of, and fulfilling a destiny against which we were perpetually struggling.

This unexampled growth of a mighty empire, the increase of which, during the long period of ninety years, has never for a moment been checked by the resolutions of Parliament or the mandates of the Court of Directors, by the opposition of the Ministry or the denunciations of patriots, or even by the pacific determination of the Governors-General themselves, has driven many reflecting minds to conclude that it follows some law of progression, which it is idle to think of resisting. Strange to say, this sentiment has been mistaken for fatalism. Mr. Cobden says, that the "pretence of destiny is not to be tolerated as a plea among Christians, however valid it may be in Mahomedan casuistry." No one will for a moment question the truth of this observation. That which might appear perfectly congruous in the address of a conqueror like Tamer-

lane, would be utterly inconsistent from the pen of a Christian ruler. But what Governor-General has ever adopted such a sentiment, or endeavoured to palliate ambition by "the pretence of destiny?" The only statesman who appears to have made use of the word "destiny" is Lord Dalhousie, and if Mr. Cobden had quoted the whole of the sentence in which it occurs, the reader would have perceived how little ground there was for the sneer in which he indulges. In his minute of the 3rd of November, his Lordship says, "But if, after all, peace cannot be procured by anything short of the conquest of Burmah; if the lapse of time and the course of events shall establish a real necessity for advance, then let us advance—let us fulfil the destiny which there, as elsewhere, will have compelled us forward, in spite of our wishes, and let us reconcile ourselves to a course which will then have no alternative. Having made every honest attempt to stand fast, we shall go on with a clear conscience, with motives unimpeached, and we may rest tranquil as to the ultimate result." But it was not till after he had made the most strenuous effort first to avoid a war, —in which he had failed,—and then to resist the annexation of any portion of the country, that he was led almost irresistibly to adopt the expression "let us fulfil the destiny which here, as elsewhere, will have compelled us forward, in spite of ourselves." To confound the word, in the connection in which it is used, with the fatalism of the Mahomedan, is both unjust and ungenerous. But while every Christian will repudiate the doctrine of Destiny, he will

not be ashamed to acknowledge the existence of an over-ruling Providence, which disposes of the destinies of nations. It is scarcely possible to contemplate the mysterious growth of our power in the East, without yielding to the conviction that it is to be attributed to the dispensation of a Higher power; and it would be an act of weakness to allow ourselves to be moved from this conclusion by any morbid dread of being charged with the presumption of making Providence a party to what are designated our "crimes." In thus acknowledging the intervention of Providence in the progress of events in India during the last hundred years, we recognise in it the application of a most effectual remedy to the anarchy and misery which had so long desolated it. The extinction of a hundred petty and ruthless despotisms, and the establishment in their stead of one great, predominating, and irresistible power, by which the country is preserved from the intestine violence and oppression and the external invasions which formed the sum of Indian history for a century before our advent, is an incalculable blessing to India; and England was the only nation equal to such a mission, and capable, through the stability of its own institutions at home, of giving permanence to the institutions of peace and order abroad.

The empire of India is not, as Mr. Cobden appears to suppose, an "imperial crime," to be expiated by "atonement and reparation," but an imperial trust, to be fulfilled with Christian fidelity and zeal; and this sense of our national responsibility in the East, will be deepened in proportion as we recognise the

hand of Providence in the growth of that empire. Nor must it be forgotten that during the period in which our dominions in India have been augmented, the ability of England to bestow on them the blessing of good government, has been enlarged in a proportionate degree. It is an unquestionable fact that the mistakes of one administration have been conscientiously corrected, as far as possible, by that which succeeded it. The science of Oriental government has been progressively matured by experience, and the provisions made for the management of each successive acquisition have exhibited a marked improvement on previous arrangements. Defective as the system of Warren Hastings appears in our eyes, it was more efficient and advantageous than that which was established in the days of Clive. Lord Cornwallis's institutions were a great improvement on those of Hastings, but they will stand no comparison with those of Lord William Bentinck's administration; and the internal organization of the government under Lord Dalhousie is greatly superior in vigour and efficiency even to that of Lord W. Bentinck. More liberal and enlightened views have gradually acquired the ascendant, and the principles which are now applied to the administration in India are immeasurably in advance of those which prevailed seventy or eighty years ago. Public opinion in England has been improved and invigorated, and is brought to bear on India with increasing force and effect. The administrative improvements which are devised in England, from time to time, are immediately transferred to India,

and the benefit of its annexation to a great, free, and ever-advancing country is constantly becoming more apparent. During the discussions which took place on the India Bills of Fox and Pitt, there was not the remotest allusion made to the necessity of bestowing any intellectual culture on the natives of the country, or endeavouring to raise the national character by education and civilization. To the greatest minds of that age, such efforts appeared to form no part of our duty. On the contrary, there were not a few men of note and influence in the Indian administration at home who repudiated the idea of imparting instruction, either secular or divine, to the natives of the country, on the ground that it was incompatible with the continuance of our rule. It is a matter of just exultation to contrast the more elevated sentiments developed in the debates of 1853 with the narrow and contracted views exhibited in those of 1783. It is an indication of our increasing fitness for the Government of India, that it was equally recognised on both sides of the House to be the sacred duty of England to bestow on it that form of government and those institutions which were best adapted to promote the moral and intellectual improvement of its inhabitants, as well as their social and material comfort, and to elevate India in the scale of nations. The difference between the Ministry and its opponents during these discussions appears to have been, not on first principles, but on the most suitable and efficient mode of carrying them out.

Fears have been expressed, not only by those

who are habitually opposed to the Indian Government, but even by some of its most sincere friends, that our empire in the East has become less secure the more it has been enlarged. A view of the map of British India, with the red line of appropriation extended in every successive edition of it, and of the vast compass of our territories, stretching from Cashmere to Cape Comorin, and from the confines of Belochistan to the borders of Siam, and of the various tribes and nations, sects and languages, comprised within this circle, is calculated to oppress the mind with a feeling of awe, not unmixed with apprehension. Every fresh addition of territory appears to be a new element of weakness; and the prophecy of Captain Trant in 1826, when we had just taken possession of the provinces of Tenasserim, Aracan, and Assam, seems to approach its fulfilment: "In this manner British India will continue accumulating, until at last the enormous fabric falls with a sudden crash." But sixty years before, the same feeling of alarm was expressed by Zephaniah Holwell, one of the survivors of the Black Hole, upon the first extension of our power to the two provinces of Bengal and Behar:—"Thus we shall go on grasping and expanding until we cram our hands so full that they become cramped and benumbed, and we shall be obliged to quit and relinquish even that part which we might have held fast, if bounds had been set to our progress, which, upon the present system we now see is impossible; therefore a total change in our politics becomes indisputably necessary." These apprehensions com-

menced with the first establishment of our political power, and they have been revived with every extension of it. It would be an act of presumption to assume that our dominion in India is beyond the contingencies and mutations to which all human possessions are liable; but we must not overlook the considerations which are calculated to inspire confidence. The means of holding the empire in security have been increased to a greater extent than the empire itself. The military resources and appliances of Government have been indefinitely augmented, while, at the same time, the means, and even the hope, of resistance on the part of the natives has been diminished in a corresponding degree. Many provinces which, when first occupied by us, required the presence of an army to keep down revolt, have long since come to a cheerful acquiescence in our rule, and a battalion or two are more than sufficient to maintain our authority in them. The martial population has subsided into a peaceful peasantry, and the prophecy appears to have attained its literal fulfilment, that men shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks. In our oldest provinces, with the exception of the troops at Barrackpore, which guard the capital, and at Dinapore, which are required to watch Nepal, there are not more than 8,000 soldiers to support our authority among 35,000,000 of people. We govern the whole of India with more ease and confidence than we formerly governed the separate divisions of it, surrounded as they were by jealous and rival potentates. We have disarmed

India and broken up its military organizations; and even the greatest alarmist will not hesitate to confess that there is not, at present, the slightest probability of any hostile combination in the provinces accustomed to our rule, which 5,000 troops, with a suitable complement of artillery, would not at any time be sufficient to extinguish. The vast army of between 200,000 and 300,000 men which the Government maintains, is rendered necessary, not so much by the strength of opposition it is intended to cope with, as by the extent of country which it is required to occupy, and the absence of all means of rapid communication, and of sudden concentration.

The same remark will hold good with regard to external invasion; the extension of our authority over the whole of India places us in the most advantageous position for meeting and repelling any inroad which may be made from abroad. In his masterly minute on Indian Railways of the 20th of April last, Lord Dalhousie states that "the points on which hostile attacks are the most probable are the Cabul frontier and the borders of Nepal." The least danger, however, is on the side of Nepal, the greatest from that of Cabul. "The probability," says his Lordship, "of an attack from Cabul under European instigation, if circumstances should arise elsewhere to recommend it.....is by no means to be disregarded." This probability has become more proximate within the last six months; Europe appears to be on the eve of a general war, in which Russia and England will be found on

opposite sides. Meanwhile, it is announced in the continental journals that the Russian general Perowsky has stormed the fortress of Ahmetzet, and that the road to Khiva is open to him. It is also stated that the Persians have at length captured Herat. These two events exhibit the recent and rapid progress of Russian influence in Central Asia, to counteract which we marched across the Indus, fifteen years ago, and encountered the perils of an Affghan campaign. At that period, Russia had despatched an army towards Khiva, and issued a manifesto announcing that the expedition was intended not only to chastise the Khan for reducing the subjects of Russia to slavery, but to establish that political influence in Central Asia which legitimately belonged to that power. The expedition to Khiva failed, and the allies of the Russians, the Persians, were driven back from Herat. But Russia always advances and never recedes. Her object is apparently attained, and the various chiefs and people of Central Asia will now be placed in a state of complete subordination to her paramount and undisturbed influence. Henceforth, whenever our differences with Russia may assume a dangerous character, the simplest and most effectual mode of annoying us will be to instigate the various tribes of that region to cross the Indus, as their forefathers have been in the habit of doing during a period of more than eight centuries, and pour the tide of invasion on the provinces of India, their hereditary prey. A little Russian gold and a few Russian officers to direct the movements of these

hordes, will be all that the Emperor will be required to contribute to an expedition which must subject us to the most serious embarrassment and expense. Few of those who may thus cross the Indus will probably be able to return home, still, the irruption of fifty or sixty thousand Mahomedan crusaders will tax the resources of British India in no ordinary degree. In the event of any such occurrence, it will be found that the security of our position within the Indus has been very greatly improved by the subversion of the independence of Scinde, Gwalior, and the Punjab, the extinction of their armies, exceeding a hundred thousand brave soldiers, and the transfer of more than seven hundred pieces of cannon from their arsenals to our own. If those courts had remained independent, they would, in case of an invasion, have become the scene of hostile intrigue and the source of great anxiety; and there can, therefore, be no hesitation in affirming, in reference to any contingencies which may arise to the west of the Indus, that the extension of our empire to that river, and the annihilation of all native sovereignty within it, has contributed to the strength, and not to the weakness, of the empire.

It must not, moreover, be overlooked how greatly the improvement of the means of communication by which the present age is so eminently distinguished, has increased, and is increasing, the means of political security in India. Government is now engaged in laying down various lines of electric telegraph to the extent of three thousand miles,

which will enable the Governor-General, in whatever part of the country he may happen to be, to receive and reply to all communications between sunrise and sunset. Intelligence of any dangerous commotion will be made to him, and the orders he may issue on the occasion will reach their destination, however remote it may be, within twelve hours. It would be impossible to overrate the importance of these telegraphic lines in India, by which a degree of ubiquity will be given to the supreme authority in territories as extensive as the whole of Europe. There can be little doubt that if Government had enjoyed the advantage of an electric telegraph on the 10th of February, 1852, when it was resolved to make a military movement upon Burmah, and due notice of that resolution could have been communicated on that same day to Bombay and Madras, the expedition would have been enabled to reach Rangoon a month earlier, and we might have dictated a peace at the capital to the astonished Court before the rains were half over. The Court of Directors have also applied themselves to the immediate establishment of railways in India, with a degree of alacrity and energy which reflects the highest credit on them. In no country will the effect of railroads be more beneficial than in India; and however great may be the social, commercial, and intellectual advantages to be derived from them, it is in the additional strength and confidence they will impart to the Government that their value will be particularly conspicuous. By the appliances of the rail and the telegraph, our hold on India will

become so firm, that the idea of any native power being able for a moment to put our supremacy in peril, appears in the light of a simple absurdity. What would be the chance of success in any revolt, when the first movement of sedition, wherever it may occur, would be communicated to the head quarters of Government with the speed of lightning, and an overwhelming force would be concentrated on the point of danger, with a degree of celerity, which, to the natives, must appear superhuman? One of the ablest of the public officers who have administered the affairs of India, remarks in a recent work on the first Burmese war, that "it must in candour be acknowledged that, in the present day, many able and highly-instructed men make light of the perils of territorial extension;" and well they may, when they find that the telegraph, which is said to annihilate time, and the rail, which annihilates distance, are about to be established in India, and that our troops and the munitions of war will hereafter be moved at the rate of 500 miles a day? With the aid of these agencies, months will be reduced to days, and Lahore will be fivefold nearer to Calcutta than Patna was in the days of Lord Clive. Well may we make light of the perils of territorial expansion, when we find the Governor-General stating the fact that "when the railway in Egypt is completed from Alexandria to Suez, and a railway shall be formed from Bombay to Upper India, a regiment may be conveyed from England to its station in the North-West Provinces in less time

and with less trouble than it could now march from Calcutta to Benares;"—when, in short, we may obtain troops from England as speedily as we now do from a distant cantonment. It is this prospect of the establishment, at so early a period, of these means of rapid communication between one part of India and another, combined with the shortening of the distance between India and England, which imparts so much confidence, and enables us to regard the growth of the empire without any feeling of dismay. In the midst of the most arduous and extensive military operations, and when the designs of the French in Egypt increased our embarrassment, Lord Wellesley complained that he had been *seven* months without a single communication from England, and was utterly ignorant of the position of circumstances beyond the limits of India. At the present time, information is transmitted every fortnight between London and Calcutta in five weeks. When the telegraphs in Egypt and in India have been completed, the interval of time will be reduced to three weeks; and he must have an unaccountable mistrust of the progress of modern science who will venture to assert that before the expiration of ten years, the London papers may not be expected to give us every morning a report of the events of the preceding day, transmitted through means of the telegraph, from Peshawur, from Calcutta, from Prome, and Madras, and Bombay.

When to these material elements of security we add the moral guarantee of the most honest and vigorous efforts to improve the institutions we have

bestowed on India, to improve the social, intellectual, and religious condition of its inhabitants, and to raise them to an equality with ourselves, there appears little reason to regard the increasing magnitude of our empire with any degree of alarm. If our benevolent exertions are multiplied in proportion to our responsibilities, the increase of the British possessions in the East will be synonymous with the extension of tranquillity, civilization, and true religion. If it be the intention of Divine Providence, as it would appear to be, that the nations of the East shall receive these blessings through the instrumentality of England, we have only to pursue our vocation with untiring zeal, and we may leave the issue of events to the great Disposer of human affairs. The late Sir Charles Metcalfe was in the habit of remarking, that as the empire came in a day, so it might be expected to pass away in a night, and that we might wake some morning and find India lost. He happened to repeat this remark one day to the late Dr. Marshman, who instantly observed: "Not unless we go to sleep over our duties. We are immortal in India till our work is done, and we have a century at least of labour before us." It is in this spirit of confidence, inspired by a sense of our high vocation, and not in trembling anxiety regarding the punishment of our "crimes," as Mr. Cobden designates our proceedings, that we are to pursue our career in India.

The question whether India is likely at any future period to shake off the dominion of England, is gradually becoming more and more linked with

the broader question whether Asia will be able henceforth successfully to resist the increasing ascendancy of the European, and, more particularly, of the Anglo-Saxon, family. The one is evidently becoming more vigorous and powerful, the other more feeble; and the matchless improvements of steam navigation tend every year to bring the strong nearer to the weak. The transfer of authority which has taken place in India during the first half of the present century, seems to be only the forerunner of similar changes, which are to affect the rest of Eastern Asia during its remaining period. To all appearance, the sun of Eastern independence is rapidly setting, and the worn-out and effete dynasties of Asia, from the banks of the Irawaddy to the China seas, are hastening to extinction. It would be an act of foolish timidity to shut our eyes to the steady and irresistible progress of circumstances, and the rapidly advancing influence of the Anglo-Saxon, not in India alone, but throughout the eastern hemisphere. Whatever be the origin of the Burmese war, just or unjust, it is difficult to suppose that, with all Lord Dalhousie's reluctance, we can stop at Pegu; that is to say, if that which has happened before is that which will happen hereafter. I wish to avoid inflicting any alarm on Mr. Cobden, but he must make up his mind for the absorption, sooner or later, of the whole of the kingdom of Burmah. The present Governor-General, or, if he should not remain long enough, his successor, will be constrained to extinguish the dynasty of Alompra, and make the British terri-

tories conterminous with those of China for 200 miles. Meanwhile, new agencies are appearing on the scene; the "thirteen revolted provinces" of Lord North's time have become a great country, with all the living energy of the parent, and none of her political encumbrances, and are exhibiting a power of development of which there has been no example in the history of man. The transatlantic Anglo-Saxon has now stretched across the continent of America from sea to sea, and is establishing settlements of gigantic size on the Pacific, in the provinces of Oregon and California, and new prospects and projects are rising in connection with these new states. A railway is projected for uniting San Francisco with New York; and the Americans, who have now reached the shores of the Pacific with their commercial activity and ambition, are looking across that ocean for new fields of enterprise in Asia. In a report recently made by the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives, it is stated that "the vast commerce of which the mighty and majestic Pacific will be the theatre is now within our grasp; the means by which to become the first maritime, commercial, and political power in the world, are stretched before us. Should we pause in the effort to secure this supremacy? Should any temporizing, timid spirit, be permitted to check this stride of progress? The teeming millions of the eastern slope of Asia, without a single obstacle to intervene, are spread out, almost face to face with the extensive possessions of the western slope of this continent." The result of the labours of this

Committee is to recommend the acceptance of the offer made by a Company, the object of which is "to cause the balance of trade with all nations to turn in favour of America, and make New York what London now is, the settling house of the world." These are great and ambitious projects, but the Americans have shown us that there is no enterprise which they abandon because it appears at first to be too large for their grasp. That which is the vision of fancy to-day, in ten years becomes matter of history. The first of the magnificent line of steamers of nearly 3,000 tons, with which it is intended to bridge the Pacific, has made her trial trip to England with perfect success; and when this line of packets is completed, the eastern slope of Asia will be brought within less than twenty days' distance of the western slope of America; and when the rail across that continent is open, the port of Shanghai in China will be as near to New York as London was twenty years ago. We have thus a power of vast energy and expansiveness, brought to bear on the destinies of the Asiatic monarchies, which stretch from Singapore to the sea of Okhotsk. Meanwhile, the empire of China is rapidly breaking up, and 350,000,000 of men are open to new influences, and will require new masters. Just at this juncture a powerful armament belonging to the United States has made its appearance in the China seas, and the officer at the head of it has been entreated to give his support to the tottering throne of the Tartars. Time will show whether the rumours regarding the nature of these negotiations be

correct or not, but the inevitable result of any such intervention requires no comment. At the same time, an American mission has been sent to break up the exclusiveness of Japan, and demand the opening of its ports to the commerce of the world; and this pacific message is wisely backed by a naval force, with more than a hundred pieces of cannon. Information has recently been received, that, contrary to all expectation, it has met with a friendly reception; but, with all the caution and moderation the American functionaries may exert, they will find it difficult to escape the result which so constantly follows the contact of a highly-civilized and vigorous power with one that is less civilized and feebler. Whenever America may be brought into collision with the jealousies, the prejudices, and the arrogance of Orientals, the issue will no longer be under her control. Then, again, a new Anglo-Saxon empire is rising as if by the wand of a magician, in the more immediate neighbourhood of these Asiatic kingdoms; and in the course of thirty or forty years there will, in all probability, be a British population of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 in Australasia, with a steam flotilla of some hundreds of vessels. The various countries of eastern Asia will thus be pressed on all sides by external and irresistible influences; and who will venture to assert, that any of the old dynasties of Japan or China, Cochin-China, or Siam, will long be able, under such circumstances, to maintain their national independence? Nothing can be farther from my wish than to justify an aggressive policy on the ground of "destiny," but

when we are required to look to the approach of a period when the natives of India will throw off the dominion of England, we are at full liberty to meet the remark by showing that such a contingency becomes every day more remote and improbable. The increasing weakness and disorganization of all Oriental states, and the rapid growth of European strength, resources, and proximity, clearly indicate the tendency of events to one result,—the ultimate extinction of all Asiatic independence, and the establishment of Anglo-Saxon authority throughout the regions of Eastern Asia.

Mr. Cobden asserts that deeds of violence and injustice have marked every step of our progress in India, and he expresses a hope that the national conscience will be roused ere it be too late from its lethargy, and put an end to them. Seventy years ago, the same charges were brought against the Government of India, in language infinitely more impressive, by the first orator of the day; the great delinquent was arraigned for high crimes and misdemeanors in Westminster Hall; the most splendid talent in the nation was arrayed against him with such efficacy, that even he himself was confounded by the torrent of eloquence, and involuntarily exclaimed that for half an hour he really considered himself the greatest villain under the sun. But he received an honourable acquittal, and the reflections cast upon him and the Government of India are, with one or two exceptions, regarded in the present day only as serving to illustrate the virulence of party animosity. The same spirit of

hostility to the East-India Company and its administration has been again manifested, and the denunciations which are now launched against the Court, are doubtless destined to the same fate as those of which they are the mere repetition. Deeds of violence and injustice have not marked every step of our progress in India. No one has ever attempted to extenuate the transactions which occurred between the departure of Clive in 1759, and his return to Calcutta in 1765: they were a disgrace to our national character; and the conduct of the Company's servants, who found themselves suddenly raised from the condition of merchants and factors to that of princes, and invested with irresponsible authority over twenty-five millions of people, in a country abounding in wealth, is deserving of all the indignation which Mr. Macaulay has poured on it. But the opprobrious language which Mr. Cobden has thought fit to adopt cannot be applied, with the smallest regard to truth, to the proceedings in which such men as Lord Cornwallis or Lord Wellesley, Lord Hastings or Lord William Bentinck, Lord Hardinge or Lord Dalhousie, have been the chief actors. No empire of such magnitude, either in ancient or modern times, has ever been erected with so little violence or injustice. When the East-India Company ceases to present the most popular object of political invective, when its acts have been transferred from the domain of politics to that of history, and are viewed with those calm and impartial feelings with which we contemplate the progress of the

Roman empire, there can be no doubt that the establishment of the British dominion in the East will be considered as a stupendous monument of national valour, wisdom, and genius. In less than a century, a handful of men, whose number, including soldiers, has never exceeded 50,000, have succeeded in establishing a magnificent empire over 150,000,000 of people, by a machinery originally devised for a commercial enterprise. It is the same seal which once attested invoices of Madras piece goods and Dacca muslins which has been affixed to treaties by which kingdoms as large as England have been disposed of. Throne after throne has been subverted, and the people of twenty languages and a hundred and twenty provinces have been taught to regard the Company of merchants trading to the East Indies, as the incarnation of sovereign power. With the exception of one or two reverses, the career of victory has never been interrupted, and no province once annexed to our dominions has ever been lost. The empire thus won by valour has been consolidated by the exercise of great political wisdom and high and noble principles, and it has been the constant aim of the British legislature and the Indian authorities at home, from 1772 to 1853, from the days of Lord North to those of Sir Charles Wood, to bestow on the inhabitants of India the best institutions which could be devised, and they were susceptible of. If, in the subjugation of kingdoms, princes have been inevitably reduced to the condition of stipendaries, we have at least endeavoured to raise their subjects from the condition

of serfs to the dignity and happiness of men. We are the only conquerors who have ever continued, from generation to generation, to bestow upon the families of prostrate and dethroned monarchs allowances to the extent of a million and a half sterling a year. The Government of the East-India Company has introduced peace and order where it found anarchy and oppression, and it has bestowed on the people subject to its sway those blessings of security and ease which they never enjoyed before. It may be little praise to say that India has been better governed by British functionaries than it was by their Mahomedan predecessors, but it is no small honour to the Court of Directors that the Government of India, under their management, has exhibited so happy a contrast to that of the colonies administered by Ministers of the Crown under the vigilant eye of Parliament. In a recent publication of the India Reform Society, the extreme cases of misgovernment on our part, and the rare instances of good government under the native princes, have been placed in juxtaposition, with the view of discrediting the East-India Company; but the reputation of a Government is to be determined by the general character and the fundamental principles of its administration, and not by certain extreme cases invidiously selected by its enemies. That there are many defects to be corrected, and many deficiencies to be supplied, in order to bring the Indian administration up to the level of public expectation in an age of unexampled progress, will be most readily admitted; and it is no small privilege for India to have this

high pressure of improvement constantly applied to it. Still, however numerous may be the flaws which we detect in the edifice when it is examined more closely, the empire we have raised in India is a noble and august spectacle, which foreigners regard with admiration, and which we may justly contemplate with feelings of national exultation.

The most prominent characteristic of the British empire in India and of its administration is its English features. Everything in it and about it is English. The family likeness of the offspring to the parent is so minute and strong as to appear "ridiculous." It is English in the rapidity and magnitude of its growth; English in the robust virtues by which it has been consolidated; and English also in all its imperfections and anomalies. The rapid rise and expansion of British interests in India correspond most faithfully, both in point of time and character, with the increase of domestic interests at home. It is during the period, dating from the close of the American war, in which our ships, commerce, and colonies, our manufactures and our industries have expanded beyond all precedent or expectation, that our dominion in the East has been stretched from the narrow limits of Bengal to its present imperial size. The one is not a greater phenomenon than the other, and they are both equally English in their nature. In like manner, the wisdom and the vigour which have given a character of stability to the Government of British India, are but the counterpart of the national virtues by which our institutions in England have been improved and

strengthened. But it is chiefly in regard to the defects and blemishes of the Indian administration, that its English character is so particularly visible. A brief reference to the salient points of similitude may be instructive, possibly amusing, to those who had been led to the conclusion, that everything in India is different from everything at home; that the one is all perfection, and the other all deformity.—It is objected to the Government of India that its revenues have been absorbed, and a debt incurred to the extent of £50,000,000 sterling, in wars; but what is this but an imitation of the example of England, the revenues of which have been exhausted, and a debt of £800,000,000 contracted, in the prosecution of wars?—It is affirmed that the expenditure of the revenues of India, past, present, and prospective, in military operations, has deprived its Government of the means of carrying on those national improvements which were so desirable; and, in his recent speech at the Peace Conference in Edinburgh, Mr. Bright made precisely the same affirmation regarding the Government of England. —The public authorities in India are charged with a neglect of their duty in having made so inadequate a provision for the education of the people, and appropriated only £80,000, out of a net revenue of about £23,000,000, to that object; yet, in England, Parliament has, even in the present year, voted only £260,000 out of a revenue of £52,000,000.—

Then, it is affirmed that in India the Government has allowed the indigenous schools, which existed in every village, to go to decay. Even if this charge

were as true as it is fabulous, it will be found to be only an imitation of the neglect which has been exhibited in the mother country, where property of the supposed annual value of £700,000 or £800,000 sterling, devoted by the piety of our ancestors to benevolent and educational purposes, has been diverted with perfect impunity from its legitimate object; while the attempt to remedy this great evil, which was commenced thirty-seven years ago, has received the sanction of Parliament only in the present year.—It is a matter of accusation that there is no criminal Code in India, and that the Criminal Courts are guided by laws which are an incongruous compound of Mahomedan institutes, and English Acts, and local regulations; neither is there as yet a criminal Code in England, though the means of completing it have been so much more abundant, and the criminal law of England is the patchwork of centuries.—It is affirmed that the civil law in India is a mass of technicality, abstruseness, and complication. But these defects arise almost entirely from the circumstance of its being so servile a copy of English law, once deemed the perfection of reason, but which the *Times* now stigmatizes in such language as this: "The practice of our own Court of Chancery, the special pleading abominations of our Common Law Courts, and the cruelties in our own criminal procedure, until a comparatively recent epoch, should render us quick to sympathize with the wretched Indian, who groans under similar troubles." —The decisions of some of the Company's Judges in India have been held up to reprobation, and Mr.

Norton, an English barrister, has culled from a number of cases at the Madras Presidency, certain instances of inconsistency and injustice, with the view of exciting public indignation against the Courts. But are the decisions of the Courts at home so entirely free from all anomalies? Many can recollect the time when the *Examiner* was in the habit of denouncing, week after week, the judgments of the Criminal Courts in London, under the head of "Justices' Justice." A few days after the appearance of Mr. Norton's work various decisions in the courts in this country, characterized by the same inconsistencies which he has exhibited, were exposed to public contempt in the columns of the *Times*. Nor will it be forgotten that one of the most eminent and venerable of the Judges of England, on the perusal of Mr. Norton's collection, affirmed that he should find little difficulty in adducing from the records of English Courts, within the circle of a few years, quite as many instances of strange and indefensible decisions. Admitting that all the cases selected by him are deserving of the obloquy he heaps on them, are they more singular, and more revolting to our sense of justice, than the decisions of many an Election Committee, to whom Parliament has delegated its judicial functions, and who have, during the present session, unseated members for the crime of bribery, recording at the same time their perfect conviction that many of the men thus subjected to an ignominious penalty were not only ignorant that any bribery had been practised, but had used every effort in their power to prevent it?

I am not attempting to extenuate the decisions of the Madras Bench by this comparison; my object is simply to show how much they correspond with decisions in this country. — The heavy costs of suits in India are generally complained of. Legal charges are doubtless very atrocious, but they are also very English. In this country County Courts have recently been established, to render the administration of justice not only simple and expeditious, but also cheap; yet the average cost of suits in these Courts is found to be equal to one-fourth the sums decreed.—In India salt has been taxed to the extent of 300 per cent., but this appears after all to be only a humble imitation of the example of England, which at one period subjected its native salt to a tax of 600 per cent.—It is also matter of reproach that the manufacture of salt has been prohibited in the lower parts of Bengal; but here also the Government of India cannot claim the merit of originality, for England had anticipated it by prohibiting the cultivation of tobacco.—Even the anomalous construction of the Government of India, to which so many objections have been raised, only serves to remind us the more vividly of the constitution of our native land. During the debates on the India Bill, Mr. Cobden declared his inability to discover where the Government of India was seated; and a foreigner coming to this country, without any knowledge of the complicated machinery of our constitution, finds precisely the same difficulty regarding the Government of England. It has been affirmed with great truth that India, to be well governed, must

be governed in India, and of this we have the most decisive proof in the fact that the three most recent improvements of the Telegraph, the low and uniform Postage, and the extension of the Rail, originated in the proposals of the Governor-General. Yet he cannot take a single step which is not liable to be reversed from home, and there is always a degree of uncertainty as to the reception which his measures may experience. The government of the British possessions in India has been confided, by the wisdom of Parliament, to the East-India Company, yet the Company cannot despatch a single order to India without the sanction of the Board of Control, which, in its turn, is so fettered that it can originate nothing. We are thus surrounded on all sides by anomalies, but they are scarcely less numerous and striking than those which are exhibited in the construction of the English Government. Here, the executive authority of the State is in the hands of the Ministers selected by the Crown, but their measures may at any time be frustrated, and they themselves turned out of office, by an adverse vote of the House of Commons, which vote, again, may be overruled by the Upper House, and upon which the Crown may place its veto. The anomalies of the British constitution, when viewed in connection with the results of this anomalous system, are the greatest political enigma of this or any other age; and they have been, to a considerable degree, reflected in the constitution of the Government of India. In both cases we have check upon check to such a degree that a spectator might be dis-

posed to believe the game would soon be up, and the administration brought to a dead lock. Yet, amidst all these theoretical inconsistencies, the great objects of good government and national improvement are prosecuted with greater success than in Governments of which the principle is more simple. In France, in Austria, and in Russia there is a total absence of all such perplexing anomalies. The theory and the practice of those governments are the very quintessence of simplicity; there is no difficulty in discovering where the government is; it centres in the three Emperors. It seems to be of the essence of constitutional Governments that the magnetic pole of authority should be invisible, and we have communicated no small measure of this principle to the system devised for India.

But the most important and practical point of resemblance between the mother country and the dependency, has reference to the means of internal communication. It is objected to the public authorities in India that they have done nothing worthy of notice in this department of public duty, beyond the construction of the Great Trunk Road and the Ganges Canal. But in England, also, the road to Holyhead and the Caledonian Canal are, I believe, the only great public works which have been completed at the public expense. The numerous railroads which intersect this country in every direction have been constructed from private capital, and it is precisely to the same source we must look for the same advantages in India. Railroads are the first political, military, and commercial

necessity of India, and before the wants of that country can be said to be fully supplied, it will be necessary to expend between twenty and thirty millions sterling. It is of course beyond the means of the Indian Government to provide for this expenditure, out of a revenue, which, even in time of peace, is barely adequate to the demands on it. The rail must be constructed from the funds of the community, and chiefly from the overflowing capital of England. Owing to the peculiar circumstances of India, no such application of private resources to a great national undertaking can be expected, except under the guarantee of the public Authorities. Much the same necessity is felt in regard to the colonies of England, but it is particularly apparent in the matter of public undertakings in India. But if the wishes of the India Reform Society had been carried, and the Government of India, instead of being intrusted to the East-India Company, had been at once vested in the Crown, and its obligations, both of the past and of the future, had been identified with those of England, and subjected to the confirmation of Parliament, small indeed would have been the hope of Indian railways. The utmost repugnance would have been manifested to augment the pecuniary obligations of England to the extent required for an adequate system of railroads in India. The diffidence which the Colonial Secretary recently exhibited in proposing to Parliament to guarantee a loan for the relief of the finances of Jamaica, to the extent of only half a million sterling, clearly indicates the difficulty which would have been experienced in

obtaining a Parliamentary sanction for raising thirty times that amount for the benefit of India. By continuing the Government of India in the East-India Company, however, the most ample provision has been at once made for our railroads. On the arrival of Lord Dalhousie's Minute, the Chairman of the Company was enabled, by a stroke of his pen, to guarantee four and a half per cent. on loans to the extent of £12,000,000 sterling, to be applied with promptitude and vigour to the construction of the Rail at the three Presidencies. Mr. Bright, in a recent address at a public meeting, designated the Government of India as the *hocus-pocus* Government of the Board of Control and the East-India Company. But in reference to the all-important question of Railways, it was a most fortunate circumstance that Mr. Bright's advice in Parliament was not adopted, and that the Government of India was not transferred to the Crown; and it is to be hoped that this hocus-pocus Government will be continued, at least, until the great duties which it alone is able to accomplish have been completed, and India is covered with a network of Railways.

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NOTES AND OPINIONS

OF A NATIVE

ON THE PRESENT STATE OF INDIA

AND THE

FEELINGS OF ITS PEOPLE.

RYDE, ISLE OF WIGHT:

PRINTED BY GEORGE BUTLER, COLONNADE, LIND STREET.

1848.

PREFACE.

THE following Notes were designed some months before the departure of the writer from India, and were arranged before he left that country, on his way to England. He offers them with great diffidence, and with an impression that he has much to fear, and little to hope; but he can assure the reader that he has been an eye-witness of many of the abuses which are herein related; and the candid will allow, that they are in accordance with the truth. The author knows them to be in unison with the sentiments and opinions he has constantly heard his countrymen express. He also begs to state, that he would not have ventured to present his Notes in their present form, repu[illegible]nt as he apprehends they are likely to be to a great many English readers who have been accustomed to view the subject in a different light, were not his own observations confirmed by English writers of the highest distinction and character who have had every opportunity, by personal experience and long residence in the country, of forming their judgment. In the course of reading these Notes many quotations from them will be found. The writer has felt the imperative necessity of using them largely, to shew both the propriety of his own views and opinions, and the just claims of India to the attention of the English nation, and would particularly beg pardon of the reader for giving the long narrative of Peer Buksh, which is so characteristic of the oppressive system of the Indian police, that he thought it better to run the risk of being blamed for its length, than to omit a document so corroborative of the facts.

After a perusal of these pages, and of the unquestionable authority on which they are supported, it will surely be admitted by impartial persons that some thing should be done. The reputation of England and the welfare of India demand some

effectual amelioration. The evil is generally admitted, and "Prevention is better than cure."

In return for their allegiance and long-tried attachment to the British rule, the natives of India naturally want nothing more than security for their lives and property; their religious usages and customs; the restoration and enjoyment of their resumed and long-established rights; and the removal of the distinctions of color and creed in the Government of their country, which distinctions, though discountenanced by the existing Charter of the East India Company, have marked, the writer is sorry to say, to the present time, the policy of the British towards its Indian subjects, which has proved to be not only ruinous to them and their country, but to have destroyed the good name of the English in the estimation of the Asiatic nations in general. Civilisation does not teach the perpetuation of these differences in the political relations of mankind, and of one race with another.

"What has Religion to do with Politics?" is the title of a book just published by Mr. MORIER, the truth of which cannot be denied by statesmen who regard, with eyes of justice, the sacred prejudices of their fellow-creatures. The wish of the natives of India is in itself a just and reasonable one, and ought no longer to be rejected. The British Government must not delay attending to their long talked-of complaint; not merely for the sake of those whom Providence has placed under English rule, but from a due consideration of its own interest.

One of the nobles of England, whose administration while in India was greatly admired and appreciated by the natives, once said, that among various plans which he had formed for the benefit of India, one was, to restore the College at Delhi, as the centre of Mahomedan literature, and Benares as that of the Hindoo; and to raise and conciliate the broken nobility and gentry of the land by assembling them around the Governor General as an Honorary Guard. Such a design was well worthy of the projector, and would have been highly beneficial to the people, and popular to Government, if carried out, and consistent

with the practice of ancient monarchs. It would have gone far to attach the respectable classess of the natives to a rule which they now dislike, and would have given them a political position, and, at the same time, have opened to the head of the Government a new channel of acquiring correct information regarding the country and the people.

One of the greatest evils of the Indian administration is the succession of changes in the office and the inexperience of the Governor General, as also the general ignorance which prevails in England about the affairs of India. Those only who give themselves the trouble to enquire, know any thing about them: the generality form their opinions from paragraphs and leading articles of newspapers, which are received in society as the truth, although the sources from which they are derived are either particular newspapers published by Englishmen in India, or the partial representations of parties who are desirous of having it supposed that the people of that country are quite happy and contented with their condition, and that to imagine otherwise is a great mistake. Much stress also is laid on the advantage of appointing a person to the high office of Governor General free from any local bias. No doubt that is a reasonable motive, but it should be asked, does it compensate for the disadvantages to which such an important trust is exposed by the appointment of entire strangers? About every third or fourth year a fresh Governor General is sent out who may perhaps never before have been to that country, and who, from the position in which he stands, hardly learns any thing beyond that which may come to his knowledge in the routine of business, through an official medium. As soon as he begins to know something of the country, and when he ought to remain, he is either recalled or voluntarily returns to enjoy life in his native land. What is required is, an unprejudiced Head possessing extensive information, clear understanding, with some local experience, and who will listen and attend to all parties, but may act independently on his own judgment.

The writer hopes to be excused for the freedom of his remarks.

If the reader will do him the justice to refer to the authorities whom he has quoted, he will find that the author of these Notes has not used such strong terms to convey his ideas, and those of his countrymen, regarding the faults and defects which he has noticed, as have been employed by the English themselves. From a desire not to provoke the feelings and prejudices everywhere common to human nature, he has not told the whole of the truth.

The writer assures the reader that these Notes are intended rather for the information of, than against Government. Though he almost despairs of meeting with a suitable consideration from the majority of such of the English readers who are already prejudiced against any reform, and believe India and its people still in a happy condition, yet he does not fail to entertain a sincere hope, that there are many who are inconsiderate to the matter herein treated merely from error, and not from design, but have good sense and experience enough to judge between right and wrong, and readily admit the truth when explained. It is among the latter that, he trusts, his Notes will meet with that due attention which the true interest of England, and the welfare of India, so loudly demand.

RYDE, ISLE OF WIGHT,
August, 1848.

ERRATA.

Page 42, line 11, *for* a hundred, *read* hundred.
—— 46, —— 2, *for* easily, *read* easy.
—— 49, —— 16, *for* gentlemenly, *read* gentlemanly.
—— 50, —— 17, *for* natives princes, *read* native princes.
—— 55, —— 18, *for* happen, *read* happens.
—— 60, —— 4, *for* enjoyed, *read* engaged.
—— 64, —— last, *for* cannon, *read* cannons.
—— 65, —— 26, *for* karavan, *read* caravan.
—— 68, —— 15, *for* 1807, *read* 1707.
—— 76, —— 5 of note, *for* gentlemenly, *read* gentlemanly.
—— 82, —— 2 of note, *for* Eddiscombe, *read* Addiscombe.
—— 84, —— 8, *for* who not, *read* who are not.
—— 91, —— last, *for* latter, *read* former.
——123, —— 6, *for* their, *read* its.

NOTES.

Much has been said and written by European historians and travellers about the British Administration in India. Many have written in its favor, and a few against it; but, as is the rule of the day, the voice of the majority is of course heard, and its influence is successful. No pains have, however, been taken by those whose duty it is to make a distinction between conflicting opinions, or rather between right and wrong, and, consequently, the evil of depending wholly on a few Authorities and precedents, in spite of common sense and reason, instead of using their own understanding to sift facts from misrepresentations, is felt by the governed, and continues to involve the Government of the country in fresh difficulties and confusion.

The picture which has been drawn of the constitution of British India is liable to deceive any casual observer, much more those who have not had an opportunity of studying the matter personally; but, when we open our eyes, and look a little deeper than the surface, and observe its working, the illusion is dispelled, and a true view of the

subject may then come in sight. The fact is, very few have availed themselves of the means of knowing the character and feelings of the people, by mixing with them beyond the sphere of their duty, and hence their opinions have generally been borrowed from others. The important representations of those, however, who have communicated the truth on personal experience, and have thus honestly done their duty to the Government and the people, are, unfortunately, treated with distrust and derision by the bulk of their readers, and are perhaps forgotton for ever, as no favorable result appears to have been produced by their labors, while affairs are still stated to be managed to the satisfaction as well of the people as of the Government; but such a happy state of things is far from real. It should be noted, that we have hitherto generally had foreign writers, who, from a particularly reserved mode of intercourse with the natives, were hardly able to ascertain the actual truth, which cannot, however, be long expected to remain concealed. The natives of India, who have hitherto been patient spectators of the scene, are now becoming alive to their own interests and welfare, and are beginning to grow loud in their complaints of the condition to which they have been reduced; a continuance of which state they instinctively consider oppressive, and degrading to them as a nation.

The sensible remarks now and then made by the native Newspapers, which have, of late years, been

numerously published by the natives throughout India (especially by "*The Hindoo Intelligencer*," a paper conducted in the English language, by a well-educated and highly-respectable native gentleman) in Calcutta, speak volumes as to the true state of things between the natives and their masters. The dislike in which Government is held by its own Indian subjects may be traced to the effect of the existing system, founded in ignorance, or in an exclusive policy.

A short, but honest, statement of facts, from the pen of a native, may not be worthless. It would, however, have been more satisfactory, if so mighty and important a subject were treated by some abler person than myself; but, in the absence of another, I take the liberty, though not so well fitted as the importance of the task demands, to state the following circumstances, a knowledge of which I have acquired in the course of my personal experience, during a long period of service.

In undertaking the duty, I assure the reader that I am actuated solely by a just motive, namely, to discharge my obligation both to the Government I serve, and to the country which has given me birth: I will but confine myself to a few general remarks only, as to enter into details would be going over trodden ground. For particular information I refer the reader to some of the European authors, such as the Honble. F. J. Shore, and other unbiased and able writers, who had good opportunities of

studying the character of the natives, and of acquiring an accurate knowledge of their actually encreasing state of depression, from the defective operation of the British rule over them.*

The British Government in India is divided into two distinct departments, namely, the Home, and the Foreign. In the former, are comprised matters relating to the Judicial, Magisterial, and Financial administration of the territories immediately under British jurisdiction; and, in the latter, the connection of the Government with the native States, independent or otherwise. I will commence with the first, touching on its respective branches separately.

JUDICIAL.

On the introduction of the British power in India, the country was governed by the laws and institutions recognised and established by the Mahomedan Government; the continuance of which was guaranteed by the British.† These institutions had existed for centuries, and the people had become

* "Shore's Notes" ought to be in the hand of every British Officer appointed to the Indian Service. The Discourses of Sir W. Jones, and the Reports of Grant, Elphinstone, Munro, Malcolm, &c., as well as the 5th Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, on the affairs of India on the renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1813, may be also consulted.

† Vide Preamble to Regulation I. of the Rules and Regulations first issued by the Government of Bengal. The British Legislature has declared, "That the Indian Subjects of Britain shall be protected in their rights according to the Laws and Constitution of India."

habituated to them, as they agreed with their manners, customs, and usages, and from the simplicity of their nature. Referring to the importance of combining the one with the other, Sir W. JONES observes, in the Preface to his Translation of the Hindoo Law,—"It is a maxim in the science of legislation and government, that *Laws are of no avail without manners*, or, to explain the sentence more fully, that the best intended legislative provisions would have no beneficial effect even at first, and none at all in a short course of time, unless they were congenial to the disposition and habits, to the religious prejudices, and approved immemorial usages of the people for whom they were enacted; especially if that people universally and sincerely believed, that all their ancient usages and established rules of conduct had the sanction of an actual revelation from heaven: the legislature of Britain having shewn, in compliance with this maxim, an intention to leave the natives of these Indian provinces in possession of their own Laws, at least on the titles of *contracts* and *inheritances*, we may humbly presume, that all future provisions, for the administration of justice and government in India, will be conformable, as far as the natives are affected by them, to the manners and opinions of the natives themselves; an object which cannot possibly be attained, until those manners and opinions can be fully and accurately known." Notwithstanding the foregoing, the guarantee in question seems to have

been forgotten, and, instead of these laws and institutions being amended where thought necessary, they were summarily abolished, and were replaced by others founded often in error, or prompted by self-interest, without the assistance of the best judges, namely, the natives of the country. The consequence was, the higher classes were depressed, and the management was placed entirely in the hands of foreigners, who neither had, nor can have as they are now situated, a sufficient knowledge of those who are subject to their authority. Oppression on the one hand, and aggrandisement on the other, have ensued. Instead of a well-digested and simple Code, we have now a heterogenious mass of Law, comprehensible only to those who made it.* In pre-

* "The Parliament of Great Britain decreed, that the natives of India should be governed by their own Laws and Customs. The Supreme Government established the existing system on the ground, no doubt, of its being best suited to the country of Bengal. But the situation of Bengal was widely different from other parts of India, which, it cannot be too often repeated, consists, not of one but of many Nations, and has not one but many systems of rules and of Laws.

Subsequent to the introduction of the Judicial system, the original Law has been almost buried under volumes of Regulations and ordinances rendered necessary to adopt it to our principles of rule. The best talents of the Civil service of the Company have been devoted to the Judicial Department, but, it may be remarked, that, although the Courts of Justice have been supported by the most liberal expenditure, and although those who preside in them are, generally speaking, as remarkable for their laborious application and abilities, as for their integrity, the Establishment has never become popular among the people, in conformity to whose real or supposed prejudices it was constituted.

The opinion of the Commissioners and several of the Judges in that country (Rohcilcund) was given in very strong language: and many other names of the best informed and ablest Civil servants in Bengal

paring it, our legislators seem to have paid no attention to the habits and feelings of the natives, being solely guided by their own judgment, otherwise the present system would not have proved so injurious as it has to the people for whose benefit it was intended. They were scarcely prepared for its intricacies, which are more beneficial to lawyers and imposters, than to suitors for redress.

In olden days, Civil affairs were settled simply by the head of the village and the qazi; the former was invested with the general superintendence of the police and matters of revenue, while the latter adjudicated Civil suits without difficulty, from his own local experience and information; and thus, in well-established districts, justice was brought home to every door, and the people were happy, seldom having to appeal to higher Authorities.

On the abolition of these institutions, English Courts of Judicature were introduced, and the work which had been done by hundreds, was assigned to a single foreigner, who, in the majority of cases, lacked much of that local knowledge so essential to help him in his decisions. As was to be expected, such an accumulation and concentration of business could hardly be gone through, by the exertion of

might be brought forward to establish the fact, that, in the countries under that Government, where the system has had a full trial, there has been considerable disappointment; and that, notwithstanding the improvements which have been introduced, much remains to be done before our Judiciol institutions can be made to fulfil the objects contemplated by their benevolent founder."—*Malcolm's "British India,"* p. 144.

one functionary, however zealous and diligent he might be in the discharge of his duty, much less when the judicial business was almost quadrupled by the litigious nature of these new Regulations. Great are the evils which have arisen from them. The judge, as well as the collector, were however, in a long course of time, relieved by Lord WILLIAM BENTINCK of a part of their onerous duties by the appointment of native judges and deputy collectors, a division of labor which has, in a great measure, accelerated the despatch of business; but oppression still continues, because they have yet only the same materials, namely, the Regulations, to work with; and, hence, justice is very difficult to be gained from British Courts of Judicature.* It is, however, true that the British functionaries have succeeded, in many instances, in restoring peace and apparent security, where anarchy had before prevailed. They have also suppressed predatory bands, such as the Pindaras, &c., who then rose, and were infesting the country. So far it is creditable to the British name. It is the only "blessing" resulting from their rule; and of which the English often so immoderately boast; but, when we take into con-

* "The inconvenience and delay of prosecution in our Courts are so great, and the chance of the ultimate conviction of great offenders is so small, that strong temptations are held out to the police to conceal, or misrepresent the character of crimes; and they must have a greater feeling of security in their tenure of office, and more adequate salaries, better chances of rising, and better supervision over them, before they will resist such temptations."—*Sleeman's "Rambles,"* vol. II., p. 316.

sideration the disorder which has been caused throughout India by the introduction of an ill-advised and inappropriate Code of Regulations, we can hardly think it counterbalanced by this blessing. Systematic intrigues and fraud, which are indisputably the chief fruits of the existing system, are now carried on boldly, with impunity. The intricate and technical forms of these bulky laws are beyond the comprehension of the simple people, the majority of whom are quite illiterate. They, however, enable the rogue to deprive his neighbour, and others, of their property and rights with a good grace, and, what is more astonishing, with the *ostensible* sanction of the governors. Owing to the careless manner that "Stamp Papers" (on which every suit, bond, or petition, has to be written) are sold, any person can purchase them to any amount, and in the name of any one, from the public Offices, without being questioned why and wherefore, and the dealer can thus make any use of them he pleases. It has now become customary with dishonest natives, who have any experience of the Regulations, to purchase, and to keep always by them, a supply of blank Stamp Papers for almost every year, to be used as their fraudulent designs may suggest. Notwithstanding the extreme severity of the law of forgery, the perpetration of that crime is so common within the Company's provinces, that even the commonest man can exercise it with facility.*

* For instance, it often happens that the man who goes and buys a

A detail of the anomalous proceedings of the British Civil and Criminal Courts, which take place daily in India, would occupy volumes to be fully described. It will, therefore, suffice here to say, that many, from poverty, have become fond of law-suits, because it is a profitable profession to them, having the risk of losing very little and gaining much. From the frequent cases of successful litigation, they have contracted a habit, and take pride in following their pernicious course; but their presence is really disgusting and dangerous to a man of honor and property, who, as far as possible, avoids going to law, yet he cannot do so always, for a rogue takes every opportunity to do him mischief.

For a confirmation of these facts, I can produce many European Authorities; one of them, Sir JOHN MALCOLM, writes as follows,—"The alleged defects of our present system are, that it excites a spirit of litigation; that its delays are great; that the expense attending suits is considerable; that the laws, from their original narrow basis, and from being framed more as expedients to meet particular cases than on general principles; have become so voluminous and complicated, that a complete knowledge of them is hardly attainable; that they are

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number of Stamps from the Office where they are sold, in every district, prepares false bonds for debts, &c., which he gets attested by bribed witnesses, and is thus enabled to prosecute his *illegal* designs by a *legal* process. To prevent such practices, Stamps ought only to be sold by and to parties who are authorised to make proper use of them.

consequently understood by few, and that among natives who study them, many have no object but to take advantage of their complexity to screen guilt, or as the means of involving or defrauding others with impunity."

The result is, that the laws have, with heavy taxation, combined to make the people extraordinarily quarrelsome, litigious, and consequently poor. Others who have any knowledge of the matter, and, if not biassed, readily bear testimony to the truth of the foregoing remarks. I have often heard, from very respectable British Authorities who have feelings of philanthropy, that, from choice, they would never have the Regulations of their Government in districts not yet coming under their operations. The fact is, that these districts are the best managed, and their subjects, though they enjoyed no other benefit from the liberality of the British Government, are yet free from the *boasted* blessings which have, unfortunately, become the fate of the majority of their brethren.

One of the greatest evils created by the Regulations, is a class of unpaid and venal advocates or pleaders (*vakils* and professional witnesses), who live solely on the money they extort from those who appeal for justice to the British Courts. Three-fourths of the suits which are filed, are instigated by these *legal* intriguers, as, without such business in hand, they cannot live. No case can be heard, unless advocated by one of these worthies, however

anxious the complainant may be to prosecute his own case personally. In ninety out of a hundred instances a rogue is successful, because, from his ill-gotten gains, he handsomely pays his pleaders. The only thing necessary for him is to arrange his suit according to law, which is very simple, and he is sure to be successful, for no one troubles himself to sift the truth; and, if he does, he cannot put his own judgment against the law. No one ever questions the integrity of the professional witnesses (who are the only people generally employed in giving evidence) as to how one person could have reasonably been the witness in so many cases in which he has given evidence. The larger number of witnesses, though they may be notorious rogues, is always more creditable than a smaller, though the reputation and character of the latter might never have been questioned. One may get as many witnesses as he likes at four anas or sixpence, or at most, eight anas or a shilling a piece, for there is no punishment for giving false evidence; and, besides, the people have become so poor, that they are willing to do any thing to save themselves from starvation. According to the former law of the land, which was once guaranteed to us, the evidence of trust-worthy persons only was admitted, and, hence, there was comparatively much less litigation during the time of the late Government than now.

There are numbers of other similar absurdities prevailing in the administration of justice in India,

The wonder is why they have been so long allowed to exist by our rulers. The only cause which we can trace out, may be their ignorance of the true state of affairs, or a tacit silence to serve self-interest. The fact is, those who make the laws for the country, are beyond feeling the effects of them; otherwise, we sincerely hope, these anomalies, which are so discreditable to the reputation of the British nation and ruinous to India, might not have existed. The only people who can have a true knowledge of the working of the existing system are the natives, the daily sufferers and observers; but, unluckily, they have no voice in the legislation, nor can they even raise it, and the channel through which alone the truth can be ascertained, remains yet closed.*

* "The most essential of all measures would be a revision of the whole of the Laws and Regulations, and the formation of an almost new Code. To the accomplishment of such a task, the very highest talents in the Service should be directed, and it would not so much require superiority of legal skill in those employed upon it, as that they should be endowed with minds unfettered by prejudice for or against any particular system, and be disposed to take the fullest advantage of the facts and experience which late years have accumulated. Such a commision would of course be aided by the information and opinions of the ablest natives from the different parts of our dominions. The most serious part of this question, and one which lies at the very threshold, is, whether we are, in the shape and substance of our administration of justice, to pay most attention to our own rules, principles, and prejudices, or to those of the nation, or rather nations, we have to govern? We may lay it down as a first principle, that no system can be good that is not thoroughly understood and appreciated by those for whose benefit it is intended. The minds of men can never be tranquillized, much less attached, until they are at repose regarding the intentions of the authority under which they live, which they never can be till all classes see and comprehend its principles of government."—*Malcolm's "India,"* vol. II. p. 162.

MAGISTERIAL.

The Criminal law is as inadequate as the Civil. It has failed to check the commission of crimes; nay, it has, on the contrary, served to increase it. The vices of adultery, theft, drunkenness, forgery, and perjury, have increased to an extraordinary degree.

No notice is taken of adultery by the law, and loose characters are thus allowed to indulge unpunished in their illegal passions, without any check.

Theft is very leniently punished, which circumstance, as well as the progressive poverty of the people, has increased that crime extensively. If a thief is seized, he is thrown into a jail, and is suitably provided, while nothing is done to redress the sufferer, although the former may be a man of estate. Hence, the thief generally enjoys his booty on returning home after his term of imprisonment is over, which is, in many cases, very short. Many paupers are so well inclined to live in jail, that, as soon as they are set at liberty, they purposely commit another crime in order to be sent back to their cheap accommodation. The sufferers, in the majority of cases, are always anxious to conceal their losses, because, if reported, they are compelled to attend the Court, and, instead of receiving redress, they are obliged to purchase their return home; and, if the theft is of a larger amount than the magistrate can take cognizance of, the matter is submitted to the circuit officer, where the sufferer must remain in

attendance for some months, and thus is subjected to a second, but legal robbery—I cannot call it by any other designation; as, instead of being sympathised with, the poor man is compelled to leave his home and family, to neglect his business, and to live on a larger scale of expense, and still not be allowed to return without paying, otherwise he gets entangled in some intricacies of the law, and involved in fresh difficulties.

Again, the police establishments, instead of protecting the community over whom they are placed, are worse than thieves, and are a great nuisance to the people. The thieves steal things by stealthy means, while these worthies extort by threats. Instead of devising suitable plans for protection, they continue meditating on the best schemes of making money some way or other, and many are the oppressions to which the poor natives are exposed in consequence. I could enumerate a hundred instances of their rogueries, but the fact is too well known to need an explanation from me. I will only refer the reader to the following instance impartially recorded by the Honble. F. J. Shore:

Narrative of a Passage in the Life of Peer Buksh, a Weaver, in the Village of Furyadpoor, in the District of Nahukkee.

"On the 15th of February last, I, the unfortunate Peer Buksh, had my house robbed; the manner was this: after the middle of the night, and the village watchman, having gone his rounds, had retired to rest, I was disturbed by a noise at one end of my house, and, suspecting thieves, got up to ascertain

the fact. I saw that several people had got into my house, though the door was still shut, and that they were engaged in emptying my chest, in which was contained a newly-wove web of cloth, and all the money I possessed. I opened the door, and shouted lustily for my neighbours to come to my assistance. Kulloo Khan, Moorad Ali, Sheikh Hingan, and one or two others, made their appearance. In the mean time the thieves had been consulting with themselves what to do; and I, watching, observed that they were busy passing my things through a hole in the wall by which they had entered. To save my property, I foolishly ran to the spot, and was immediately saluted by a stroke from a sword, which, grazing my temple, fell on my shoulder. My neighbours were running up to my assistance, but the man with the sword, rushing towards them, and hitting Kulloo Khan and Sheikh Hingan a slight cut each, they fell back, and the thieves escaped with the booty. Presently our good old mundul (village chief) Sadoo Meajée, hearing the scuffle, came to inquire what was the matter. Our first intention was to go to the police to give information of what had passed; but our friend Sadoo, remembering former occurrences, dissuaded us, saying, "What is past is gone; we know what has been, but who knows the future: why bring on certain trouble, seeking an uncertain remedy? Has not our landlord told us that if we wish to avoid trouble, we must shun the Company's servants? better remain quiet, and what will come, will come." Edified by this advice, we dropped all intention of complaint, and, as day began to dawn, we retired again each to his resting place. The hole by which the thieves had entered was, unfortunately, noticed by some persons, who mentioned it to the watchmen at the police-office; the watchmen repeated the story to the police-inspector (thanadar,) who presently came, accompanied by four policemen, to ascertain the fact. I was called on to say why I had not reported the breaking of my wall at the police, desired to report all that had happened, whom I suspected, and who had come to my assistance. No sooner had I mentioned the latter, than the

constables were dispatched to fetch them to the spot. In the mean time a new idea seemed to have seized the mind of the inspector; he said I was his enemy, all the people of the village were his enemies, and this was a concerted plot to bring disgrace on him. He really believed there had been no robbery, but it was our plan to say I had been robbed, so that, if the thieves could not be traced, he might be punished. He ordered me to give him a list of the articles said to have been taken away; and told me that, unless I would say who had them, I should certainly be punished. The poor old mundul (village chief) was one of the first who arrived, shoved along by a constable, but wrapped up in the shawl in which he had been sleeping. He was immediately sharply questioned by Bahadoor Khan, the inspector: his statement being the same as mine, the enraged functionary swore he was in the plot, ordered him to be stripped, and the rattan to be applied to his back. The old man appealed to me for having brought him into this trouble, which was immediately noted by Bahadoor Khan, as confirming his accusation; Moorad Ali came next, and was treated in the same way, their wrappers being retained by the policemen as proofs, I suppose, of their guilty connivance with me. Then came Sheikh Hingan, but his cut and my wound were mere tricks, and only proved the determined nature of our plot. At length, however, he seemed inclined to listen to reason, and desired the mundul to bring together the inhabitants of the village, that he might inquire if any one could assist in tracing the thieves; twenty or thirty came at once: the rest, seeing the marks on the mundul's back, walked out of the way, and betook themselves to the fields. Several suggestions were offered, but nothing satisfactory; at last, having levied two rupees as a fee to the police, from those who had experienced their civility, the inspector withdrew, leaving me, the sufferer, and my friends, under charge of the remaining two. By the advice of the good mundul, we suffered in silence, remaining without food or refreshment of any kind till evening, when our worthy protector left us. Thus passed the 16th. On the 17th we were all taken to the police-station

in the morning, and, after having been there detained till evening, were dismissed, on payment of the usual fee. On the 18th the same process was repeated, and again on the 19th. On the 20th we were only required to pay one rupee fee, without being taken to the station-house. On the 21st, we were ordered to accompany some constables to the village of Panchpara, to search the house of a suspected person for the stolen articles, and nothing having been found, were afterwards taken to the station-house, and discharged, on payment of the usual fee. On the 22nd we were told that the proof was now clear against us,—that we must go to the magistrate's station at Nahukkee to stand our trial. We fell at the feet of the inspector, and told him our families must starve, if deprived of the support of our daily labour: we never intended to make any complaint against him, and never should report the robbery that had taken place, he might, therefore, let us remain in peace, without fearing any injury from us. He required us to give him a proof of our sincerity, by signing a confession that no robbery had occurred, by building up the broken wall, and by paying him forty rupees for the trouble and annoyance we had given him. We replied that we had not so much money, but should endeavour to get it from our landlord, the owner of the village, who lived at a distance of two days' journey. Considering us to be in a complying humour, he seemed pleased, and allowed us to depart. We had then a consultation together, when the old mundul told us that he could no longer advise us to submit to such hardships; that we must complain to the magistrate, who would certainly give us redress, and remove the inspector, after which we should have a chance of better treatment from his successor. We approved the advice, and set forth with the mundul's brother, and several other friends, for Nahukkee, sending, at the same time, a deputation to the landlord, praying for his advice and assistance. Next day we were joined by some of the villagers, who reported that, as soon as our absence was ascertained, the people of the police-station had seized everything belonging to us they could lay hold of, and even attacked other people for

conniving at our departure. We consoled ourselves with the hope that the day of retribution was at hand; for though the magistrates could not see and prevent such things, they would certainly punish the perpetrators, when brought forward. On the 24th, we inquired when the magistrate was to be seen, as we had a matter of grievance to represent to him; but we were told we must wait, as he had important matters in hand, and would not then be troubled with other things. We then sent a second message to the owner of our village, saying that we could neither pay the money required by the police-inspector, nor obtain protection from the magistrate, and must, therefore, quit the village altogether, unless he could find some remedy. In reply, he desired us to persevere, and not submit to the unjust requisition of the inspector, and that he would assist in paying our expenses. Thus encouraged, we again demanded access to the magistrate, but were turned away by his servants, who told us that one day in the week was set apart by the magistrate for hearing of petitions, and we must wait till that came round. This would have required a further delay of five days; we therefore hit on an expedient, suggested by the mundul, to get a petition written in English by a clerk of his acquaintance at a neighbouring indigo factory, and sending it by the Company's post; it would thus fall into the hands of the magistrate on the same day, the gentleman being himself post-master at the station. We had the petition accordingly ready for dispatch by the time the postman came in, but that the address might be legible to the post-office writer, it was thought advisable that it should be written in Persian.

We then set out in our return to Nahukkee, anxious to be on the spot before the delivery of our petition, lest, peradventure, we should not be present when the magistrate sent for us, as we felt assured he would, as soon as he perused our petition. We stopped near the office, saw the postman come in and deliver our petition, with other letters, to the clerk, and waited for several hours in anxious expectation of the result; we were, however, doomed to be disappointed. This was on the 25th of

February: on the 27th, a court-runner, seeing our anxiety and impatience, told us the letter was still in the hands of the post-office clerk, but if we made it worth his while, he would take care that his master got it that day. We ascertained his terms, and immediately complied with them. He then asked us the particulars of our business, and said, as we were strangers, he should be glad to put us in the way of having our matter settled to our satisfaction: that we must respect the nazir (court-sheriff,) and the head-clerk of the court, otherwise we never could succeed. We were called in on the same day by the magistrate, and graciously informed that we must transfer our complaints, in Persian, on stamp-paper. We soon found a kind friend of the nazir's, who undertook to put our complaint into due form, as desired, and on the 1st of March, being Sunday fortnight after the robbery, we were happy in finding our complaint fairly on record, and, as we concluded, on the point of immediate investigation and redress. We soon learned, however, that justice is too valuable to be so easily procured. For the sake of regularity, one person only must appear as prosecutor, and he must give security to go through with his charge. The mundul's brother was the person who had explained to the petition-writer our case, and he was put down as plaintiff. To find a security where we were all strangers was, however, a difficulty, we should never have got over, had not our friend the court-runner found an obliging person who, for a small sum, was willing to offer himself in that capacity. For this we were very grateful; but another fee was to be paid to the nazir, who took on himself the heavy responsibility as reporting the surety as a good and sufficient person. The nature of our complaint being now generally understood, it was explained to us that what we had undertaken was no light matter. Bahadoor Khan, the police-inspector of our village, was a friend of the head court-officer, and he had not yet paid up the full amount of his douceur* for his appointment; we

* The douceur, or fee, to the head-officer, for his influence with the magistrate in procuring the situation of police-inspector for his friend; this, of course, must be realised by exactions from the people.

had, therefore, a powerful opponent, and if we did not make the other officers in the court our friends, we should place ourselves in an awkward predicament. We followed the advice we got, and our landlord, seeing the helplessness of our situation, gave us the necessary means for proceeding. A summons was at length issued to the inspector and his policemen to answer our charge ; some days elapsed, and the defendants failed to appear. With the assistance of our friendly court-runner, we contrived to get our petitions (which did not cost us anything,) presented to the magistrate even at irregular hours, and at last he kindly ordered a peremptory repetition of his summons to be issued. All this time we begged and entreated our landlord, who had an acquaintance with some gentleman known to the magistrate, to get them to use their influence in our favour ; but he replied that this was improper : that we must have patience, and we should have justice ; and that the inspector himself was so convinced of the danger of his own situation, that he had written to him to say he would make us compensation for the trouble he had given us, if we would desist and withdraw our complaint,—we were, therefore, sure to succeed, if we did not loose courage. We did as we were directed ; the prosecutor's deposition was taken, and he was ordered to serve subpœnas on his witnesses. It was in vain, he stated, that his witnesses were on the spot, having accompanied him to Nahukkee ; they must receive their subpœnas through the hands of the acting police-inspector of their own village, and be by him despatched to the magistrate's station. We knew what the consequences of doing so were likely to be : we should be made prisoners, placed under as strict a guard as if we were convicted felons, prevented even from stepping to one side in the way on any account, without a propitiation to the constables in charge. Finding, however, there was no alternative, we went back to our village, a distance of twenty miles, to receive our subpœnas. The acting police-inspector happily neglected to take us at the same moment in custody, and we availed ourselves of our liberty to hasten back to the magis-

trate's station, without the protection of his policemen. But hence arose another difficulty: the sheriff would not recognise us as the persons subpœnaed, because we had not arrived under custody of persons from the police-station, who could identify us. He was at length, however, satisfied to receive us, on condition that we should either give security for appearance, or remain under custody. Not knowing that the latter proposition implied further payment of fees, and the former requiring expense, we gladly assented, considering the sheriff as on the whole favorable to our cause. Next day we found our mistake: the constable placed over us could not live on his salary, and we were, therefore, obliged to support him. We were now every day in attendance at the court, sometimes examined by the magistrate, and sometimes by the court-officers. At last the worthy gentleman who had proceeded so far in our case was ordered to another station, and our affairs rested, while we were literally half-starved, without clothes or shelter from weather, which was very. severe. At length the poor old mundul was worn out by privations, and died. Then there came a new magistrate, and with him new distress, which shall be detailed hereafter."*

The reader is requested to bear in mind, that Mr. SHORE was one of the highest Judicial and Magisterial officers of the Indian Government, and in the constant habit of meeting with such cases, and knowing the operations of the subordinate agents of the police. He is therefore the last person who would give such a picture of their misdeeds, were they not of common occurrence.

For a confirmation of the narrative given by him, I might refer to Chap. 21 of Col. SLEEMAN's Ram-

* Since Mr. SHORE's Notes were written, some Regulations have been made to improve the system, but they have been of very little use in eradicating the evil.

bles headed "Indian Police—its defects and their causes and remedy." The following extract is enough here: "A robbery affords a rich harvest. Some article of stolen property is found in one man's house, and by a little legerdermain, it is conveyed to that of another, both of whom are made to pay liberally; the man robbed also pays, and all the members of the village community are made to do the same. They are called to the Court of the Thanadar to give evidence, as to what they have seen or heard regarding either the fact, or the persons in the remotest degree connected with it—as to the arrests of the supposed offenders—the search of their house—the characters of their grand-mothers and grand-fathers; and they are told, that they are to be sent to the magistrate a hundred miles distant, and there made to stand among a hundred and fifty pairs of shoes; till his Excellency the Nazir, the under-sheriff of the Court, may be pleased to announce them to His Highness the Magistrate, which of course he wont do without a consideration. To escape all these threatened evils, they pay handsomely, and depart in peace. The Thanadar reports that an attempt to rob a house by persons unknown had been defeated by his exertions, and the *good fortune* of the magistrate; and sends a liberal share of spoil to those who are to read his report to that functionary. This goes on more or less in every district."

Drunkenness out of doors was entirely prohibited

by the Mahomedan laws.* We now see an *Abkaree* or licensed shop, for the sale of spirituous liquors, almost in every town and large village. In fact, it has been made a source of revenue, instead of being altogether abolished, as tending to demoralize the minds of the natives.

Forgery and perjury have already been noticed, and demand no further illustration than to quote the following passage from the Minute of the Right Honble. HOLT MACKENZIE, dated in October, 1830, which is so appropriate here,—"We are everywhere met by people complaining of the Authorities set over them, and the Authorities complaining of the people. The longer we have had the district, the more apparently do lying and litigation prevail, the more are morals vitiated, the more are rights involved in doubt, the more are the foundations of Society shaken, the more has the work of Civil Government become a hopeless, thankless trial, unsatisfactory as to its immediate results, hopeless as to its future effects." The foregoing passage speaks volumes. If that true observer were still present there, he would be surprised at the wonderful progression of his prediction; nay, matters are getting worse and worse every day.†

* In the *firman*, or deed, executed by the late King Shah Alum, dated 29th October, 1764, conveying to the Company the Province of Ghazeepoor, and the rest of the Zamindaree of Rajah Bulwant Sing of Benares, it is expressly stipulated by His Majesty, "That the Company must use their best endeavours to prohibit the use of things of an intoxicating nature, such as are forbidden by the Law of God.

† "I believe that as little falsehood is spoken by the people of India, in

It is evident that these sad vices did not exist in India to such an extent before the introduction of the English Regulations. Where the latter have not yet been introduced, the former are very scarce.

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their village communities, as in any part of the world with an equal area and population. It is in our courts of justice where falsehoods prevail most, and the longer they have been anywhere established, the greater the degree of falsehood that prevails in them. Those entrusted with the administration of a newly-acquired territory are surprised to find the disposition among both principals and witnesses in cases, to tell the plain and simple truth. As magistrates, they find it very often difficult to make thieves and robbers tell lies according to the English fashion to avoid running a risk of criminating themselves. In England this habit of making criminals tell lies arose from the severity of the penal code, which made the punishment so monstrously disproportionate to the crime, that the accused, however clear and notorious his crime, became an object of sympathy. In India, punishments have nowhere been under our rule disproportionate to the crimes, on the contrary, they have generally been more mild than the people would wish them to be, or think they ought to be, in order to deter from similar crimes; and in newly-acquired territories they have generally been more mild than in our old possessions.

"The accused are, therefore, nowhere considered as objects of public sympathy, and in newly-acquired territories they are willing to tell the truth, and are allowed to do so in order to save the people whom they have injured and their neighbours generally the great loss and annoyance unavoidably attending upon a summons to our courts. In the native courts, to which ours succeed, the truth was seen through immediately, the judges who presided could commonly distinguish truth from falsehood in the evidence before them, almost as well as the sylvan gods who sat in the peepul or cotton trees, though they were seldom supposed by the people to be quite so just in their decisions. When we take possession of such countries, they, for a time, at least, give us credit for the same sagacity, with a little more integrity.

"The prisoner knows that his neighbours expect him to tell the truth to save them trouble, and will detest him if he does not; he supposes that we shall have the sense to find out the truth whether he tells it or not, and the humanity to visit his crime with the measure of punishment it merits, and no more."—*Sleeman's* "*Rambles*," p. 114.

Hence, we can confidently venture to affirm, that they are the offsprings of a bad system of legislation.

The wise remarks of Colonel (now General) GALLOWAY, C.B. (one of the best supporters of Government), in his Work on India, "that there is a systematic anarchy of Law at present in India," is too true to be disputed, and is still confirmed.

Would it not have been in every way just and beneficial to the people, and creditable to the Government, to have improved the old institutions, which were so congenial to the habits, customs and feelings of the people? A simple code, founded on those institutions, and revised in a judicious form, would have certainly secured to Government in both branches, the desired object, at the same time that it would have fully benefitted the people, and proved a blessing to the country, and thus would have been erected a lasting monument of British wisdom.

BURKE says, "a true politician always considers how he shall make the most of the existing materials—a disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve taken together, would be my standard of a statesman." This wise maxim seems to have been followed in Ceylon, but not in British India. In 1811 the people of that island were directed to be governed by their own established usages and old customs, and a simple Code was ordered to be prepared for their use accordingly. Why such a laudable measure was not introduced in India, is

difficult to be conceived. Its adoption would have greatly prevented the oppressions and injustice which so shamefully prevail throughout the British Provinces.

The object of every good law in every country is to protect the community of that country in the enjoyment of their rights and privileges, but the existing laws have failed to produce this benign effect. The wisdom of the English may be considered great in theory, but in practice it has failed in producing the desired result. The multiplicity of British Courts and system of appeals, and numerous technical forms, defeat the ends of justice, and the protection of the law. The less the number of Courts, the more comfort will it be to the people: we ought to have a simple Code of Laws suited to their condition. Each district should have a wise and well-experienced English Superintendent of known merits and integrity, having a sufficient knowledge of the colloquial languages, customs and manners of the people, with a suitable number of native judges employed in the interior, in almost every *Pargana*. The appeal should be confined from the native judge to the English functionary, who ought to be aided in the despatch of business by responsible native assessors or councillors.—Beyond a District Court there ought to be no appeal below a Lakh of rupees, and then it ought to be made directly to the Supreme Council. Trivial matters, however, ought to be decided by the people

themselves, by their selection of arbitrators in their own villages; and, in case of failure, before a *Pargana Panchaet*, which ought to be fixed by the Superintendent, in concert with the principal inhabitants.

In vol. II. p. 451 of his Book, Colonel SLEEMAN says, "The people are confounded at our inconsistency; and say, where they dare to speak their words, 'We see you giving high salaries and high prospects of advancement to men who have nothing on earth to do, but to collect your revenues, and to decide our disputes about pounds, shillings, and pence, which we used to decide much better among ourselves when we had no other court but that of our elders to appeal to.'"

Experience teaches that no law is better adapted to the convenience of a people than one in accordance with their customs, habits, and prejudices, and no one can be a better judge than he who lives among them. Where matters, judicial or criminal, are decided by a *Panchaet* they have generally given satisfaction. The reason is, they understand the motives, feelings, and circumstances of the different parties brought before them, as well as of the witnesses produced. From their local knowledge, they can decidedly do the work better than a European, better even than an Indian of another part of the country, as the people are divided into so many tribes and castes, following various customs and manners.*

* "It is often stated by those who are adverse to the extension of the

Unhappily, very few of our present governors have paid attention to the acquirement of a knowledge of these most essential points. Many innovations which have been made in the country, and proved ruinous to its people, can only be the result of an ignorance of these important matters. The best study of a governor ought to be the study of the people whom he governs, or he cannot be a useful instrument of Government; but the attainment of this knowledge is almost impossible to an European officer, under the circumstances existing, which will be separately detailed.

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judicature of *Panchaet*, that the records of the Government of India prove that they are not a popular Court, because they are not so much resorted to by the natives as the courts of *Adalat*. The cause of this has been elsewhere stated. Under a native prince, when complaints were made or accusation brought forward, and he, instead of a despotic award, directed, in a spirit of justice or moderation, that a *Panchaet* should assemble to investigate them, can any man, acquainted with the principles upon which such states acted, and the feelings of those subject to their authority, believe that the defendant or complainant (though each had the privilege of a fair challenge) deemed himself at liberty, whatever nominal forms might exist, to refuse to submit his case to the tribunal ordered to investigate it? He could not but know that such conduct would be deemed contumacy, and subject him to all the hazard of a summary and violent proceeding. Under the British Government men can have no such apprehension, and unless the rule is made absolute for trial of certain cases in these courts, it would not be in one out of a hundred that the two parties would assent. Both the plaintiff and defendant would calculate whether they had the best chance of gaining their suit by applying to a *Panchaet* or *Zillah;* and whenever they did not agree, the latter court, in which the forms compulsory would be that in which the case was at last tried. But this result must not be brought forward as a decided proof of its superior popularity. Before such a fact can be admitted, it must be established whether the preference to it is given by the honest men or the rogues.—*Vide Malcolm's "Central India,"* vol. II., p 296.

The *Panchaet* system is certainly very beneficial. It exists in Malwa, and its blessings are numerous to the people under its operation. If something similar to the above were introduced in the British Provinces, justice would be brought to the door of almost every individual. Now-a-days, besides the tedious and expensive mode of prosecution, very few obtain justice or protection from oppression. Should any one by chance succeed, he is likely to lose more than he gains, because the *Adalat* fees and extra expenses are very extraordinary. If, in addition to the proposed plan, the *Zamindars* or landholders of the villages were invested with the power of superintending and protecting their own villages, the continuance of the police establishment, to some degree, would become needless;* but its restoration cannot succeed, *i.e.* the *Zamindars* cannot become responsible, until they are restored to the same powers and privileges which they then enjoyed. We will speak at length of the extortions to which they have been subjected under the present Revenue system, and, without a modification of it, they can

* The duty of a zamindar in former days was to preserve the peace, to superintend Judicial, Police, and Revenue matters. He made good the stipulated rents to Government under a certain penalty. He also assisted the State against any rebellion or invasion, in proportion to his means. It was hence that business was carried on so satisfactory to all parties, and it is from the suppression of this system that an accumulation of difficulties has arisen in the administration. Akbar's instructions to his local officers for the management of the interior are very admirable, and with a few revisions might be beneficially restored. Some reform is positively necessary, and it is surprising that the old system is not revived.

never be so responsible as the necessity of the case demands.

When a theft occurs, the Zamindar is at present referred to by the Thanadar, but he shakes off the matter in the best way he can, because, in reality, he is not the responsible person. I have shewn from Mr. SHORE's Notes, in case of contradiction, he is liable to be confounded with real offenders. The Thanadar is vested with the entire management of the police. I have known instances in Malwa and in other parts of India where European officers have revived the old system as a temporary measure, and it had the desired effect of imposing a sense of strict responsibility on the proprietors, which increased their vigilence and prevented the usual frequency of crimes.

Instead of Thanadars, I would recommend native Pargana Judges or Superintendents, having the powers of a Thanadar on a larger scale, as well as of a judge. By the appointment of *Panchaets*, and by holding the *Zamindars* responsible for the safety of their villages and the roads, his duties, in both departments, will be much curtailed. He will have only to superintend the working of the *Panchaets* and the police duties. The members of the *Panchaet* and *Zamindars* should be empowered to decide the matters concerning their respective offices within a certain limit, and beyond it they ought to be referred to the Pargana Superintendent. Cases of a trifling nature are generally every where more

numerous than important ones, and hence very few cases can be brought before the Pargana tribunal.

I would give the powers of the Nizamut Adalats and Sadder Boards to the English Superintendent, and those of judge and magistrate to the Pargana tribunal, and of the Sadder Ameens and Munsiffs to the Panchaet and the Zamindars. The adoption of this plan will render justice and protection of easy access to every one, many of whom are now anxiously obliged to go in search of both to several Courts situated separately in places distant from their homes. Moreover the greater portion of the innumerable cases with which the Courts of Judges and Magistrates are overloaded, and which have generally their origin in intrigues and falsehoods, will almost totally disappear. People can seldom impose on those who know them. Only such litigation which has its origin in truth will then appear, and there could be no difficulty in settling it easily and simply, but under the existing system, however anxious the Government and its functionaries, of whatever merit and colour may be, it is almost impossible to gain that most desirable object.

REVENUE.

I regret to say, that the management of this department has generally proved as extortionary as the others have been unjust and oppressive. The

Zamindars and the tenants are hardly better off than the rest of their countrymen. The settlement is so hard that scarcely any thing is left to the poor peasant, and certainly very little to his landlord, to make them both comfortable. Even in a good season they live only from hand to mouth. In order to augment the income still more, the benefit of a permanent settlement, which, though subsequently accompanied by equally intolerable evils, was extended to the Lower Provinces from the very commencement, is yet withheld from the ceded and conquered Provinces. Nothing can be more unjust and impolitic than such conduct, especially with regard to the population of the Upper Provinces.*

The people who are more attached to the soil than to the Sovereign, are thus kept in an unsettled and discontented state. From their experience of the past, they have no hope of prosperity under the present system, and heartily wish for its removal. The Zamindars, from an apprehension of being deprived of the fruits of their expence and labour,

* In 1789, Lord CORNWALLIS introduced a permanent settlement in the territories of Bengal, which exists to this day, although the landholders, like their other brethren, have been deprived of some of their rights which had been enjoyed for many years, and were then guaranteed to them by Government. Owing to the litigious nature of the Regulations subsequently enacted, and which subjected the landholders to uninterrupted disputes, and the *Adalat* expences against their own tenants, who, under the protection of the law, tried, as far as possible, to withhold the payment of just dues, hardly any one remains in possession of his lands and villages; their estates having been sold by Government, and purchased by another class, who possessed wealth, but had no connection with the soil.

never try to do any permanent good to their estates. The permanent settlement, though distinctly promised under the governments of Lords WELLESLY and MINTO, are still withheld, from time to time, from the Upper Provinces, and the rental is progressively raised by the "over-zealous collectors," with a view to gain the favor of the Government, and thus to serve their own promotion, to the ruin of those who may unhappily be placed under the charge of such selfish public officers.

The privileges and powers which were formerly enjoyed by a Zamindar (as stated in another place) are entirely resumed throughout the country. He was the chief person between the tenant and the Government. Now, he has dwindled down to a mere collector of rents; yet there is no mercy shewn to him, or a peasant, if, by chance, he fail, from a hard season, or any other valid cause, to pay the Government revenue punctually. His estate, and the whole of his personal property, are sure to be sold by auction to satisfy the demands of Government. No consideration to his hitherto regular and long-made payments can save him from this misfortune. Having thus lost his credit, he must necessarily be a beggar for the rest of his life, as he has nothing left whereby to obtain means to satisfy even nature's wants. As to any other employments, they have nearly vanished under the present Government, as will be hereafter shewn.

In the Upper Provinces, hardly any of the old

Zamindars are to be found in existence, their estates having been disposed of either by the Government, or themselves, land being so heavily taxed as to have ceased to yield a sufficient return; and, besides the land revenue, they have to pay several other taxes, such as the fees of the Adalat, and the price of stamps, which have combined to hasten their ruination.

For a confirmation of this sad fact, the following quotation speaks for itself: "For some twenty or thirty years of our rule, too many of the collectors of our land revenue, in what we call the Western Provinces, sought the 'bubble reputation' in an increase of assessment upon the lands of their district every five years, when the settlement was renewed. The more the assessment was increased, the greater was the praise bestowed upon the collector by the revenue board, or the revenue Secretary to Government, in the name of the Governor General of India. These collectors found an easy mode of acquiring this reputation. They left the settlement to their native officers, and shut their ears to all complaints of grievances, till they had reduced all the landholders of their districts to one common level—beggary, without stock, character, or credit, and transferred a great portion of their estates to the native officers of their own Courts, through the medium of the auction sales that took place for the arrears, or pretended arrears of revenue."—*Sleeman's* "*Rambles*," vol. II., p. 350.

The subjects of the native princes, and, next to them, those of the Company's Provinces who are not under the operation of this grinding system, are comparatively much happier than those who enjoy "the blessings of English law." The reason is obvious: they, particularly the former, are treated with clemency, when visited by any unforeseen calamity, and, besides enjoying many other indulgences and rights, are free from the fees and expences of litigation, which help them to recover their position; but such leniencies are scarcely known in the present administration of the Government of India, although they were enjoyed by their own ancestors while in a similarly primitive state.

A reference to the *Aeen Akhoree* will shew that the system introduced by the Mahomedans was milder than the one now in force. In Turkey, it is not more than a tithe of the actual produce. Even in England, the centre of all laws and regulations, the land-tax is very mild. Since writing the above, I see an article in "*The Hindoo Intelligencer*," as follows: "The Bhasker of the 28th instant (April, 1848), in comparing the Mahomedan with the British rule, says, 'we hear of nothing else but schemes of raising the revenue; situations of emolument are denied to the natives of acknowledged merit, and unexceptionable character; commerce is monopolised by foreign merchants, and the profits of agriculture find their way into the pockets of Europeans. Money now leaves India, never to

return back in any shape whatever." This is a correct picture of the Indian finances, and any unbiased reader who examines the subject will readily admit the truth of it.

On my way down to Bombay, I questioned several of the *Patails* (landholders), whether they were happier under the present system than that which they enjoyed under the native Princes: they replied in the negative; and, as their reason, almost every one of them stated that there was no *Barkat* (profit) under the present rule; that formerly, if one of the family were engaged in cultivation, the rest contributed to its support, generally by serving the Ruler, while, at present, there is scarcely any public employment, and the whole family therefore depended upon their cultivation, which has comparatively been more exhorbitantly taxed than ever, and more subjected to extra expences. Throughout my whole line of march, I found the Nizams' territory better cultivated, and the Ryats more happy than in the Company's districts, where the poor peasants are in an actual state of poverty. These people are still in the enjoyment of their *wattuns*, or hereditary lands, but sad is the case of those who have been deprived even of this resource.

The resumption of the rent-free lands in the Bengal Presidency and in the Upper Provinces has reduced a great portion of the community to a state of starvation. I have heard and seen many of these miserable creatures, once the gentry of the country,

lingering out a wretched and degraded life. Numbers of substantial dwelling-houses have been pulled down, as their only resource, and the materials sold to prolong their existence. Any impartial person, desirous of knowing the truth, has only to go into the interior of the country to satisfy himself of it.

These lands were granted in times past to the ancestors of those from whom they have been resumed, in consideration of their services to their Rulers, or from charitable motives, and had been enjoyed from generation to generation for a hundred years. At the time of granting them, many of these lands were uncultivated. It was the custom of the Rulers to give away waste lands to encourage cultivation. The custom still prevails among the native Princes, but it was carried out more liberally by the old Rulers, not only to improve the country, but to attach the grantees more firmly to their respective settlements.

After much pains, labor, and expense they had fertilised and enriched these lands; and localities, such as the plantation of groves, the construction of wells, gardens, &c., some of which still exist, though in a decaying state, useful to the population and to the country. Was it just to have deprived them of these grants after they had been so long attached to them, and when they had no other support whatever to subsist upon? The great misery which this oppressive and unjust measure has brought on the country might melt the hardest heart; but it has

hitherto failed to move the compassion of a Government which prides itself so much on its civilisation and morality over "the semi-barbarous native Princes" of India.

The proceeds of these free lands amounted to 2,26,18,127 Rupees, or £2,492,564, and supported a large class of the community. They were a part of the rights of the people which, on the establishment of the British Government, were not only solemnly guaranteed to them, but were allowed to remain in their possession unmolested for more than half a century. What would be thought in England of an enquiry into the title-deeds of English estates held an equal time, and a re-measurement of the lands, with the intention of resuming a part of them for Government?

In 1783 a Regulation was passed that all rent-free lands, in whatever quantity, unless held under the sanction of the Governor in Council, or unless possession thereof had been obtained antecedent to the Government of the Dewanee, were resumable. No reasonable objection can be advanced against this Regulation; but yet it is a dead letter, and that selfish motives have predominated over good faith and solemn pledges, for the resumption of these rent-free lands, cannot be construed otherwise. To give a better grace to the breach of faith, some have advocated the justness of the measure, by stating that the *sanads*, or grants, held by these free-holders

were forgeries, which, after such a lapse of time and succession of rulers, is a very lame palliation.

Although very few of these papers can be properly proved to be false, if submitted to the investigation of impartial judges, yet, for argument's sake, supposing them to be all falsified documents, what can be said against a title derived from a possession enjoyed from time immemorial, and which had been so faithfully confirmed by the above Regulation? Nothing but covetousness could have led to the perpetration of such a palpable act of injustice.

The inadequate plea adopted for depriving the poor landholders of their possessed estates will strike any reasonable being. It is a well-known fact, that only those who were very old and on the point of death were exempted from the sweeping calamity for the remaining portion of their lives, but several of them died as soon as they returned home from the Commissioners' Courts, where the validity of these grants was examined. All this clearly shews a great abuse of power, especially on the part of a civilised Government. A native Government might have acted differently, and in a more noble and praise-worthy manner. Nothing but an absorbing cupidity, which is the characteristic feature of this proceeding, could have dictated such an extortion of long-existing rights. We have certainly hereby made our conduct towards, them both officially and privately, so odious, as to excite their

strongest prejudice against us, and to have rendered our authority highly obnoxious to them.

The fact appears to be this:—About this time, Government labored under great pecuniary difficulties. It had incurred an enormous debt by the late war in Ava, and annually required a large sum to pay the interest on loans, as well as for the payment of the pensions and establishment in England. The expenses were in excess to the income, by some millions. To obviate this difficulty was considered of primary importance by the Home Authorities.

Lord William BENTINCK having been nominated Governor General of India in 1827, was particularly requested by the Honorable Court of Directors, to extricate the Indian Government from its pecuniary embarrassment. The retrenchments which his Lordship made in the Civil and Military branches of the service, are too well known to require an explanation. These curtailments, however, were not enough. His next step, therefore, was to resume the rent-free lands, but the regulation of 1793, which prohibited the resumption of the lands held before the grant of the Dewanee, in some degree stood in the way. His resolution was firm, and could not, therefore, be shaken merely by a paper barrier. This Regulation was, in consequence, abolished by the promulgation of Regulation III. of 1828, which made the Governor General in Council, competent to appoint special Commissioners, to hear and decide upon all appeals made to them against the collectors on resuming the

rent-free lands. What justice can be expected in such Courts, is easily to conceive. Appeals were, as a matter of course, made by some of the helpless sufferers, not only to these Commissioners, but to superior Authorities, but without any effect.

This measure has made the British name more unpopular in India than any thing else they could have devised, and the enmity which it has produced has no bounds. Thus, is it cursed in almost every village which has suffered by these arbitrary resumptions, and surely with justice, as will be more fully explained hereafter. It will be only sufficient here to observe, that India is treated as if she had no master, because notice is seldom or ever taken of any oppressions to which the natives are subjected.

The local functionary placed in charge of a district is scarcely three years stationery, and as soon as he begins to acquire any knowledge of his little government, he is transferred to some other part. What interest can he take in a people, beyond a heartless execution of his duty, to remain in good graces with the Government? The nobility and the gentry are almost entirely annihilated, and so are the landed proprietors. Who is then to look to the improvement of the condition of the people, unless, according to the present fashion, every thing is to be managed by steam?

If a permanent settlement of the Upper Provinces were declared, as it is in the Lower, after a suitable abatement, for the existing one is almost intolerable,

and other heavy taxes reduced to a reasonable amount, that prosperity, which is now altogether absent, might be gradually restored, and the cultivator, and the farmer, or Zamindar, will then take a strong interest, and adopt better means of applying their energies to the improvement of their lands, and those public works, forming local ties, to which I have alluded, as now in a declining state, might be renewed. Otherwise, is it reasonable to expect that any person in the world will, generally speaking, take interest in the promotion of an object in which he has not some hope of ultimate benefit to himself or his country? A permanent settlement and an abatement of the present excessive taxation, will assuredly prove a blessing to the cultivators and Zamindars, and secure an unfluctuating revenue and good name to Government.

On my journey to Bombay, I saw near Ahmudnagur, a village* presenting some substantial temples and other buildings, as well as one or two gardens, but which are now, with the town itself, in a state of progressive decay. I asked the *Patail* the reason of the change. He told me, "that it was formerly held in *jageer* by the Panwars; but, that since its resumption, no one takes an interest in its improvement, because we have no immediate head, and an exhorbitant Assamiwar settlement which has deprived the cultivators even of the aid of the Zamindar,—and these circumstances have combined to

* Named Soopra.

ruin the village." There is apparently much truth in what the *Patail* said, for I saw numerous other villages which have been resumed in a similar condition. If, instead of resuming them, villages had continued in the possession of their old proprietors, on a fixed moderate assessment, or been given to others worthy of consideration, the prosperity of these villages would not have declined so rapidly. Perhaps this course is withheld from an idea, that natives will be oppressive to the *Ryats;* but this is a very wrong impression. On the contrary, they are much happier under an immediate protector whose interest it is to promote the welfare and cultivation of his village.

If, instead of pensions, lands were to be granted by Government to its native Dependants, the result would be beneficial to the country, and its present declining state be, in many places, arrested.

At the same time, it will be a very philanthropic and merciful act to restore the lands which have been resumed so unreasonably, and without any just grounds. These resumptions perhaps, might have not been felt so severely, if the people could have turned to any other means of subsistence; but, in their present miserable condition, it has proved very fatal to their well-being.

Nothing, therefore, will make the Government more popular than the recal of the Resumption Act. Such a measure would greatly serve to restore its good reputation, which has, I regret to say, now-a-days, been much deteriorated.

FOREIGN.

I am glad to say, that, in this Department, the British Government had, *at one time*, succeeded in establishing a good character and favorable impression throughout India. Their word was considered unchangeable, and their friendship courted on all sides, which was the result of the prudent and liberal policy wisely followed out by its Agents.

A reference to the administrations of CLIVE, SHORE, HASTINGS, and their successors, with little exception, will shew, that the line of policy followed, and the object incessantly kept in view by them, namely, the aggrandisement of power, were invariably the same; but the conduct of the Agents of Government towards those who were brought in contact with them was comparatively very conciliatory, gentlemenly, and generous—treatment which made the people, for a time, pleased with the change of masters, not knowing their ultimate fate and entertaining a hope of better days.

Since the time of WARREN HASTINGS the aspect of affairs is much changed. I do not mean to say thereby that Government has changed its policy; but the judicious rules which are laid down by it, for the guidance of its officers, are scarcely observed in many places. The wholesome system of non-interference has been generally put on the shelf, and the will of the local Agent has become the order of the day. This departure from the true

policy has been the cause of misrule and confusion in the management of many native States, especially the small ones. I cannot again help quoting a passage from Mr. SHORE's notes, as bearing me out in my opinion:

"Formerly, the English did pay some attention to the Natives, and treat them with some consideration and civility, and instances innumerable are on record, of the beneficial effects of such behaviour; while, not one can be adduced of any evil consequence arising from it. But since, for many years, the English have adopted an opposite mode of conduct, it is no wonder that the Natives regard them with dislike, and that this dislike is on the increase."

The occasional occurrence of warfare and insurrection in the dominions of the natives princes of India may be, in many instances, traced to a negligence, on the part of the British officers, of the line of conduct prescribed by their Government. Many are the evils which arise in consequence, and the blame is generally, though unjustly, thrown on the shoulders of the innocent Chief or his helpless functionaries. He is either charged with infidelity to the British Government, or inability to manage the internal affairs of his country, and hence unnecessary quarrels arise, and terminate in bloodshed, and the dethronement of the ill-fated prince, who is powerless to prove his innocence. Very few native States have their Agents present with

the Governor General. Until every one has a representative with the head of the British Government, the British Agent is the only channel of communication.

There can seldom arise any benefit from the direct interference of our Agents in the affairs of the native States, and hence there is no necessity for a continuation of it, unless it be for the purpose of increasing disorder and confusion in these different Principalities, so as to enable Government eventually to take possession of them on the plausible ground that their own Chiefs cannot themselves govern them properly, which is not always just.

The following remark made by Lord WILLIAM BENTINCK, in his Minute dated 30th of July, 1831, on the affairs of Oude, is very wise and true:

"Although I have presumed to differ with two of my distinguished predecessors on the question of right and obligation to force the Ruler of Oude to desist from his arbitrary sway, I beg to express my entire concurrence in the description given by Lord HASTINGS of the conduct and demeanour that ought to be observed by a British Resident, towards the King of Oude and to the Chiefs of all dependent States. In proportion as our power is notoriously overwhelming and irresistible, so should the display of it be carefully suppressed, and if possible invisible. The utmost delicacy should be used on all occasions of intercourse, whether of ceremony or business, to uphold the rank and dignity of the native Prince, and to treat him with the utmost consideration and attention. The errors of our policy in this respect seem to have been two-fold; first, to interfere a great deal too much in all the petty details of the administration, and in the private and personal arrangements of the sovereign,

making, in fact, the Resident more than the King; clothing him with a degree of state, equal to that of royalty itself, and allowing him to act the part rather of a school-master and dictator, than of the ministers of a friendly power, professing to recognise the independence of its Ally. The immense jurisdiction exercised by the Resident at Lucknow, within the town itself, the actual residence of the sovereign, is totally incompatible with the royal dignity and Authority, is often the occasion of much complaint and inconvenience; and is strongly opposed to a considerate and liberal policy:—and, secondly, not to interfere with sufficient promptitude and decision as the paramount power, when the vital interests of both States, the cause of good Government and of humanity, imperatively demanded it. It is in the first description of meddling and interference and the mischiefs of the double Governments, which have been so often described, that I feel so much adverse. If the Political Agents for the most part were altogether removed, I believe it would be for the comfort of the sovereign, for the advantage of good Government, and for the real interests of both States. This measure is, of course, not possible, where we have our subsidiary Forces, and where there are large collections of European officers, whose conduct it is necessary to control—but to the minor states, in which this measure has been carried into effect, the worst consequences appear to me to have accrued.

"It is impossible that this *imperium* in *imperio* can ever be successful; it is directly opposed to every feeling and passion of human nature. If the Dewan is the creature of the Resident, the Prince, as Sir Thomas MUNRO observes, will necessarily counteract his own minister. If, on the other hand, as it has frequently happened, the minister is supported by the Prince, but not by the Resident, the influence of the latter is immediately courted by the faction in opposition, and his intentions and conduct are, contrary to his own will, often misrepresented for party purposes. Again, it often happens that an administration offensive to the people, draws or pretends to draw a sanction to its proceedings from the support of the British authority."

If proper enquiries were made, and necessary precautions were taken, to check the abuses pointed out by his Lordship, the interference with the jurisdictions and privileges of the Native Chiefs could not take place to the extent it does. Lord METCALFE, one of the ablest of Statesmen in India, recorded his opinion on the same subject as follows:

"With few exceptions, the boon* most probably has been voluntary and gratuitous, arising out of the practice which has prevailed at the Residency of Lucknow of setting up a jurisdiction in counteraction of that of the ruler of the country, or at least separate from it, a jurisdiction which is unwarrantable and mischievous and ought, under any circumstances, to be abolished."

The intercourse between the native Ruler and the local British Agent is, as Lord W. BENTINCK says, generally in the style of a king and his dependant, and many of the petty Chieftains are sometimes treated as indelicately as menial servants. Every mark of respect is extorted from these Princes, while a negligence or indifference is shewn in observing the same conduct towards them.

It is the custom of India to take off shoes when entering the room of any friend or superior, of course from the commencement of the carpet, because shoes are considered unclean by Eastern nations; and not merely out of respect, as is the impression among Europeans. The native is, however, willing to shew the same consideration while on a visit to an English gentleman, as to one of his own countrymen; but the former does not, as he ought to do,

* The exercise of a jurisdiction, independent of the Chief.

observe the same respect, by taking off his hat, when visiting a native Chief. The poor man, being quite at the mercy of his English superior, never dares to remonstrate against such a want of etiquette, because he is taught, by the example of others, to know, that to offend the latter is very dangerous to the safety of his State, which might thus become involved in inextricable difficulties. He therefore swallows the insult, but feels the anomaly of his position very deeply, as he is made of the same flesh and spirit as is the Agent, and is governed by the same passions and sentiments, though he be in a more degraded position.

Some Political Officers avoid the observance of the ceremony from an idea that the natives do not like their visitors to uncover their head, which however is a great mistake—the natives very reasonably like to be as much respected as any person can.

The other day, when Mr. THOMASON, the Lieut.-Governor of Agra passed through Malwa, he, on a visit to a native, as is customary with the Governor General, and other high dignitaries of the British Government, took off his hat. On his departure, I heard the native Chief observe, that he was a good and noble-minded gentleman. Yet, such little things are considered unworthy of notice by the generality of local Agents; but they have done almost as much harm to the interest of the British Government by alienating the hearts of the Princes, as deviations from good faith.

Many similar instances, which happen daily, might be related, but it would be trespassing too much on the patience of the reader. I will, therefore, content myself with remarking that these proceedings on the part of English officers, are either the result of ignorance or contempt, or perhaps partake of both, but chiefly of the former, as will be stated by and by.

At the same time, the policy of the Government, which is as clear as the sun at noon-day, is much misconceived or neglected, a circumstance which has tended to produce a bad impression upon the minds of the native Princes, as regards its real views and intentions. I do not mean to condemn every European Officer as wanting in the respect due to the person and to the Authority of the native Chiefs, but it is too frequently the case, and as often happen, the misconduct of a few brings discredit on the whole.

The instructions of the British Government to their local Agents are considered a farce, an opinion which is further corroborated by its continued silence, even after the errors of its officers have been prominently brought to its notice.

Policy is often only a refined term for intrigue; diplomacy and force have always been the favorite weapons in the hands of conquerors. The latter, however, was most generally employed by the old race of monarchs, though they contented themselves with conquering countries, and not the

nationality of the people, who were treated as favorably by them, as by their predecessors. Unfortunately, the policy of the British Government has a tendency towards both, as the evident depression and degradation of the natives, and their exclusion from all share of high and honorable preferment gives them too much cause to believe.

In adopting this policy, if true, the Government has forgotten its own delicate position and instability in the country, which is very precarious, and subject to revolution any day. The country has been acquired and maintained hitherto by the observance of good faith on the part of the English, and disunion among the natives. As the former is lessening, the latter also decreases, and the result ultimately, if matters go on in the manner they are now doing, will be any thing but favorable to the interest of the Government.

The rules prescribed by the British Government, for the guidance of its Political Agents are however very creditable, as far as the wording of them goes, but not so in execution. To the best of my knowledge, they are as follows:

I. To abstain from interference in the internal affairs of the native States.

II. To maintain order between the different States subject to the supremacy of the Government of India.

III. To put down notorious bands of plunderers, if any such exist, which set the authority of all

States at defiance, and to make every State combine for that purpose.

IV. To report, if any States are utterly incapable of governing themselves, or performing their duties to others, in order that such measures may be adopted as such case may seem to require.

This policy has been dictated to every Agent in all parts of India.

Lord ELLENBOROUGH also issued a circular letter of instructions almost to the same effect, but more in detail, strictly prohibiting any interference with the internal affairs of the native States, and to show proper consideration to the Chiefs of the country; but, unluckily, all these orders are considered generally as dead letters, and perhaps they are hardly in the memory of those whose duty it is to observe them. They are, however, in accordance with the terms of the treaties which the British Government has, from time to time, entered into with the native States, and ought, therefore, to be enforced.

By virtue of these solemn pledges, the native Princes are quite independent in the management of their own affairs. To interfere in them is not only conducive to many misfortunes to the Chiefs and their people, but is a breach of the sacred engagements, which the British Government is solemnly bound to observe. The departure from this policy has created a very bad impression on the minds of the Indian Chiefs. Their belief is, that the British Government breaks its treaties whenever

it finds it convenient to do so for its own interests. Certainly such an impression is much to be lamented, and is anything but conducive to the welfare of its Government in India.

The system of guardianship, in the case of minors, which has been lately introduced, is another innovation which has occasionally been carried too far, and has further strengthened the apprehensions of the natives as to the good intentions of the British Government. In some of the native States where this favorite policy has been adopted, it has done much harm to the interests of the State under its operation, because half measures can never be permanently successful. It is supposed that, under the refined principles of British admintration, a state may prosper; but, when the result is the contrary, what must be the inference?

In the first place, we ought not to become the immediate guardian* of a State, or, if we do, we ought always to try to improve its finances in such a manner as to leave behind us a clear conviction of our superior management.

The English history, generally giving only one side of the case, furnishes many instances of keeping questionable faith with the natives of India. Those of recent date are too fresh in the memory to require specific explanation. There may, no doubt, be, in

* By guardianship, I do not mean protection, or wholesome advice, but a direct interference, setting aside all native agency, and conducting affairs by one's own diction, as is sometimes the case, which has caused a kind of anarchy in the State.

each case, circumstances which may appear to palliate, in some measure, if they do not justify, the aggressive system of policy on which it is founded; but the people of India do not overlook the circumstances attending the origin and progress of the British power in that country; alluding to which in the life of Lord CLIVE, Mr. GLEIG justly remarks, that—

"CLIVE and Admiral WATSON, having received the sanction of the Authorities in Bombay, determined to extirpate such a noxious swarm of outlaws;* and it is characteristic both of the men, and of the theatre on which they operated, that a council of war was held previously to the departure of this expedition, in order to fix the proportions, according to which the spoil, which they counted on securing, was to be divided. For this it is which casts its deepest shadow over the entire series of events which led the East India Company from its original state, to that in which we now find it. Plunder seems to have been the one great object sought by leaders of armies and fleets, throughout our earlier wars in the East; and it not unfrequently came to pass, that, having achieved conquests and gained honor in the field, they ran some risk of losing at least the latter in squabbles over the booty."

It is true, that an Act of Parliament was afterwards passed, declaring that—

"As the pursuit of schemes of conquest was repugnant to the wish, to the honor and policy of the British nation, it was not lawful for the Governor General in Council of Fort William, without the express authority and concord of the Court of Directors, or the Secret Committee, either to declare or commence hostilities, or to enter into any treaty for making war against any of the native Princes or States in India, or any treaty guar-

* The pirate Angria, and his followers.

anteeing the dominions of such Princes or States, except when hostilities should have been commenced, or preparations actually made, for the attack of the British nation in India, or of some of the States or Princes whose dominions it shall be enjoyed by subsisting treaties to defend."

Nothing can be more exalted or noble in the British Senate than the imposition of such a binding decree on the officers of the executive Government, but how little it has been followed out, in reality, may be seen by the series of conquests, and the assumption of lands and territories which have from time to time marked their policy. The best criterion by which any system of policy can be judged is its result, and if the end and aim be good we should not lose sight of them to gratify any immediate objects.

Interference in the affairs of the native Princes has now become more general, and new conditions are dictated, and extorted without sympathy on one side or opposition on the other. Such clauses cannot be binding when one party, as is sometimes the case in minorities, acts for both: but might is right, as the saying is.

In India, especially among the Rajpoots and the Mahrattas, it has been a long-established custom to adopt an heir, in case one may die without a male issue. Such usage, however, is a bar to absorbing ambition. It is therefore being gradually got rid of: and, in fact, has been dispensed with in one or two instances, although treaties have secured

the right, not only of the contracting party for himself, but for his heirs and successors, without distinction. Accordingly, as long as a successor is selected agreeably to the usage of that party, he is a lawful heir, and ought to be acknowleged as such by the paramount power: but, instead of this wise and just course, the interpretation now often given to the word "heirs" is, that the male heir of one's body is the only rightful heir. Such a construction, however, was never contemplated at the time of framing the treaties by either party; but, if the passage admitted of doubt, then, according to the laws of nations, the interpretation ought to be in favor of the weakest party. The petty Chiefs in India, having no power to oppose the overwhelming force of the British Government, their sole trust, in signing these treaties, has been in the good faith of the British. It is the breach of it which has created the greatest alarm in the minds of the native Princes, and the acts of the British Agents connected with their respective Governments, are looked upon, therefore, with the utmost jealousy and distrust.

Perhaps some of the local Agents, especially those in immediate charge of minorities, are, from their limited intercourse with the natives, which is chiefly confined to visits of ceremony, not aware of the evil consequences which are produced by their own direct interference, otherwise, injurious as they are to the interests of both Governments, they would abstain

from such a course, could they divest themselves altogether of selfish motives. It is the duty of every Agent to keep always in view the rules which have been faithfully laid down for his guidance by the Government he serves. The preservation of good faith to every possible extent, is the best policy. It is not only incumbent on Government to be honest in words, but in acts, and to inculcate the necessity of it on all its functionaries; our integrity ought to be preserved in all our dealings, for it is impossible always to carry on an ill-disguised system of self-interest without detection, and when credit is once lost, there is no further confidence. What was the chief cause of the late disasters in Afghanistan?

Before we entered the country we made very handsome promises to the leading people to induce them to support the cause of Shah Shujah, or, in reality, that of the British Government, as the King was merely a puppet in the hands of the English, and brought upon the stage to serve the ends of their own policy. The Afghans were true to their engagements, and performed their duty accordingly; but, unhappily, as soon as we had placed the Shah on his throne, we quite forgot our own solemn promises. The very people who had acted faithfully, were not only unwisely neglected, but often treated contemptuously. A general disaffection was the consequence, which terminated in the destruction of the British army and authority then in Cabul, leaving a stigma on the national character which will last for ever.

It is a matter of great surprise, that the lesson which we learned in Afghanistan has not yet taught us to improve, and to introduce a reform in the narrow policy which is now a-days pursued in India. The truth is, that those true principles of Government which are so essential to the general welfare of the empire, no longer rule the British Councils.

Temporary and selfish advantages, which are so repugnant to a wise and liberal system of measures, are the order of the day. The chief cause of the rapid conquest of such an extensive dominion is quite forgotten. Had it not been for disunion and the internal disputes and disorders which followed the invasion of India by Nader Shah, and to some instances of disloyalty and fraud, and the assistance of the natives themselves, to the effects of which we are insensible in the darkness of our perversity, the English would hardly have been so flushed with victory in every part of India.* It is not however a sign of wisdom to estrange the feelings of the people, and to make them conscious of their fallen condition, and thereby revive their recollection of the privileges

* Lord CLIVE to deceive Omichund (in arranging the installation of Meer Jafer, in exclusion of Surajuddola, who was the rightful ruler of Murshadabad, but not favorably disposed towards the English) prepared in Council at Calcutta two treaties, one real and the other fictitious, and when the then Admiral, whose signature was necessary, refused to sign these deeds, Lord CLIVE himself forged his name, and thus carried out his heinous design; and, to crown all, when he was charged with the crime, he denied even the criminality, though he admitted that he had perpetrated the act! Such was the sense of the morality of principle which guided the founder of the British Indian empire in the East.

they enjoyed under their former rulers. To give an idea of the disagreeable state of feeling between the natives and their present Governors, and of the causes which have led to it, I beg to offer the following observations, as the chief causes of estrangement in the affection of the natives, towards their present masters, and the unpopularity of the British Government in India.

From the foregoing portion of my Notes it will be concluded that the natives have received very little benefit from the hands of their European governors, for which they can feel indebted or thankful to the latter; but there are, in addition, many other causes which have led to the total degradation and impoverishment of the country.

Among them may be enumerated the following:

In the time of the Mahomedan rulers, India yielded annually 23 croses of revenue, the whole of which was expended in the country.

The standing army in the time of Shahjahan consisted of two lakhs of well-paid Sawars alone, besides infantry, artillery, and numerous other military and civil establishments, as well as an immense force always maintained by the Jagerdars and feudatory Chiefs. Nasir Jung, the Suba of Hederabad in the Deccan alone, assembled in the field at Gingie, in A.D. 1756, against his nephew Mozofferjung, 300,000 fighting men, of which more than half were cavalry, together with 800 pieces of cannon, and 1,300 elephants, besides the contin-

gents of the feudatory Chiefs who attended him.* The military were composed of the natives of the country, with very few foreigners, and all situations from high to low were also filled by them. The pay of a Sawar, or horseman, in the time of Shahjahan, was 60 rupees per mensem a man. When it was reduced by Alumgeer to 30 rupees, Shahjahan observed, "from this time, I count the decline of the Mogul empire, because, although 30 rupees a month was quite enough to keep a Sawar, yet it would not enable him to give a proper education to his children, and maintain his respectability. Hence, the next generation will be almost illiterate, and not properly discharge their duty." To a great extent the prediction of Shahjahan was verified.

Besides these great establishments, which upheld the whole nobility and gentry of the country on a scale worthy of their rank and station, the trade and all other sources of income were likewise in their hands, as were the manufactories of every description. Moreover, they enjoyed certain rights and privileges, without cessation, from generation to generation, and numbers of colleges were erected, and provision made for their respective maintenance. Ferishta says, "Firoz Shah built fifty great aquaducts, forty mosques, thirty schools, twenty karavan saraes, a hundred royal edifices, five hospitals, a hundred tombs, ten spacious baths, ten spires, a hundred and fifty wells, a hundred bridges, &c.

* See History of Nizam Ali Khan's Predecessor, p. 20.

Baber says, that he ordered a *minar*, or obelisk, to be raised at every nine kos, with a relay of six horses, besides many gardens and palaces which he planned and erected. Sher Shah, Akber, Jahangeer, Shahjahan, Alumgeer, and their nobility and officers vied with each other in these works of magnificence, and the immense wealth which was thus daily expended, besides great charitable establishments, went to support the poor. Added to which, Mahomedan and Hindoo nobility and gentry lived in the country, and liberally expended every farthing in their private establishments, as well as in objects of public utility, and thus the revenue of the country flowed back to the people.

The following impartial extract from the unbiassed pen of Mr. GLEIG, about the state of affairs in India, at the time when the English merchants landed and settled in Surat, will not be uninteresting:

"A thousand deputies rising in degree one above another, managed the affairs of the innumerable Provinces into which his (the Emperor of Delhi) empire was divided. These had large bodies of revenue officers and police in their pay, judges and magistrates under them, with standing armies, and all the other appliances of sovereign power; and they maintained at their Courts a degree of state which nothing about those of European princes seemed to come near.

"The habits of the people likewise were, as far as strangers could judge of them, civilised in the extreme. Their manners were gentle and polite, while their ingenuity (speaking of the working classes) as weavers, and their skill in the mechanical and agricultural arts, excited the admiration of persons born in Kent, and brought up in Manchester and London. Meanwhile,

the Indian aristocracy inhabited palaces gorgeously decorated, and of vast extent. Their temples, too, and market places, the tombs of the dead, and the monuments erected to commemorate the virtue of the living, all appeared to the wondering eyes of our countrymen superb. In like manner, the density of the population in the cities, and the perfect order which prevailed—the awe with which rulers seemed to be regarded—and the pomp and dazzling splendour of their possessions—went far to confirm the impressions which a consideration of other more shadowy objects had made."—"*Life of Clive*," p. 16.

In short, the inhabitants enjoyed every means of prosperity and happiness; the country was in a flourishing state, and the people as happy as any nation in the world could be. Hence, "the wealth of India" is proverbial, and has always been the theme of ancient and modern historians; but a change of masters has visibly brought on an entire change in the condition of the people and the country. The people have been almost wholly thrown out of employment, both public and private. The nobility of the country crushed to dust, and the gentry nearly broken down. The trade has, been in a great measure, engrossed by foreigners, and the native manufactures stopped by the importation of those of England, while Englishmen, who form the present nobility and gentry of the country, come out to India merely to make fortunes, and live comparatively on a very low scale, and as soon as their object is accomplished, retire to England with their hoarded wealth. At the same time, we do not see any public works undertaken, either by Govern-

ment or its servants, as formerly existed. The only buildings they erect are little better than temporary, which would become a heap of ruins, if neglected, in a very few years.

In short, the resources of India are rapidly drained in several ways, and the consequence is that the natives have been neglected by their masters, and are reduced to a hopeless state of poverty. Many of them can hardly find a piece of bread to satisfy the cravings of hunger. The only employment they have is the most exorbitantly taxed—tillage. The army consists only of one lakh and fifty thousand men, and that generally of the dregs of society.

The decline of the Mogul empire may be dated from the death of Aurangzeb in 1807. Ever since which the English have had every stimulus to exertion, while the natives of India have been making a retrograde movement, both in civilisation and literature. The former appear in general to be heedless of exhausting and impoverishing the resources of the country, neglecting those things necessary to promote its permanent good. Self-aggrandisement, which could only be effected by the depression and ruination of the inhabitants, appears but too often the only interest which has been observed by our present rulers, as shewn, particularly in the exclusion of the natives from all sorts of employments of trust and emolument.

The large revenue extorted by Government goes, in a great measure, to discharge their commercial

debts, or in paying foreign expenses, as well as a large establishment in England, scarcely one-fourth of the income being expended in the country. All those liberalities of Government, which once made India so prosperous, are no longer to be known, nor have we a hope of its restoration to that happy state as long as matters are managed as they have hitherto been.

But, unluckily, the natives are considered unfit for employments of trust or importance. Nay, some *good-natured* gentlemen go so far as to say, that the natives, owing to their numerous castes, and some inabilities inherent in their nature, are incapable of improvement. They are also accused of being indolent, and wanting in habits of enterprise, or they would have exerted themselves in establishing manufactories and machineries, as the people do in England. As to the unfitness of the natives, it is absurd to argue the point: such an idea could only enter the heads of those who are laboring in the dark, and are as ignorant of the real character of the natives of India, and their capabilities, as the occupants (if any) of the moon and stars. In the first place, they have never been tried, as they ought to have been, in any independent employment. In whatever capacity they have been engaged, they have generally given satisfaction, as regards the due despatch of business. The employment of native Judges and deputy Collectors has been a very gratifying measure to the local Government. Besides,

who carries on the native business in the several Mofussul, or Provincial, offices? If the English functionaries at the head of them were not assisted by their native Amla, the business would be almost entirely at a stand still; nay, many of those officers are so incapable, from their ignorance of the people who are unfortunate enough to be placed under their control, that, if they were not guided by their native Assistants, they would often be at a loss how to act. I will treat this subject separately under the head of "Native Service." As to the want of exertion in the natives to improve their own condition and that of their country, I will content myself with the remark, that no nation has ever prospered with an empty purse, without the co-operation and encouragement of its Government, as well as of its own people. The latter have, either from indifference or ignorance, or both, been reduced to mere insignificence, whilst the Government has never gone beyond good intentions, proceeding from the head rather than from the heart, in its desire to ameliorate the condition of their degraded subjects.

The comparison, therefore, between the English and Indian nations is unjust. The one is luxuriating in wealth, and meets with every support from Government, and derives immense resources from the profits of trade with other countries, while the other is not only deprived of all these advantages, but is obviously depressed to enrich and aggrandise the foreigners. How then can the natives of India

make any advancement in the liberal arts and sciences?

Again, the things manufactured in India are now far less in demand than they were in former days. The muslins of Dacca, the silks of Benares, as well as numerous other articles meet with scarcely any sale, even in India. The natives have become too poor to use these costly things, while the English prefer the manufactures of their own country for their own consumption; and, as to the coarse articles, they are done away with by the cheap goods imported from England, which are prepared by the aid of machinery. Could not these articles be made in India by the Indians? There is every reason to suppose that they would be, but there is no earnest endeavour in those who have the power of introducing reforms and improvements, while the natives themselves have no means of helping each other, should they be inclined to do so.

That acute and impartial observer, Col. SLEEMAN, on the want of employment and depression of the natives, speaks as follows: "We do the soldier's work with about one-tenth of the soldiery that had been before employed in it over the territories we acquire, and turn the other nine-tenths adrift. They all sink into the lower class of religious mendicants, or retainers, or live among their friends as drones upon the land, while the manufacturing, trading, and commercial industry that provided them with the comforts, conveniencies, and elegan-

cies of life while they were in a higher grade of service, is, in its turn, thrown out of employment; and the whole frame of society becomes, for a time, deranged, by the local diminution in the demand for the services of men, and the produce of their industry."

India has, for a long period, been governed by foreigners. The Hindoos were not so jealous of the Mahomedan rule as they are now of the English, because, under the former, they were not excluded from a share of power in the management of their own country, nor were they so heavily taxed in several shapes; but, if they continue depressed as they are, it will not be surprising if, in self-defence, they may some day or other rise to rescue themselves from the starvation and thraldom to which they are now exposed, and when the dry materials have once caught fire, it will be difficult to arrest the rapid progress of the flame. They are certainly treated as contemptuously by many of their European masters as the animals of the forest. The natives have become proverbial among the English for all sorts of vices in the world, although the accusers will not be found, on a fair trial, with very few exceptions, to be free from so serious a charge. For any bad act, it is generally in the mouth of an officer, "How like a native." Such is the force of prejudice, that Mr. Shore, in speaking of the behaviour of the English towards the natives, remarks, that, "in India, a man who speaks in this way of the natives often

has a greater part of the society (English) in his favor. While a person who knows something of them, and does not see so very great difference between them and himself (vide Sir JOHN MALCOLM) can only venture to say a word in their favor, with the almost certainty of being ill-spoken of by the majority of his countrymen. One of the expressions commonly used, and meant one of dissatisfaction, is 'O, he is fond of the natives!' One would suppose the principle adopted was to treat the people as a degraded, inferior race."

I saw a young officer in a grand procession, where numbers of English gentlemen were present, scornfully ordering the driver of a native gentleman's elephant to fall back, because he considered his dignity, or rather his vanity, lowered, by "a black fellow" being a-head of him, though, in his own country, in point of honor and respectability, he might be equal, if not on a higher footing, than himself. It is the custom of the natives to bow respectfully to a superior. When this compliment is paid to Europeans, there are very few who return it. When the officers go on a visit to a native Prince, they generally stretch their legs in the open *Darbar*, which is considered a great indelicacy at a native Court; but, if a similar want of etiquette be observed in the conduct of a native Prince, in his visit to an European, he is sure to be degraded. If an English lady or her child goes to visit a Hindoo lady, she is generally accompanied by a *mehtranee*,

or sweeperess, who is considered unclean by a Hindoo. When the meeting is over, the carpets and the whole place are purified by the usual means. Such visits, instead of being a source of gratification, are always very troublesome to the host.

These are instances of want of proper manners, which, though inexcusable, may be ascribed to ignorance; but some of the young officers are as harsh, or I may say brutal, in their treatment of the natives, as the other are void of civility and politeness; and, what is most astonishing, their unbecoming conduct does not meet with due punishment from Government.

For illustration, I may be allowed to refer to the two following instances of very recent occurrence:

On the 2nd of November, 1847, Lieutenant —— at Kapurthala, (a native independent State in the Punjab), ordered his servants to maltreat an inhabitant of that place; and caused him to be beaten with a stick; his beard, mustachoes, and the hair of his head to be cut off; his head to be blackened, and shoes to be hung round his neck; and then, mounted on an ass, paraded him about the town; and the lieutenant himself sprinkled the blood of parrots and pigeons on his face. For this violent outrage, the lieutenant was tried, and was ordered, by the Commander-in-Chief, instead of being dismissed, to be reprimanded in the presence of the troops at Lahore!

The other instance is this: Lieutenant ——, in a

moment of frenzy, inflicted a kick on a *syce* or groom of which he died. The lieutenant was tried by a court-martial; but the charge was so framed that it was impossible for the court to convict him; and he thus escaped retribution! What respect can be had for such courts and for such *even-handed justice?* I am sure if a native were to slaughter an Englishman he would not escape condign punishment.*

Other instances of the degradation of the natives might be mentioned, but the above are enough to give an idea of the contempt with which the native British Indian subject is often treated by the majority of the English. With such examples, it would be surprising if the natives should not be full of hatred towards a rule which subjects them to such highly unbecoming, or rather savage, treatment.

These grievances, added to the faults of their system of rule, have exceedingly raised the animosity of the people. Even the women taunt their husbands and male relatives for their patient submission to the condition of slavery to which they have been reduced, and such of the natives as receive an English education, and imitate the customs and manners of the English, are looked upon with disgust, and apparently with sufficient reason, because many of these young men, being very little acquainted with their own habits, religious and national feelings, begin to assail their own countrymen summarily, like their European masters.

* Vide Reports of Courts-martial, and Extracts from "General Orders" in the "*Indian News*," dated 4th July, 1818.

In short, it is the deep impression of the natives that the English are not what they were some years ago: they consider them demoralised. This contagious idea is general, and has arisen from the treatment which they daily experience at the hands of their governors. The latter have adopted only one course of maintaining their supremacy—*force*. Conciliatory means, and kindness of manners, are laid aside. Many have adopted the idea, that to be on familiar terms with a native, or even to treat him with civility, is derogatory to an English gentleman, and that his dignity is supported by reserve, and by remaining at a distance from him, little knowing that people are respected for their merits and for their virtues and philanthropic acts, and not for uncourteous manners and a want of that upright and just conduct which alone secures that which is now vainly sought by not mixing with the people.* The British authorities are hence feared, but not beloved, and they remain almost in the dark as

* The natives of India generally meet with every civility and politeness in England, as if the English at home and the English in India belonged to two different races of people. Almost every native of India who visits England is struck with this difference. He comparatively praises the gentlemenly behaviour of the one, and censures the arrogance of the other. Mr. Shore justly gives the following character of his countrymen in India: "The haughty superciliousness, arrogance, and even insolence which the generality of the English (I chiefly allude to the civil and military officers) think it necessary to adopt towards the natives, by way of keeping up their own dignity, is extremely great. This conduct appears rather on the increase, but to such a pitch has it already been carried, that the feeling among most of the natives is rather to avoid than court intercourse with the English; as, by even paying a visit to an English gentleman, the former are more likely to be treated with slight and neglect, than to meet with civility."

to the feelings of the people, and as to what passes in the country. They have a ceremonious intercourse, and an imperfect information derived from parties either paid for it, or who discolor the truth.

The knowledge of a country can only be acquired by three means; namely, observation, reading, and conversation. The British authorities see enough of the country and the works thereof, but comparatively observe very little of the character of the people, their manners, feelings, and customs, or the effect of the existing administration on them. The reading to which they have access regarding India, is furnished by parties, who, in the majority of cases, are as imperfectly informed as themselves. The history of British India generally contains eulogiums on the actors, and records the important events, without sufficiently mentioning as to how they were caused or how brought about. It is also the duty of an historian to give a correct account of the origin and progress of laws and institutions, as to their effects on the people, and how they promote the public happiness. I am sorry to say, that our bulky histories of British India are often silent on these most essential points, which they perhaps consider of no consequence. As to conversation, I mean on a familiar footing they seek no opportunity of benefitting by it.

Thus, they can only exercise their reflection on erroneous materials, and its fruits must, therefore, be as immature as the information on which it has

had to work. Hence arise the various mistakes in public opinion, and the adminstration of the country; hence is the ignorance of Europeans on these essential points; hence the assumption of their superiority of dignity, and their impression of the inferiority of the natives, which keeps them for the most part from intermixing with the latter, and causes them to be treated with contempt and harshness; but those who advance in their knowledge begin to be more considerate and kind, and candidly admit the general ignorance and groundless pride of their countrymen in this respect; but the number of these is comparatively very limited.

It is a subject of great surprise, that, notwithstanding their long residence in India, the majority of European officers should remain so unacquainted with it as they generally are. There are very few who understand the colloquial languages through which the routine of business is conducted, and those who can read and write in them are very scarce. Hence, many are the evils which chiefly result from this want of knowledge on the part of those whom Providence has destined to govern millions of their Indian fellow-subjects.

The life of an Englishman in India is within a beaten circle. When he gets up in the morning, he goes out either walking or riding, and, on his return, takes tea, reads, dresses himself, and goes to breakfast. As soon as it is over, he goes to business, or, if he have none, he visits his English friends to

have a chit-chat with them. When the day's work is over, in the evening, he takes a drive, and, on his return home, dines and amuses himself in the company of his European friends, and afterwards retires to bed. He never keeps society with a native. How can he then be capable of governing a foreign country?

They have adopted quite a different dialect of the Ordoo from what is spoken in the country, which is peculiar to themselves, and which is called by the natives *English-Hindostanee.* The fact is, they generally pick up the language from common servants, with their own pronunciation, and never mix with the society of gentry, where alone they can learn a correct style of speaking, and attain an idea of the manners and customs of the natives. On this account they are very much laughed at, and I believe the same may be the case in an English society, if one were wanting in proper manners, elegance of expression, and genteel address. To support my assertion, I cannot avoid again quoting a passage from SLEEMAN's Work. He is one of the best Oriental scholars that the Honble. Company's service has produced, and is now in India. He speaks thus:

"The best of us, Europeans, feel our deficiencies in conversation with Mahomedans of high rank and education, when we are called upon to talk upon subjects beyond the every-day occurrences of life. Perhaps few Europeans have mixed and conversed more freely with all classes than I have; and yet I feel myself sadly deficient when I enter, as I often do, into

discussions with Mahomedan gentlemen of education, upon the subject of the character of the Government and institutions of different countries, their effects upon the character and condition of the people, and thousand other things which are subjects of every-day conversation among educated and thinking men in our own country. The chief cause of this deficiency is the want of sufficient intercourse with men, in whose presence we should be ashamed to appear ignorant—this is the great secret, and all should know and acknowledge it.

"We are not ashamed to convey our orders to our native servants in a barbarous language. I have heard some of our highest diplomatic characters talking without the slightest feeling of shame or embarrassment to native princes, on the most ordinary subjects of every-day's interest, in a language which no human being but themselves could understand. We shall remain the same till some change of system inspires us with stronger motives to please and conciliate the educated classes of the native community."

I could bring other authors, such as Mr. SHORE, Sir THOMAS MUNRO, &c., to confirm the fact of the general ignorance of our present governors with the language and usages of the people over whom they rule; but the truth may be too readily admitted by those who have any personal knowledge of the matter to need any further authorities.

It is sufficient to observe, that the continuance of the generally prevailing ignorance is highly pernicious, both to the Government and the people, and is consequently very impolitic and injudicious. The good will, attachment, and happiness of subjects ought to be the chief aim of a good Government. It has been often asserted by partial writers, that the

natives are happier under the present rule, than they were under their former rulers. Such a conclusion is the result partly of ignorance and partly of misconception. Are the natives happier, because they have been thrown out of employments of trust? because they have been deprived of all share of honor, as well as of their hereditary lands? because, by the exaltation of their masters, they have been degraded and despised? Considering their privations, the natives have not any adequate cause to be happy; and a moment's reflection will convince any thinking mind of the truth of this remark. An impartial observer will be far from taking such an exclusive view of the matter. If he be a well-wisher of his Government and nation, he will urge them to adopt a different line of policy, and recommend some wise measures of social and popular reform, without which the profit, the strength, and the duration of a Government are always doubtful, and liable to accidents and danger.

I trust that the British Government will, in future, pursue a course calculated to give perfect security to so splendid an appendage to the British Crown. This point can only be gained by the sincere attachment of the people, by raising them from their present humiliation, and by restoring them to honors, and to a just share in the Government of the country, giving them the means of a liberal education. With such treatment, the natives will never be ungrateful, but will, as in duty bound, revere the British sceptre which controls them.

At the same time, Government ought to inculcate the necessity on each of its officers, not only to acquire a perfect knowledge of the languages, customs, manners, habits, and feelings of the people with whom he is to deal, but to prepare a book for their guidance, and that of their successors in office, as in the Government. The compilation of such a book would prove of the greatest service to the officers themselves, and prevent them from committing many mistakes into which they now sometimes unintentionally fall, and get annoyed with the natives without sufficient cause. They would also thereby learn to judge of the natives by their own standard, and not by that of England, as they generally do. They would likewise be able to form a better idea of their moral character, as well as of their aptitude for the administrative and legislative business of their own country.*

* The other day, the speeches of our worthy Chairman of the Honorable the Court of Directors, delivered at the Colleges of Eddiscombe and Helbury, advising the young men selected for the Indian Service, to treat the natives of that country civilly, to study their languages, manners and customs, &c., &c., were very praiseworthy and creditable. Such wise instructions I believe are very often given by Government, not only to the students who leave the Colleges, but to the officers in India; but no measure ever seems to have been adopted to ascertain as to how far they are attended to. Hence, there are very few who act up in accordance with these instructions. It is the duty of Government, not only to inculcate the necessity of the acquirement of a complete knowledge of the important *points* in question, but also to know the capabilities of its officers for the various offices to which they are attached, by instituing periodically some suitable inquiry. Such plan alone can secure the improvement of young officers for the attainment of those qualifications which they so generally want, and without which they cannot be useful either to Government or to the people whom they govern.

The middle class which formed a link between the lower and the higher classes of the community, having been entirely broken, along with the nobility of the country, as has already been observed; the only connection between them is now through the native *Amla*, or official subordinates. The political and statistical information which is acquired by the local functionaries of Government, on whose reports it has chiefly to depend, is, in a great measure, derived from the *Amla*, which is, after all, only an imperfect source of information, partaking as it does in many cases of the general indifference of their superiors about the welfare of the country and its affairs. Very little truth is, therefore, likely to reach the ear of Government.

The native service consists generally of menial servants and writers. The former are composed of so low a class that they are hardly regarded by the natives as worthy of trust, and necessity only obliges them to hold communication with them. They are not the fittest to get correct information, but they are often very credulously employed by some, even in important matters, and many are the evils which arise in consequence. The latter have, at the same time, a great share in the management of the native business. Without their assistance, it could not be carried on for a day. Many of their superiors being foreigners and inexperienced, have necessarily to

rely on their guidance, but the question is, whether they are sincere. In the majority of cases they are not, nor have they any great cause to be so, because whatever good they do, the credit is solely taken by their superior, and their worldly career, being entirely at the mercy of the latter, is very precarious. In such an uncertain position, a writer considers himself a fool to be honest to those who not honest to him, especially as he is very often liable to be dismissed by his next master, who, if anxious to make room for his own creatures, generally involves him in difficulties and disgrace. Again, a third and the strongest of reasons, is the lowness of his salary, which is very small, in comparison to his labor and merit, as, besides his own personal expenses, he may have a family to support. Moreover, he has no stimulus to promotion, or even assurance of his permanence in office. To crown all these misfortunes, he is treated little better than a menial.

The native *Amla* in the Judges' and Magistrates' Courts are obliged to stand before them from ten to four o'clock, and do the business in that attitude. Besides being very humiliating, as well as painful, is it not an unfeeling act? I have seen these poor people sometimes suffering from swollen feet. It is wonderful that they can do the business when they are almost out of their senses from fatigue. If the functionaries were disposed, for humanity's sake, to allow their *Amla* a seat, the bad feeling which now exists would be partly removed, and the despatch of

business much facilitated. Such a custom was never known before, nor does any where exist among native Princes at present, but was introduced from novelty and self-love, along with other similar useless innovations. Perhaps the idea originated from the *Khedmutgars* standing at the table of the English gentlemen. Even these, low as they are, would seldom serve, if made to stand as long as a respectable *Shareshtehdar*, or head native secretary.

In former days, Europeans, when in the receipt of small pay, were quite as dishonest as the native *Amla* of the present day, with his numerous grievances, is accused of being.* Nay, even at present, instances of dishonesty against Europeans are not wanting. Honesty is a virtue not confined to any particular nation or color. It has its temple every where, among the savages as well as civilised, among Christians as well as Mahomedans and Heathens. Why then should the natives of India be unjustly accused of a want of faith. Have they had sufficient cause to be so faithful as they are wished to be? India, to all appearance, strongly demands a good and experienced reformer.

Sir JOHN MALCOLM, on this subject impartially observes,—"It is not to be expected that we can ever completely succeed in establishing any cordial

* "No man, not even the members of Council, sought good of the people. The object of every one in the service was to amass a rapid fortune by whatever means, and to return speedily to England. Injustice prevailed in every Department. The natives had been oppressed till the name of the European stunk in the nostrils of the people."—*Marshman.*

or social union with the natives of India. We are, as foreigners, differing in manners, language, religion and feelings, too much opposed to them to admit of our ever realising such hopes; but our efforts should, nevertheless, be continually directed to the object of reconciling them to their condition. Nothing can tend so much to this as their employment. The character of our government debars us from intrusting them with military or political power; but this is the strongest of all reasons for bringing them forward in every manner that is unattended with danger. The acquisition of knowledge, under a system which almost excludes the higher classes of our native subjects from any participation in the government of their own country, must either rouse them to efforts against our authority, or sink them into a state of abject submission, and leave them with few objects in life beyond indolence and sensual indulgence."—p. 141.

Mr. JAMES STUART, in his fifth Report, p. 581, treats the subject thus,—"Are the natives of India a different order of beings, that they are to be stinted into honesty and degraded into principle. As we proceed, these Provinces (Hindostan) will soon present the singular spectacle of a great empire, the government of which rigidly excludes its subjects from every object of fair ambition, which, in the pursuit, could stimulate men to cultivate their faculties, or in the possession enlarge their understanding and elevate their mind."

The testimony of Sir THOMAS MUNRO, in his Minute of 30th December, 1824, about the abilities of the natives of India, is thus recorded:—"The natives possess, in as high a degree at least as Europeans, all those qualifications which are requisite for the discharge of the inferior duties in which they are employed. They are in general better accountants, more patient and laborious, more intimately acquainted with the state of the country and the manners and customs of the inhabitants, and are altogether more efficient men of business. Unless we suppose that they are inferior to us in natural talent, which there is no reason to believe, it is much more likely that they will be duly qualified for their employments than Europeans for theirs, because the field of selection is so much greater in the one case than in the other. We have a whole nation from which to make our choice of natives, but in order to make choice of Europeans, we have only the small body of the Company's covenanted servants. If it be admitted that the natives often act wrong, it is no reason for not employing them: we shall be oftener wrong ourselves. What we do wrong is not noticed, or but seldom and slightly; what they do wrong meets with no indulgence.

"Let Britain be subjugated by a foreign power to-morrow; let the people be excluded from all share in the Government, from public honors, from every office of high trust or emolument, and let them in every situation be considered unworthy of

trust; and all their knowledge and all their literature, *sacred and profane*, would not save them from becoming, in another generation or two, a *low-minded, deceitful*, and dishonest race."

With such testimonies, the employment of the natives seems to have been very much limited; nay, on the establishment of the British rule in India, the natives of rank were associated with Europeans in the management of their internal affairs. The power of the British Government was rapidly promoted through their agency; but, as their European friends grew more powerful, self-interest overruled the sense of duty, and their native colleagues, notwithstanding their usefulness, were excluded from the service of which they had, till then, been members.

In 1812, the Court of Directors themselves, among other remedial measures, of which we will speak in another place, recommended the employment of the native agency, in the management of their territory, on a liberal scale. But the execution of this judicious measure was neglected, and was only partly carried out by Lord WILLIAM BENTINCK, when he, having been appointed Governor General, arrived in India in 1828. To him the uncovenanted service owes a great debt of gratitude for the little which he effected in introducing the plan of employing native Judges and deputy Collectors. The good which has resulted from the adoption of this measure, notwithstanding the numerous abuses of the sys-

tem, is apparent. Col. SLEEMAN, on his personal experience, says,—"The consequence is a degree of integrity in public officers never before known in India; and rarely to be found in any other country. In the province where I now write, which consists of six districts, there are twenty-two native judicial officers, Moonsifs, Sudder Ameens, and the principal Sudder Ameens; and in the whole province I have never heard a suspicion breathed against one of them; nor do I believe that the integrity of one of them is at this time suspected. The only one suspected within the two and half years that I have been in the province, was, I grieve to say, a Christian; and he has been removed from office, to the great satisfaction of the people, and is never to be employed again." With such a precedent before us, why are not the natives raised to a still higher grade, and the same rule not observed in the political and other departments? Promotion and good payment are the soul of good service, besides which, such a rule would ultimately effect a great saving to, and add much to the reputation of Government. Some raise objections to its introduction in the Political Department; but experience teaches us, that a responsible, trust-worthy, uncovenanted servant may be more useful than an irresponsible one, who, now having no stimulus, very seldom exerts himself to the extent of his capacity. A respectable and well-educated native, with good pay, could superintend the native part of any office, and,

at the same time, despatch other business, which is now performed by an English assistant, as creditably as by the latter, and, in many instances, with much more usefulness, as regards the governors and the governed. His abilities and talents will then certainly appear with greater advantage than they do now. At present, he has no will nor weight enough to set his superior right, should he take a wrong view of a matter, as generally happens, from the fear of giving him offence, but, when he becomes more responsible, it would be his duty to check or expose the mistake of his superior. Numerous are the evils now committed through ignorance, or a malicious design, and innocent persons are thrown into jails, when they should have been set at liberty.

It would be similarly useful to introduce this reform in the Courts in the Company's Provinces, promoting a *Sarishtehdar* to the rank of a general supervisor, with power to advise his superior, should he go wrong. Such a course would surely succeed, in a great measure, in preventing the series of intrigues and frauds which are now-a-days practised. They are the bane of the community which happens to be subject to them, and, until it is removed, there can be no security to person and property from its dire effects. A man of respectability and wealth is now more happy in living under a native Prince than within the Company's Provinces.

It is far from wise and just to have the destinies of millions of people subservient to a single (generally

inexperienced) person, without any check, or the means of knowing the errors which, as human beings, the British officers, especially in their present peculiar mode of limited intercourse, are continually liable to commit. A Government, separated by hundreds of miles, and having the voluminous cares of an extensive empire to look after, is surely not able, nor can it be, to amend the errors of its distant officers, which sometimes involve it in serious difficulties.

This view of the subject is more applicable to its Diplomatic Agents than to the Home Departments of Government. A reform is, however, very desirable in both, and will tend to produce great benefits, not only to the people, but to the Government. Every care should be taken by the latter to guard its faith and character, for much depends on this single point. It is indeed of primary importance. Let the functionaries set an example by their conduct to those who are subordinate to their will and authority, and let the service thus improve. The best criterion of a public officer's character is the opinion of the people whom he governs. If he does not enjoy their good will, he has not done his duty. There are very few European servants of the Government who enjoy such golden opinions, yet have they more from the popularity of their manners among their own countrymen, than any merit in the opinion of the natives, secured a good name with Government, which is a matter of much surprise to the latter.

The uncovenanted service strongly demands a reform. Gradation of rank, with liberal salary, will do much good. When it is belived that every one, in the course of time, will be rewarded for good conduct and the faithful discharge of his duty, and not capriciously dismissed, as is too often the case, without having a fair trial, and without the consent of Government, the service might be much improved. There are instances of writers, who, having served a score of years, have been discharged for a frivolous fault or pretence. What good, then, can be expected to result from such a precarious tenure of office?

At present, in the first place, the services of a native servant or dependant of Government, are very seldom taken notice of, and when by some good luck they are, the only distinction he receives is the title of Khan and Bahadur, if a Mussulman, and of Rae Bahadur, if a Hindoo. In a country where the bestowal of such honorary distinctions, or higher still, as Nawabor, Rajah, &c., were always accompanied by grants of lands and Jagher, and high emoluments, the gift of such empty titles can evidently not be much appreciated. Government ought to adopt a different and more liberal plan of rewarding the services of its native servants and dependants. They should be promoted without distinction, according to their respective merits, and raised in dignity by granting to them more often honors similar to those with which it distinguishes the European service. By this measure, it will not

only raise the degraded, but gain for Government the real popularity and attachment of its servants.*

Some rules ought to be enacted for the guidance and encouragement of this important branch of the public service, and to be observed strictly and impartially. This hard-working, valuable, and large class of servants deserves the particular notice and care of Government, as well as the other branches. They are the essentially useful members of the body forming the whole service. Much disgust and discontent now prevails among them. Can there rea-

* The only solitary instance now-days in which Government has rewarded the services of a native, by the grant of a pension, is the case of Mohun Lal. Although under a native prince, similar service to his, would probably have met with higher reward, yet as it is, it has prejudiced the minds of the European part of the service generally against him, as if being a native, he was unworthy of this distinction. The consequence is that, instead of being employed in some suitable situation, where by his services he might have given further testimonies of his gratitude and usefulness, he is allowed to lead an idle and inactive life in retirement. Government ought not to be deterred by local or personal prejudices, from employing and rewarding its native servants.

There is another of the ablest and most worthy native servants, Peer Ibrahim Khan, the native agent at Bhawalpoor. He is a gentleman of acknowledged merits, and undeniable integrity and respectability, and has more local experience of the North-Western provinces of India, than any person now in that quarter, either native or European. If he had been employed in taking charge of Multon, instead of the two young European officers who were lately sent to that quarter, the matter might not have come to the same crisis, and very probably there might have been no bloodshed; but, being a native there he is now employed in a subordinate situation, where he cannot act or be of full use to Government on his own discretion or responsibility. If he were directly appointed by Government, for the management of our affairs in that quarter with becoming distinction, his services would have proved much more useful, and at the same time, it would have given him weight and consequence in the eyes of his European superiors.

sonably be any cordiality of co-operation among a body, a part of whom is actually neglected by the other, and suffering from a system of partiality and self-interest, which seems to be the rule of the day? Certainly not. It is the imperative duty of Government to remove the evil. "Every chord of the instrument must be in tune or there will be no harmony," as one of the best judges and experienced officers, Sir JOHN MALCOLM, says.

The disaffection is not confined to the uncovenanted service, but to natives in general, among whom it has become of a contagious nature. It has caught also the native army on which so much dependance is placed. They are, it should be remembered, the natives of the country, and have relations and families who have suffered from the oppressive and extorting system of Government. Thus, they partake in the general misery, and sympathise with those who are the nearest and dearest to them. If you ask any Sepoy, unless he has some fears to restrain him, he will positively tell you that his family has suffered exceedingly under the Company's *Raj*. Those who have experienced the rules by which the country is administered by the English, will prefer a native Government. Even that of Oude, notwithstanding its reported oppressions towards the *Ryats*, which of course, as well as that of Hydrabad, are much more exaggerated than they really are, is liked much better than the English Government. It is the opinion of some statesmen that we

have conquered the country by the sword, and must keep it with the sword. When such is the feeling of the native army which forms the chief strength of that Government, it is an opinion which may be considered theoretical and absurd. It will not be surprising, that the very army may some day be the chief cause of the destruction of its own Government. If it be the policy to maintain the country by sword, the army should be kept contented and happy. Moreover, it ought to be composed of better materials than it now is. A higher grade ought to be opened in it for the gentry of the country, because, to use a vulgar saying, the bundle of grass must be tied with grass, or it is not a wonder if it be loosened and scattered. The broken nobility and gentry who are heartily desirous of the downfall of the English power, would thereby be much pacified and conciliated, by finding a provision in the army, the respectabity of which would at the same time be much increased. The harsh treatment to which recruits are subjected is very repugnant to the feelings of an *Ashraf*, or gentleman. A gentleness in the manner of enforcing discipline should make that service cheerful. If the existing rules were reformed in a degree which might remove the objection, the army would be composed of a higher class of men, and hence many benefits would result both to the country and to Government.

At present, a Sobehdar of thirty or forty years standing is immediately placed under the order of a

subaltern, just sent out of school, who reasonably is hardly supposed to have that knowledge or experience of his duty, which may qualify him to command an old officer, though a native. What may be the feelings of the latter is easy to conceive. We ought to adopt some better and just policy if we wish to remain popular with the native army, which is considered the very corner stone of the British power in the East. The introduction of the order of merit, is a very judicious measure. But that is not enough. The grant of lands is valued beyond all other distinctions in the East. If Government may reward its native army for its gallantry in the field, and other meritorious conduct with some such distinctions, and opening, at the same time, a higher grade, it will serve a great incentive to people of higher classes to enter it. Besides, the person thus distinguished will be the pride of his family, kindred, and village people, and in him they will see a living testimony of the British liberality. Thus, its popularity will be established on firm grounds, and it may be loved instead of being desiped, and feared without being hated.

RELIGION.

Religion is a very delicate subject, and I should have wished to avoid it, but it is gradually becoming so much mixed with the present politics of the country, and has so shaken the confidence of the

natives, that I beg to be excused if I tire the patience of the reader by saying a few words on this head also.

On the establishment of their rule in India, the British Government, among other rights, wisely guaranteed the toleration of the various religions of the people. It is to their credit, that with very few exceptions, they have hitherto never openly interfered with the various creeds professed by their subjects. Even when discussions on religious matters were proposed by the professors of the College of Fort William, this course was publicly prohibited by the then Governor General, Lord WELLESLEY, as its tendency was considered offensive to the religious prejudices of the natives. Since that time Government has continued keeping its orders in force on this subject. The only people who at all made themselves busy about the matter were the missionaries. Their exertions, however, had been very limited and guarded, and rather directed towards the Hindoos alone than Mahomedans, the latter being considered more bigotted than the former. Since the renewal of the present Charter, their exertions have been more extended than before, and, in some instances, assisted by the local authorities; but the minute of Lord TWEEDLE, in defiance of the guarantee of his own Government, ordering the introduction of the Bible as a class book in the Indian Government schools, is the only instance of any note in which a local Government

(Madras) has taken so much public interest. The measure has, however, been completely opposed by the natives, nor has it been supported by the superior Authorities; the latter, notwithstanding the repeated appeals of the natives of that presidency, have not yet evinced their disapprobation publicly, a circumstance which keeps the minds of not only the appellants, but of almost the whole of India, in a doubtful state as regards the future design of Government in this matter. They cannot account for the prudence of its present silence, nor does it seem safe or wise, however pleasing it may be to particular parties who take an extensive view of the question: but we know that the same policy which induced Government to guarantee the toleration of all religious usages of the natives of India, the same motive which prompted Lord WELLESLEY to issue a general prohibition in 1804, the same necessity exists at present to follow the same wise course. The same necessity will perhaps never cease in India. Let any one reverse the case and ask himself the question. To suspose so would be contrary to human nature. It will, therefore, be a very judicious measure in Government, acting in conformity with their own faith and pledges, to issue a general prohibition to its local Governments and officers not only to assist in the conversion of the natives to Christianity, either publicly or privately, but to prevent any such attempts on the part of their countrymen, if they wish to secure the good will of the people.

The natives of India are naturally as much attached to their respective religions as any people or nation of the world. Those are doctrines sucked in with the milk of their mothers, and implanted on infant minds as heavenly revelations, where they grow up with themselves and take the deepest root. To try to eradicate them by means which are considered by them as false, has always been futile and mischievous. Such attempts have generally proved a stumbling block to all nations and conquerors. It is a dear-bought experiment and we ought not to re-buy it. History shows that one of the chief causes which led to the dismemberment of the Mogul empire, was the religious enthusiasm of Alumgeer, when he tried to put down the shea chiefs of the Deccan, Hindoism, &c., &c.

The serious ~~meeting~~ *mutiny* of Vellore was caused by an impression that Christianity was going to be propagated, as stated in the Governor-General's letter of the 7th December, 1807. Subsequently, the insurrection at Bareilie in 1816, as well as in Benares, and other places, will shew how religion was made the tool of exasperating the people, and inciting them to resist the acts of Government.

I wish the Indian reformers would bear in mind the horrors, bloodshed, and cruelty which attended the "Protestant Reformation," and still it did not succeed in exterminating the Popish religion altogether from Great Britain and Ireland. They will meet with much more resistance and difficulty in

their way in India, than HENRY VIII. with his favorites CRANMER and CROMWELL met in England in introducing the "Reformation."

At present, they only succeed in making now and then some unguarded youth a convert to their religion, but by such a course, they do not advance the cause of Christianity. They not only disturb the peace of families and mortify the feelings of parents and relations, but shew the weakness of their doctrines, and justly so. Why should they not teach them to grown-up people and parents who can understand them? if they succeed in convincing and making converts of them, they will have the whole family at once to adopt Christianity. What affectionate Christian parent will allow his dear child to be separated from him for ever? Now, by the seduction of mere immatured boys and girls, the reverend missionaries defeat their own purpose, and, at the same time, cause a mischief to Government by an increased estrangement of the feelings of its subjects. Let Christians teach the superiority of their religion and morality to the natives of India by their virtuous acts. They ought to inculcate the necessity of liberal education being given to the people; to try to found colleges, hospitals, charitable institutions, *caravan-saraes*, aqueducts, canals, and many other benevolent works for the support of the poor, and the improvement of the country, as was done by the native princes, and thus gain their good opinion. Mere words inconsistent with our own

conduct can obviously produce no good effect. The exertions of the missionaries would be well directed if they tried to improve the moral character of their own countrymen, and thereby taught the natives the excellence of their own religious faith. As yet, the latter perceive, in reality, no difference between the morals of the two nations, if judged by their respective standards. The truth of this remark may be proved by the testimony of their own unprejudiced countrymen who have had better opportunities of studying the point than those who pass idle opinions, without sifting and examining the subject.

If the dark age has actually passed by, which, from the nature of our conduct, I believe it has not, let us act more impartially, more honestly, and more openly, and let the world judge of our principles by our deeds. In the enlightened age which we pretend to have acquired, let us not be guilty of the same bigotry and superstition to which we ascribe so immoderately the crimes and offences of our forefathers, and to the barbarous nations in general. The policy followed by the Emperor Akbar in this particular respect was certainly very wise and praiseworthy. He issued a prohibition to all his local authorities that they were not to interfere with the religion of the people, saying, that "as every one is always very sensitive about his temporal affairs, how much more so will he be about spiritual matters, which hold out to him the hope of everlasting feli-

city." Why is not a similar proclamation issued by the British Government to restore the shaken confidence of the natives of India? It is true that no public orders have been given by it, authorising the conduct of the missionaries; but, on the other hand, notwithstanding the repeated appeals of the people of the Madras Presidency, &c., it has issued no prohibition against the system. Hence, the natives are very reasonably led to conclude that the missionaries are secretly acting in concert with the views of Government: an impression which ought to be removed.

EDUCATION.

In the last article, I have shewn that the instruction of religious doctrines and a few conversions have not served in any way to improve India, but, on the contrary, have merely irritated the feelings of the natives against Government. The only scheme for the mental improvement of that country, is the introduction of a liberal education. Before we give an account, however, of the means which the British Government has adopted for the accomplishment of this noble object during its existence for nearly a century. I will commence with a retrospective view of the means which were employed by the native Government in educating its subjects.

History bears sufficient evidence of the colleges and charitable institutions which were, from time

to time, founded by the late rulers. Nay, it was considered not only a religious obligation, but a deed of honor and virtue, both by the Hindoos and Mahomedans, to give a liberal education to the people, to provide the poor with the means of subsistence, as well as accommodation. Hence arose the numerous colleges, caravan-saraes, bridges, aqueducts, wells, charitable institutions, &c. These were erected not only by the rulers themselves, but also by the nobility and gentry. To perpetuate the continuance and maintenance of their work, they assigned lands and means from their own private estates, and set them aside, under the superintendence of independent and virtuous characters. These noble establishments were never molested by their successors; nay, such an act always was, and is, considered very disgraceful. They rather vied with their ancesters, to preserve their memory, by erecting similar benevolent monuments. Thus, these public works continued accumulating from time to time. It was owing to them, that India was famed as the land of hospitality, generosity, ease and plenty, and thousands and thousands of people, widows, orphans, indigents and strangers received education and every proper care and support.

To form some idea of the extent of these laudable means, a comparative view of the income of the present and the late Government, and their respective possessions will give some just estimate. We have shewn in another place that the annual amount

realised by the Mahomedan Government was twenty-three crores of rupees, or twenty-three millions of pounds stirling. The British Government collects nearly the same amount of revenue, but its territorial possessions are not yet so extensive as those of the former. In addition to the whole territories now subject to the British rule in India, the Mogul emperors also possessed the whole of the Sikh country, Peshawr, Cabul, Candahar, Belochistan, Bhawalpoor, the present Marahta territories of Gwalior, Malwa, Nagpore, Baroda, Haberabad, and Luckhnow, and, I believe, Ava and Nepaul also, and some of the islands, which were all managed directly by their own governors, and their revenue went to the royal treasury. Besides this income, they likewise collected tributes from all the dependent Chiefs. It is true, that none of these advantages are yet enjoyed by the British Government, but their annual revenue is already equal to the income of the late Government. This difference may be traced chiefly to two causes: firstly, to the exorbitant increase of the original amount of taxation; and, secondly, to the non-existence at present of the large estates and tracts of lands which were attached to the above charitable establishments, as well as to the discontinuance of rent-free lands and jageers enjoyed by the nobility and gentry of the country. These circumstances have equalised the income of the British Government with the late rulers, though possessing but little more than half the same extent of territory and means of income.

From the foregoing, it is evident that ample, as well as permanent means, were provided by the late rulers, not only for the education, but the support of the poor. Besides, there were other incentives for the encouragement of learning. Many of the people were raised to high dignities for their literary qualifications and meritorious acts, both by the Hindoo and the Mahomedan rulers, and this stimulus served to increase the zeal of their subjects in acquiring literary attainments, or performing virtuous acts.

On the dismemberment of the Mogul empire, almost all these advantages, which made India happy, ceased. During the time of anarchy, and the change of masters, no reference even was made for a long time to the welfare of the people, who were allowed to sink into ignorance, while the nobility and gentry were heedlessly depressed.

The majority of the poor who were provided with the means of education and sustenance *gratis*, were thus thrown on the country without either, and in large cities and towns one may see troops of these wretched creatures moving about in a state of beggary.

The revival of education remained under discussion for several successive years with the British authorities. By some, the enlightenment of the natives was considered as dangerous to the stability of the British rule in India.* In consequence, this

* With the same motive apparently the freedom of the Press was also

noble cause was neglected; nay, from the little encouragement which learning has yet received, we are led to believe that it is still supposed so. During the century nearly that the British Government has existed in India, no adequate means have yet been adopted to bestow a liberal education. The sum laid out by Government for diffusing knowledge among a population consisting of one hundred millions, is but a few thousand pounds which supports only a few Government institutions, and those have come into existence very slowly. The first college was established in the Fort William, in Calcutta, by Lord WELLESLEY, for the instruction of Europeans. The Delhi college was restored

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withheld from India for a long time. Even some of the editors who wrote against the policy of the Government were punished, and sent back to England. The illiberality of this course was however at last seen and admitted, and the liberty of the Press was wisely granted during the short administration of the late Lord METCALFE; the favorable results of which are obvious. If we pay a due attention to the subject, the advantages of it are more in favor of Government than the people, especially in its present critical position in a country like India. In addition to several other blessings, the liberty of the Press, if impartially used, partly opens a channel for it to acquire that valuable information of the effects of its own acts over the minds of its subjects, of which it otherwise might have remained in the dark, and thus enables it to adopt remedial and precautionary measures in time to prevent the evil results of its own, or its local officer's policy. In every way, it is the means of the improvement of the administration of a country, and the enlightment of its people. It is therefore a matter of wonder why its extension to India should have been so vehemently opposed. Instead of reproaching this policy, the Home Government ought to have considered itself indebted to Lord METCALFE for this most valuable act of his wise administration, in adopting which, he was only led from a due sense of his duty and good will both to the governed and the governors, and I may say, much more to the latter.

by Lord AMHERST, in 1823, on its old principle, which promised some means of subsistence for those who could not provide for themselves, but it was subsequently discontinued, and few scholarships were created in its stead. This restoration of the college was hailed by the people of Delhi and the neighbourhood, with the greatest demonstration of joy. Hundreds of boys came, but only a certain number were kept. Soon afterwards the developement of European sciences to the natives of India, through the channel of the English language, was advocated and partly encouraged. With that view, in 1827, a class for the instruction of the English language was established in the Delhi collage, with similar institutions in Agra, Benares, Barealie, and some other large places. A few indigenous schools have also lately been established by our present Lieut.-Governor, Mr. THOMASON, in the Upper Provinces, for instruction in the vernacular languages. These institutions certainly have been very useful in diffusing a knowledge of the European literature and sciences to a certain extent, but they are visibly very inadequate to effect the great object of *educating a population of a hundred millions*. Besides, the education given in the Government schools and colleges does not extend beyond a knowledge of history, mathematics, geography, and some other theoretical branches, and yet little or no attention is paid to those useful and practical arts and sciences, the study of which ought to be of primary consideration.

Again, those who are so educated, do not receive that manner of encouragement which they ought, by being employed in Government offices. If it be earnestly disposed, as it is its duty to be, to improve India, and to restore its degraded and wretched people in some degree the means of their former literary attainments, and to raise them to a level with other civilised nations, it ought to come forward liberally and impartially in providing for the national education, and offer facilities for its extension to the community at large. Our present system ought to be changed, and the cultivation of the physical and practical arts and sciences be promoted. Government should establish extensively institutions in various branches of popular education, in addition to a general knowledge of the sciences, including agriculture, civil and military engineering, medicine, and other arts and trades. There ought to be two divisions, one for the poor (many of the old nobility and gentry come under that head from their present circumstances) and the working classes, who now, without any employment, are merely drones on society. To them the knowledge of the mechanical arts, such as may be of use to them in their several professions, ought to be imparted through the vernacular languages, the superiority of which, after prolonged discussions, has been established beyond other languages to facilitate the cause of improvement, but we have not, however, yet heard of the appropriation of any pecuniary aid for the translation of the English scientific works into the native lan-

guages. Besides, as has been shewn, the poor classes were formerly provided with the means of living, Government ought also, at the same time, to adopt some course which, though it may not provide wholly will serve at least in some degree to maintain them. Without such a provision, it is very difficult to enable these miserable people to receive instruction in our schools.

The classical studies, and the acquirement of foreign languages, more especially the English, the language of our masters, ought to be confined to the higher classes who can command time and means to devote themselves to the cultivation of their minds. But there will be no advancement in this class also without a stimulus. There ought to be an Act issued from the legislative Council making every scholar of a certain knowledge and qualification eligible to all public employments of trust, without any distinction. As long as the Government of India is conducted on exclusive principles, there is no incentive for its people, and it is plain there can be very little progress in their improvement.

The following observation of an Indian Editor of a newspaper, "*The Hindoo Intelligencer*," speaks for itself on this subject: "The native candidates for promotion in the educational department are deceived by the hollow promises held out to them, and faint is the encouragement given to the cause of national improvement, and its results are only equal to the means."

Sir JOHN MALCOLM, on this subject, speaks as follows: "Many persons who profess a great desire to enlighten and improve the natives of India, exclaim against plans which are calculated to confer upon these natives high and confidential employment on the ground of their being, as a people, ignorant, corrupt, and immoral. Allowing for a moment this melancholy picture to be correct, can it enter the mind of any man who has the slightest knowledge of human nature, or human communities, that mere instruction, whether moral or religious, will ever advance men in civilisation while they are excluded from all that stimulates the mind to good and great actions? We may teach them to understand better than they now do their own depressed and degraded condition; but if we wish that, as they acquire knowledge, they should maintain their allegiance and attachment to those by whom it is imparted, we must grant them confidence and respect; and if we succeed in giving them consequence in their own estimation, they will soon attain it in that of others."

The difference between the means of education and the incentives for its encouragement which were enjoyed in the time of the former rulers of the country and the present is very great. Give us even half those means and encouragements, and we shall consider ourselves fortunate. Is it not the duty of a Government to bestow a liberal education on the people of a country from which it derives an immense revenue, and draws so many resources for its

native land? If so, we naturally do not want more than what is usual, and what is the bounden duty of Government to afford.

To those who entertain an opinion, that the improvement of the natives of India, both mentally and politically, will be the cause of the early downfall of the Bsitish power, I can only say, that such an opinion is not liberal, especially when entertained by a people who lay a strong claim to civilisation, and a superior standard of moral excellence. To keep down a conquered nation merely to serve our own selfish motives, is indeed short-sighted and unjust. Too much pressure, at last, will produce a reaction, and then we cannot conscientiously blame the natives of India. Let us act liberally and morally; let us give them proper education, and improve their political position, and relieve them from the pinching want and distress to which we have reduced them; let them have a share in the honor and power, and also in those political and civil rights from which they are now rigidly excluded. If then they act dishonestly or ungratefully, they will render themselves unworthy of consideration, and there will remain only the satisfaction of knowing, that good deeds have been repaid by ingratitude; but with our oppressive treatment, we have no claim on the gratitude of India.

From what I know of my countrymen, I am quite sure that the British Government will never have to repent of their adoption of a liberal line of policy.

With good treatment, the people will support the Government. Empty encouragements however will continue as abortive and futile, as heretofore.

In Egypt, Mahomed Ali, a Turk, has established Colleges in his capital of Cairo, and also at Alexandria, on a very liberal scale, and has also introduced cloth and other machinery and makes every proper use of them, and takes every other means for the mental and social improvement of his people. Again, the British Government itself has established two Colleges in England for qualifying their young countrymen for the military and civil branches of the service. Why should they withhold from the natives of India similar institutions to qualify and encourage them to serve the Government with equal zeal and ability.

CONCLUSION.

From all that has been written on its various Departments, it may be concluded that the present system of conducting the Government of India is any thing but favorable to its permanent welfare, or to that of the country and its inhabitants. The safety of the British Government, as now constituted, hangs on a thread, and the whole fabric, erected as it is on a sand-hill, may sink under its own weight, if not hurled down in the meantime by some external cause. Still, numerous eulogiums are passed on the pretended good administration of India, and

the blissful condition of its inhabitants. It is true, that the natives are not very energetic, nor powerful enough at present to be very dangerous, but they have malignity enough to render them willing tools in the hands of an enterprising adventurer, who perhaps may not be long wanting with such inviting prospects before him. This state of things is partly regarded, however, as the result of ignorance, and a want of correct information.

Had the country been governed by permanent residents, whoever they might have been, and the manufactories of India not been annihilated for the profit of a foreign country, and its wealth been expended in the country, and the natives, as well as the English, would have had a wider field for employment, the condition of both, socially and politically, would have been quite different, and the Government, instead of being disliked by the population and the Chiefs, might have established an enviable reputation throughout India. It is astonishing that, notwithstanding the existence of the Government in the country for nearly a century, the numerous faults of its constitution still remain.

The Hindoo and Mahomedan rulers are stigmatised by foreign writers as very tyrannical and oppressive: but this is a great error. Their system of taxation was much milder than it is at present, and their personal treatment of the natives was liberal. Although the Mahomedans differ from the Hindoos in religion, they made no distinction of

color or creed. The Hindoos were as eligible to situations of trust as the Mahomedans. They had made India their home, and the wealth of the country was spent in the country. The monuments of their liberality in improving India are visible almost in every village. A visit to Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Mandoo, Ojgen, Burhanpoor, Ourungahad, Dowlatabad, Ahmednagar, and numerous other ruined towns, will exhibit extensive remains of the magnificent buildings, gardens, mosques, palaces, bridges, caravan-seraes, &c. The difference between those places and any English town, Bombay, &c., is quite apparent! Very few public works are there to be seen, beyond jails, godowns, and a few traveller's Banglows, particularly constructed for the accommodation of Europeans. Were the English compelled at once to quit the country, they would leave scarcely any memento of the beneficence or magnificence of their rule in India.

The Mogul empire was, in its effects, not a foreign but a domestic government. Its chief fault was the form of Government, which was that of a pure despotism, and which, under an imbecile monarch, guided by a weak ministry, was liable to be detrimental to the welfare of the kingdom; otherwise, it was a popular and liberal Government. If the conciliating and liberal policy adopted by Akbar the Great had been continued by his successors, and not have been rashly subverted by Alumgeer, the Mogul empire would not have so easily declined.

We are told, that we have now a better form of government, but, unfortunately, it has proved much worse than any despotic one in its operation. Until we possess a larger share of the blessings of a constitutional government, the state of India will continue as wretched and depressed as ever.

The Hindoo and Mahomedan princes, the monuments of whose liberality I have been describing, would undoubtedly have been much more astonished than the present generation to view the commercial rapacity of the present age. Experience and a right judgment teach that liberality, if not honesty, is the best policy which a ruler can follow. At least, "we ought to do unto others as we would like done unto us," as the Holy Scriptures say.

India can never improve without the help and assistance of its own people. The laws enacted by those who have little or no means of judging of their effects, cannot be beneficial to the country, which wants representatives in the legislative Councils of Government, for, it is evident, that she has not yet improved without the co-operation of those who have a permanent interest in her welfare. It is essential that the responsible heads of the Government should have a full knowledge of those for whom they are appointed to legislate, but individuals in those high stations are at present devoid of the means of acquiring that aid to their deliberations, owing certainly to the reserved intercourse and the political exclusion of the natives, who only appear in disguise

before their English masters, who are extremely few in number in comparison with their native subjects. Hence the position of the former may always be considered very precarious. What then makes the Government persevere in such a line of policy, which only serves to estrange the feelings of the natives, and to increase their apathy and dislike, is a matter of great wonder. If we are desirous of keeping the country, and of making its people happy as it is declared to be the object, it is our bounden duty to raise them from their present degraded and impoverished condition. The British dominion can neither be secure nor a blessing until it has elevated the vast population over which it extends, by adopting every reasonable means of improving their intellectual culture and political advancement. If not, it will run the chance of ruling a nation of disaffected paupers, and consequently be in danger of losing the country, because the safety of the one evidently depends on the prosperity of the other. The latter point, however, cannot be attained until the natives have a hand in making their own laws, or if some other equally efficient measure be not adopted.

Europeans persist in thinking that very few of the natives are competent to fill the principal offices in the British Courts; the fact being, as I have before stated, that the laws have been made on strange principles, quite at variance with the usages and institutions of the country. Had they been in accordance with them, as good and wise policy re-

quired, every village could have produced a scholar in the law. Whatever may be thought of them, the natives are not altogether so ignorant and incapable as they are supposed to be. Numbers of them, who are men of intelligence and experience, at least understand the business of their own country decidedly better than many foreigners, and are sighing most anxiously for some sort of employment.

The interests of the Government and the country strongly demand that the natives ought to receive indiscriminately not only every share in the honors and management of their country, but also in the legislation. It is a universal law, that every man must have a share in the making of the laws which are enacted to protect his rights and property. Our laws, however, are made by those who have no rights or property to be protected by them, and are beyond feeling their effects. They have been made indifferent to our rights, and have sprung up from their own selfish motives, and are, therefore, void of that true protection for which they are declared to be enacted.

The following is a remark on this subject from the pen of Dr. Wilson, in winding up his "History of India:" "Much undoubtedly remains to be effected to counterpoise the evils which are inseperable from the nature of the connection that subsists between the Government of India and its subjects—the unnatural rule of foreign masters differing in origin, language, civilisation, and religion—whose only sympathy with the natives of

India arises from a sense of duty, not from identity of interests or reciprocity of feeling; who have no permanent stake in the country, no personal pride in its embellishment, no personal profit in its improvement—to whom, in short, it can never be a home. It is by this inherent and irremediable defect, that the main faults of the Indian Government —the costly and complicated machinery of an administration ill-suited to the condition of the society on which it has been forced—the slow and imperfect distribution of justice, the feeble and vicious organisation of the police, and the perpetual and exhausting drain upon the public revenue—are to be accounted for."

We have, however, been compelled to obey these laws, though they have, as experience proves, been of very little profit to the country or its people; on the contrary, they have attacked their rights and reduced them to abject pauperism.

In England, even where a certain portion of the community has the right of electing its representatives to make their laws, they yet cry out, that *every one* has not a voice in the choice of legislators, and very naturally and justly so. What, then, must be the feelings of those who, from high to low, in addition to the forfeiture of several other rights, have no manner of voice, but have foreigners to make laws for them? The color of skin makes no difference. Human nature is every where the same. The question then arises, why should we force on

others principles which we ourselves cannot bear, and how can we think those principles will be popular with them?

Among the remedial arrangements which were proposed in 1812 by the Honorable the Court of Directors to the local Authorities, one was the extended employment in the distribution of civil justice, of native agency, and especially in the form of Panchaets, and of individuals possessing authority or influence, as the head men of villages, opulent landholders, and the like.

The first part of this judicious proposition was carried out by Lord William Bentinck, by the employment of native judges, as has been already mentioned in another place, but the other, and the most important and useful part was reported by the Civil Authorities as utterly impracticable in the Bengal and the Western Provinces, now forming the Agra Presidency, though it was successful in the Madras Presidency, and introduced in Bombay with good effect. The plan so wisely suggested was consequently dropped, without a trial, to the great misfortune of those whom it was intended to benefit.

The second proposition was the limitation of appeals, simplification of process, and reduction of expences, &c. The adoption of that also was not considered advisable, on the opinion of the same parties, and was likewise withheld.

In my humble opinion, in devising these measures, the Honorable Court consulted the very best means

of ameliorating the internal administration of British India, and there can be no doubt that they would have been as successful in the Bengal territories as elsewhere. It is now left to the high Authorities in England to consider if the prosecution of their beneficent plans should be further delayed, owing to the objections of those by whom they have never been tried, and contrary to the experience of some of the highest officers of the Honorable Company's service, namely, MALCOLM, MUNRO, and ELPHINSTONE, as well as the judgment of the natives themselves.

It is the opinion of some that India ought to be colonised by English settlers, who will thus form a link between the governors and the governed. This measure might at first still more tend to depress the native gentry; but, ultimately, prove as advantageous to the country as it might be prejudicial to Government, because the latitude of authority which is generally exercised by its distant functionaries, and which is sometimes revolting to justice and to humanity, would hardly be borne by the English settlers; collisions would therefore follow, the result of which, in a discontented country, among such discordant elements, may easily be conceived. Although it is difficult to say how long the natives may patiently bear their grievances, yet it cannot be disputed, that they are more meek, controlable, and submissive than any other people; and, by proper attention to their welfare, and a kind and

liberal mode of treatment, to which they have been accustomed almost from time immemorial, they can be closely attached. It is the latter they want, and not the downfall of the English, because it is possible that their withdrawal from the country might throw it into a worse state than that of which it complains at present.

Here I close these short, but lamentably true, Notes on the present deplorable state of India. I fear they may be a prelude to many such histories which India will yet produce before she can attract the notice of those whose duty may prompt them to do her justice. If there is a will to pay attention to the claims of India on the protection of the British Government, it is not merely what I, but English writers themselves, have said on the subject, that will justify enquiry. I have shewn in these pages that there is much reason to complain of injustice and a greedy extortion, and that, in lieu of the wealth and trade, the honor, the self-government and the independence of our country—once a land of riches and plenty—we have been reduced to pauperism and degradation, moral and political, and to a contemptuous treatment. What more, then, is slavery? This is slavery, or worse; because an ordinary slave has a protector who provides him with his necessary wants, while the natives of India have to depend, unfortunately, on the empty consolation of *good intentions* and fine speeches.

This is indeed a sad bargain: and hitherto sub-

missive India to every foreign yoke, may gradually be forced by her necessities to become disloyal—a state which she has never been known to exhibit, but which also she may ultimately be indebted to the present exclusive system of policy by which it is governed.

"I may once more observe, that India is a brilliant appendage to the British crown; it is a field to make your heroes and statesmen; it is a land where your young men find employment and make fortunes, and where your manufactured goods are largely consumed. In short, it is a land whence you derive numerous benefits, more than from any other country or colony. There is not a place in the United Kingdom of Great Britain which does not, more or less, share in the wealth of India. With all such advantages, is it not worth preserving and improving, and are not its natives deserving of more consideration than they have yet received? If these matters are seriously worthy of notice, I strongly appeal to those who, by the solemn nature of their responsibility, are bound not only to their own nation, but to God the universal Bestower of Kingdoms and Countries, to do equal handed justice to those who have been placed under their protective care.

When the existing Charter expires, these mighty subjects will, doubtless, be fully discussed and satisfactorily disposed of, both as regards the interests of the governed and the governors; and it is then to be hoped, that the former will be admitted to a due

share of honor and distinction, and the real blessings of good government in the administration of their country, which is now sinking under its burthensome expense and selfish system.

Let the English Government, therefore, imitate their predecessors, and do actual good to India and its people; and let its countrymen consider the former as their own home, and the latter as their fellow-creatures, and not treat them like the beasts of the forest. Then, and not till then, will its name be universally beloved; its Government be founded on the hearts of the people, and its strength be impregnable.

G. BUTLER, PRINTER, COLONNADE, RYDE.

PRINCIPLES

OF

INDIAN REFORM:

BEING

BRIEF HINTS.

TOGETHER WITH

A PLAN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONSTITUENCY OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY,

AND FOR

THE PROMOTION OF INDIAN PUBLIC WORKS.

Phl·4

BY

J. CHAPMAN,

AUTHOR OF "THE COTTON AND COMMERCE OF INDIA CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN."

LONDON:

JOHN CHAPMAN, 142, STRAND.

MDCCCLIII.

PREFACE.

THE object of the following observations required the adoption of a style which needs some apology. That object is to bring together, in little space, a number of statements which seem to me as important to be apprehended in their mutual relations as in their individual truth. To contract, therefore, the expression, qualifications and apologies have been dropped, proofs of positions some may deem questionable omitted, almost all references dispensed with, and the whole reduced to a bareness and apparent peremptoriness of assertion which, but for its purpose, I could endure as little as the reader. Wherever this mode of treating the subject may lead to that better kind of conviction which a thinking man works out for himself, it will receive the chief justification I covet.

These scanty pages are occupied almost exclusively with the exposition of principles, partly because it is impossible to discuss in a small space many forms of detail amongst which choice may be made with little difference of effect, and partly because the discussion of details, without a previous apprehension of principles, leads to obscurity, confusion, and failure.

One word to the friends of Indian Reform may be permitted. The main labour of that great enterprise will have to be undertaken *after* the termination of the present discussions, whatever may be their issue.

J. CHAPMAN.

MARCH, 1853.

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PRINCIPLES

OF

INDIAN REFORM.

I.—The Engagements existing between the Imperial Government and the East India Company.

1. The sum of 12,000,000*l.* sterling is now guaranteed to the body of proprietors of East India stock, to be paid to them by the Imperial Government, as a final discharge of all claims, on being deprived of the Government of India, if claimed within twelve months of the deprivation; the payment to be made in three years from the date of the claim. (See 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 85.)

2. The annual sum of 630,000*l.* is likewise payable to the East India Company, by way of dividend, "out of the revenues of the said" Indian "territories," or "out of such part of the revenues of the said territories as shall be remitted to Great Britain;" and this annuity or dividend is payable until the aforesaid deprivation of Government and payment of the capital stock take place.

3. The capital of 12,000,000*l.* seems to have, inferentially, the guarantee of the British Government, for it is the consideration for which the East India Company made over to the Crown all their rights in India; so that, in case of failure of Indian resources, it appears it would be a charge on the taxes of Great Britain. But the annuity of 630,000*l.* appears to have no further guarantee of the British Government, than an engagement that it shall be the first charge paid out of the net taxes of India remitted to England; so that, on failure of Indian resources, this annuity would *not* be a charge on the taxes of Great Britain.

4. This arrangement may last until 1874. Previous to that date the capital of 12,000,000*l.* cannot be paid off, or the annuity cease, except on requisition of the East India Company following their being deprived of the government of

India*. But, at that date, the British Government can peremptorily pay off the capital, and terminate the annuity, the East India Company having no power to refuse.

5. A sum of 2,000,000*l.* sterling, deposited in the Bank of England in 1834, has accumulated to nearly 4,000,000*l.* towards the discharge of the capital of 12,000,000*l.*, under the name of the "Security Fund."

6. The trading power of the East India Company is in abeyance so long as they possess the government of India; but it will revive when they cease to hold that government.

II.—The Influx of Gold, and its Consequences.

1. Vast augmentations are taking place in the quantity of gold available for use as money; and, unless equal augmentations of industrial and commercial activity all over the world should take place (which seems impossible), the consequence must be a great and rapid decline in the purchasing power of any given quantity of gold, that is, of the metal which the British Government has contracted to deliver to the proprietors of East India stock in 1874.

2. Money, and obligations expressed *in money*, must sink in practical value: property, and all capabilities of production, existing *in kind*, will keep their relative value amongst themselves on the whole, but will become dearer in money value.

3. There is no probability of a legislative readjustment of values to suit altered and altering circumstances, for the following reasons:—First, it would be unjust; since they who bargain to receive gold at a future period, are no more entitled to a change of terms, on an adverse turn of values, than they who bargain to receive cotton, iron, wood, corn, labour, or anything else. Secondly, vast interests will always be opposed to such a change. Thirdly, the continual alteration of circumstances, under a large and perpetual influx of gold, will always render it impossible to fix either the terms of a new adjustment, or the time at which it shall take place.

4. If, then, the proprietors of East India stock suffer their money to remain quiescent under the present arrangement, they will probably find, when paid off twenty years hence, that their capital will produce a much smaller quantity of

* Query: What is the kind of arrangement that will, and what that will not, "deprive the Company of the possession and government of the said territories?"

railways, roads, territorial works, or other productive objects, *in kind*, than the same sum would purchase now.

5. Profits and interest, as computed on equal nominal amounts of capital, will not be materially changed by the accession of large quantities of gold: consequently, half the quantity of possessions in kind will produce only half the income, that is, only half the income, considered practically, with reference to its purchasing power. An income of 500*l.* per annum from Indian Stock, if no alteration be made, will probably find its possessor twenty years hence in no better position than that in which an income of 250*l.*, 300*l.* or 350*l.* per annum places him now. This is the danger to which the proprietors of East India Stock expose themselves by letting an adjustment lie over till 1874.

6. No particular ratio need be assigned here to the depreciation; any conjecture must, of course, be without an actual basis; only let it be observed, that facts connected with the production of gold are constantly outstripping expectation, and are therefore tending every month to a larger probability of depreciation than existed the month before. Whatever the proportion may turn out in time to be, it is clear that a very great risk would be avoided, if the capital could now be laid out on terms affording an equal guarantee of the British Government for its security and productiveness: an additional advantage would be gained, if this equal security could be associated with a fair chance of profit beyond the amount of the present annuity.

7. India, if converted into a country of large production, would take a large amount of gold for the extension of its own coinage, and so mitigate the fall in the value of gold, or, in other words, the rise of prices.

III.—The Relation of the Industrial Condition of India to the Commercial Interests of England.

1. The probability of England realizing from India the various sums in which the latter country is indebted to the former, depends chiefly on *an improvement* in the industrial condition of India. In its present industrial condition, India is every year getting deeper into debt, and is likely to do so. It did so under its native governments, but then the debts were got rid of by fraud, or violence, as they arose, or the cost of governing was in great part evaded by omitting to fulfil the duties of government.

2. The proprietor of Indian stock, that is, the creditor of

India, depends for his dividend exclusively on the resources of India, although that real dependence is masked by the imposing formality of a Government, and by some sort of participation of the Imperial Government in the engagement. The Indian Government has a deficit every year, which the Imperial Government is not bound to make good.

3. England needs and will long need extension of her markets for manufactures. Exports are so far the base of our system, that if they diminish, or are affected with loss for any considerable length of time together, we have a crisis, a panic, from which we do not recover for several years.

4. Our markets abroad, except where indigenous manufactures successfully rival our own, are confined, for much the greater part, to small populations on sea-coasts or navigable rivers; and such markets as we possess are, for the most part, liable to be shut up in a greater or less degree, by the blind rage or policy, or the consistent necessities of despotism on one hand, or by adverse theories of trade or the disturbance of tottering social systems on the other.

5. This limitation of the markets is occasioned by the want of the means of transport, by which to bring heavy produce to the coast from the great interiors, in payment for our goods. Where such means of transport exist, or the return produce happens to be light enough in proportion to its value to be carried to profit on bad roads, there our goods are used; where one of these is not the case, the people make for themselves what they want, as well as they can, although they could more profitably buy of us.

6. Panics occur when these limited marginal markets have been some time overburthened with the goods produced by our augmented and continually augmenting capital, credit, skill, and labour. Losses then occur, which first break down the commercial agency, and after that cripple for a time the producing powers.

7. An influx of gold may modify or postpone panics, but, however great, it cannot put an end to them, for it does not put an end to their causes. In some views it may even aggravate them.

8. Free trade may modify panics, but cannot prevent them, since it does not so alter the total area of consumption for our goods as to bring up the demand constantly to the perpetually increasing supply.

9. The means of escaping panics, or perhaps of escaping chronic losses equal in effect to panics, lie in an extension of markets proportionate to, and ever keeping pace with the

successive extensions of our own producing power, and which shall be likely to last until other great markets have grown up, or become accessible to us.

10. The first and most important element in a market, and that which most slowly augments, is population. Power of producing acceptable articles of exchange, discovery of natural capabilities, habits of enjoyment and consumption,—everything which goes to make up the causes of demand, changes far more rapidly than the absolute amount of the population.

11. In all matters necessary to the augmentation of demand by a given number of persons, the population of India is as susceptible of change, when suitable inducements are presented, as any population in the world; and the natural capabilities of India are greater than those of almost any other country.

12. The amount of the population of India which would be accessible to us commercially *but for want of roads* is probably three times as great as that of all other countries put together which we supply with manufactures, out of Europe and the United States; and in these last-named countries native manufactures are rivalling our own, and the possibility of political and social changes imperil the demand.

13. A British colonist does not take from England more than from 2*l.* to 4*l.* per head, in manufactures;—certainly on the average not 3*l.* per annum more than he would have consumed if he had remained in England.

14. If we were to send away 330,000 persons per annum to British colonies (besides those who go to the United States, &c., where they meet with other than British manufactures), and if each of these were to take 3*l.* per head per annum, we should have an addition to our exports of 1,000,000*l.* sterling per annum. This rate of emigration, somewhat exceeding that of the increase of the home population, is beyond the practicable limit, for it would gradually depopulate these islands. If the 120,000,000 of India could be brought to raise their demand for our goods 3*d.* per head per annum (that is, about one-fourth of its present miserable amount), the increase of our export would be 1,500,000*l.*; that is, it would exceed any increase which it is probable *can ever* arise from emigration.

15. The inhabitants of India take from us goods at the rate of 1*s.* 1*d.* per head per annum*; those of South America,

* This is founded on the estimate of 114,500,000 for the population of India. See "Cotton and Commerce of India," pp. 137, 180. But

slaves, natives, and all included, take from us at the rate of 8*s.* 8*d.* per head per annum. The demand varies in different parts of South America, exactly according to the means of transit. The reason of the demand of India being so low, lies entirely in the state of the roads; "entirely," however, in this sense, that a remedy of the roads would be followed, *of necessity*, by all other needful remedies.

16. If India took goods from us at the same rate per head as South America, the amount of our exports would be doubled; that is, our people would earn every year a considerable part of the 60,000,000*l.* of which that export would consist, in addition to their present income.

15. If one-half of the population of the British Islands were to emigrate, and then to become customers to the other half at the same rate as our present colonists, the effect, as shown by figures, would not be nearly so great as that of bringing up India to the commercial demand of South America.

16. The turning point of England's future commercial course will be the treatment of India; and if of her commercial, then of her political course; for politics follow economics, although we commonly attempt to reverse that natural order.

IV.—Necessity of Roads, and of other Public Works to follow.

1. The question of the internal improvement of India is a question of external commerce, and the question of external commerce in India is *entirely* a question of public works: first, of roads; then, as may be found profitable, of other works. "Entirely," in this sense, already explained, that these roads being made, other evils, financial, political, or even social, would soon of necessity be remedied, or at least diminished; but these roads *not* being made, those other evils would be remedied either not at all, or at an intolerable snail's pace, as heretofore.

2. Increase of irrigation, where there are no *navigable* rivers, is perfectly useless, unless roads are also made to carry away the increased crops. Indian ancient works should be studied in connection with *local* Indian history. Causes dependent on natural circumstances and the native systems of policy have brought the old works of India to decay much more

later authorities give 150,000,000 as nearer the truth. The consumption of our goods by the natives of India, if this be correct, is not much above 11*d.* per head per annum.

than English neglect or mismanagement. In some cases, no doubt, we have blundered greatly; but for the most part it would be folly, from change of circumstances, to restore the old works for irrigation until we have provided means of transit. Roads, railroads, river navigation, first; all else will follow, if due freedom of enterprise be secured.

3. Great part of India has no navigable rivers; where they do exist they ought to be fully used.

4. Carriage on long routes without water conveyance can only be profitably effected on railroads; profitably, that is, when the goods are heavy, and have to be projected into the general market of the world.

5. There are many lines in India on which railroads would pay, and where they are indispensable; there are many others on which they would *not* pay, and there common roads should be made, to be sustained by tolls. The principles by which the cases may be distinguished to which each class of roads is applicable are very clear, and only require in each case the ascertaining of ascertainable facts and probabilities.

6. The margin for profit in any case of enterprise is the difference between the cost at which the desired effect can be produced by proposed new means and by the established old ones. The profit of the new bridge depends on the inconvenience or danger of the old ford. This is the first or essential limit of profit. There is another limit, or rather maximum, lower down, which depends on considerations to which we need not now advert.

7. The existing means of transport in India are in every sense *extremely* costly—in direct charge, in damage to goods, in consumption of time, in want of concert with markets, &c., &c., &c.

8. There is therefore a large margin for profit in better means of conveyance to be established in India.

V.—Roads ought not to be in the Hands of Government.

1. Governments are bad managers of industrial business; necessarily so, and not from the mere accidents of misconduct. Joint-stock companies are not so bad as governments; partnerships, where sufficient, are better than joint-stock companies; individuals, where competent in pecuniary means and personal qualifications, are better than partnerships. Efficiency increases or diminishes very nearly as we approach to or recede from individuality. Amongst the worst of modern devices is that of a government and a company, *both* concerned in the actual management of the same work.

2. One of the most notorious modern examples of the incompetency of a government as a trader is that of the East India Company after it became a government.

3. The most notorious instance of neglect of public works is that of the East India Company; a natural and inevitable consequence of its being a government, aggravated, however, by the special circumstances in which our Government in India is and must be placed.

4. Other Governments fail in the same way. France with her roads, England with her dock-yards, &c. Several of the United States of North America, profiting by experience, have recently revised their constitutions, so as to prohibit their legislatures from meddling on State account with public works. Yet in America they are making ten miles of railway *per diem;* while in India, which needs such works far worse, six years of discussion and three of work have not sufficed or have scarcely sufficed to complete twenty miles of easy railway in Bombay. All California and all gold-producing Australia have come into being, commercially speaking, since Indian railroads were first discussed on sufficient data for action; and the Isthmus of Darien will be abolished as an obstacle to intercourse before the Ghauts are crossed by a railroad.

5. Amongst the most remarkable instances of failure of this kind are those of the old Governments of India. They almost never made a road, in our sense of the word road; and when they did make one it was for the convenience of the Government, not of the people. They left ruins behind them at their successive seats of power almost all over the country, amongst which, by the way, are very few ruins of bridges; and they never reared a spirit of either enterprise or co-operation amongst the people sufficient, without the Government, even to keep up the works when made.

6. And yet in face of these facts, and on this very field, notorious above all others for the failure of the principle, we are continually calling on the Government to make roads in India, the classes in England most of all interested not having yet made the slightest pecuniary venture in a matter so vital to them. Should not these classes read the fable which tells of a farmer asking his friends and relations to cut his corn, while the lark thought her nest and young ones in no danger until he set about reaping it himself?

7. The final and complete separation of the management of public works in India from the authorities administering the Government of that country, is a policy resting on the same principles as the separation of the commerce of India

from the same authorities in 1833, and may be confidently expected to be followed with the same results, of vast and most beneficial increase.

8. The participation of governments in any works carried on for profit, whether public or other, is a breach of sound principles, inasmuch as a government ought to be an impartial umpire amongst all interests, not an interested or prejudiced party itself.

9. Such participation is socialism, as far as it extends. The special and inveterate socialism of France may be traced to the undertaking by the Government for the absolute well-doing of the people, which undertaking is sometimes openly paraded, and is always implied in the minute and universal interference of the Government with industry. The cry in India, which corresponds to that of socialism in France, is, "the Government will do it." Let the people of India become as awake to public matters as those of France, and then, if the principle of State works be persevered in and consistently carried out in other matters, that Indian cry will be heard in the French version of it.

VI.—Guarantees injurious.

1. The guarantee of a government to a railway company provides amply for the indifference of all concerned; and if for indifference, then for laxity, disorder, and dishonesty; or for the opposite series of stiffness, form, the merging of individual capabilities, energy, and responsibility, in corporate mediocrity, cowardice, or rashness; ending either way in blundering, decay, quarrels, and loss.

2. An advance lodged with the East India Company, to be drawn out for expenditure as public works require, is just a loan for the time to the East India Company—a convenience which, with an established annual deficit in the revenue of the Company, is not likely to be hastily disturbed.

3. A deposit which equally bears interest whether used or not, is an effectual quietus to the depositor.

4. In none of the present arrangements, then, is there anything to promote the effectual prosecution of public works in India by public companies; and yet we may at any time have a panic, and, far worse, "a famine of cotton," entirely for want of them.

VII.—Practical Mitigation of the True Principles.

1. If, however, a government is a bad manager, and a company guaranteed and controlled by a government still

worse—if unfettered and unguaranteed private enterprise be the only sound system—it may still be necessary, *as a temporary device*, to adopt some plan by which a timid or uninformed capitalist in England may be induced to embark in an Indian undertaking. But there is an essential difference between taking up a plan as a true method, and taking up the same plan as an admitted make-shift in default of the true method. A man may use a hatchet where, if he had it, he ought to use a knife; but he who, in such a case, insists that the hatchet is the right tool, is likely to remain a clumsy and inefficient workman to the last.

2. Freedom of enterprise in Indian territorial works is, then, an end to be aimed at, even where it is not a plan to be presently adopted.

3. All engagements of this nature may contain conditions terminating the guarantee when certain favourable results have been arrived at, and their permanence sufficiently tested.

4. So also it is practicable to devise arrangements by which the shareholder shall have a sufficient guarantee (if he have sense and courage of his own), without that minute control over details by the Government which ruins the action of the railway executive, gets rid of the responsibility of the railway board, and renders every undertaking worthless as to any effect on that invaluable public opinion which depends on an interest generally diffused.

5. One important point in all such arrangements is, to put the actual business into hands which shall not be responsible, in matters of better or worse relating to profit only, to those who are entrusted with the government of the country; if they must be responsible in such matters to other than their own employers, at least let it not be to the actual Government. Another point is, to make all special connection between the Government and public works temporary, so as at least to be terminated on the realization of specified contingencies, if not by mere efflux of time, the system being set free at last.

6. Where even this cannot be done, then the same eventual condition may be reached another way. Let the Government construct the works themselves, then work them until they become profitable, then sell them, and reinvest the proceeds in further works to be again sold, and the capital reinvested as before; and so on. In default of English sagacity and courage, 10,000,000*l.* so employed might be made to traverse India with main lines of railway perhaps before the first generation had died out, whose zeal rightly excited might possibly suffice to keep up the vigour of the

system during their lives, and the want of which zeal in the succeeding generations would lead to decay, as in all like cases, if the works remained in the hands of Government.

7. All this, however, it must be remembered, is only makeshift, to be justified, if at all, by proved failure of sounder plans under present circumstances, which sounder plans have never yet been tried at all in respect of Indian public works.

VIII.—The Public Opinion which governs India.

1. Every country is ruled by a public opinion of some kind. This public opinion may be pure or debased, intelligent, ignorant or brutal, native or foreign; it may have sufficient and appropriate machinery for its expression and action, or, as is the case almost universally with debased and ignorant public opinions, it may have no such machinery at all, but go on fretting, wasting, cursing, intriguing, nursing up plots and revenge, until some chance—oftenest a quarrel amongst the rulers—produces an explosion, when its ignorance shows itself in the form of ferocity. Even a despot, the single head which wears the crown for the benefit of a class or a faction, is an embodiment of public opinion. A public opinion of some kind, and acting in some way, is the foundation of every government, and imparts its own character to the government it supports.

2. The public opinion which rules a country is commonly native to it; but that of India, as far as the sentiments of the people can be learned, delegates its own task to the public opinion of England.

3. Whether India will continue to be so ruled or not depends on the further question, whether or not the people continue to feel it on the whole a benefit to be so ruled. New benefits must be continually added to the old to sustain the feeling of content. To stand still is to prepare the loss of India.

4. The public opinion of England rules India chiefly through two means of action. First;—through the fact, or ever impending possibility, of the actual proceedings of our Indian governments and officers being reviewed in England; but this is defective, in consequence of the general want of knowledge of Indian subjects in England, and, except at times, of the absence of general interest in them. Second;—through the English sentiments of those actually employed in the Government of India: but those persons commonly go out to India young, and during a long residence there, they

unavoidably mix up with views which are substantially English a considerable proportion of native error; for instance, an old Indian officer will commonly talk of an increase of the revenue being *a profit to the Government*, as distinguished from a profit to the people, without seeing that by this truly Oriental phrase he really lets in the fundamental error of Oriental monarchy, and perpetuates the principle of despotism, which English public opinion intuitively endeavours to destroy.

5. Nevertheless, English public opinion does much good in the ruling of India. The Government of India is an Oriental despotism, worked by men brought up in freedom, who are, to some extent, held by their fellows at home to the principles, although not to our particular forms, of freedom.

6. England will not bear tyranny in India if she knows it. The defect is that she does not know either what is transpiring or how to judge of it. Our public opinion, as far as it resides in the general public, is in fault not so much in its quality, as in its weakness and insufficiency; it needs strengthening with public knowledge of India, and it will then soon have the capacity to judge correctly of Indian subjects.

7. The constituency of the East India Company, in its present state, is almost useless, whether as a substantive public having an opinion, or as an organ expressing the opinions of others. Candidates for the direction never ask for preference on the ground of their public principles—one candidate on one side of given questions, and another on the other,—which would be the case if opinion, or even a felt interest in India, ruled the elections; nor, if they did address their future constituents on such principles, is it probable they would forward their elections by it.

8. We have, then, no sufficient public opinion in England on Indian subjects, and one great object of present changes in a political sense should be to secure the growth of it in future.

9. The brief and infrequent fits of attention to Indian subjects, which are occasioned by a "renewal of the charter," a disastrous expedition, or the annexation of a kingdom, are altogether insufficient for the formation of an effective public opinion; for these occasions neither supply sufficient information of India in general, nor do they apply to the matters which lie at the foundation of our Indian Government, nor do they require or produce so much continuity of attention to Indian subjects as to render the opinions which may happen to be formed available for confident and familiar use.

10. No strong public and well-informed opinion can be created where men have not, in their own interests, frequently recurring occasions of attention to the facts.

11. An active interest in public works would supply such occasions; these public works, by extending our commercial relations with India, would also carry still further the same interest in Indian affairs through their own proper operation. In both ways they would strengthen and inform public opinion here, and so tend much to the good government of India, and to the long continuance of our rule there.

12. Conversely, India by the same means would become much more intimately and correctly acquainted with England, to her own great advantage, and to the maturing of her own capability of self-government.

13. Railways, guaranteed as at present, do very little towards improving public opinion in England in relation to India.

IX.—Needed Amendments in Political Forms.

1. The main defect of our Government in India is its want of a public arena of complaint and of discussion of grievances. A man may suffer atrocious wrong, and not be able to get a hearing. The scoundrel gets a hearing, and sometimes something more, by paying for it. A whole district may suffer without any sufficient recognised means of aggregate complaint to the superior deciding authorities. General measures too, as, for instance, new laws, cannot have the advantage of more than the sagacity and good intentions of the very limited body of law-makers. New laws, wanted and not made, may remain untouched for a generation, because nobody has the opportunity of giving notice that "he will ask the Hon. the Secretary for the Judicial Department, when the bill for enacting the proposed penal code will be introduced." This privacy, so unfit for government, has arisen from our Governments in India having been originally mercantile bodies, from which condition they have handed down private forms of discussion.

2. The same defect as to Indian affairs exists in England. You have a plan—a complaint—a business of some kind, which admits of two, or of many opinions, accordingly as the facts are more or less correctly understood. You go to the India House;—you see the officers;—you see several of the directors;—you receive great civility, probably quite without guile;—you find opinions expressed in your favour, probably quite sincere;—and, excepting in case of some director who quietly tells you he will consider your business when it comes

officially before him, you think all is going well; at any rate you have done all in your power. So also you go to Cannon Row, although it is not quite regular to do so, for everything with the Board of Control ought, by rule, to be done through the India House; and you go to much the same effect. After a time, generally a very long time, you hear of a decision; you find that not only is it just contrary to what you expected, but very often that a fact is alleged, or a reason given for it, which you could at once have set aside, if you could but have been heard. You find, too, you have been discussing the matter with those who had no power to settle it, and you cannot find out with whom the decision rested at last. But the thing is done, and a Government rarely attains to the dignity of saying, "I was mistaken." All this is made vastly worse by the Board of Control standing behind, and being masked by the India House, but with all real power in its hands. You are very likely to resolve to have as little as possible to do with either again, notwithstanding your belief that there are many good men in both; and so is India cut off in this quarter from the enterprise of England, and especially from the enterprise of independent parties.

3. Very likely, in most cases, this disappointment and injustice are occasioned by the real rulers having no chance of learning the facts most needful to their judgment, doing their work in the dark. Often it is done very honestly; but sometimes, no doubt, it is the effect of a dirty trick, to which darkness gives opportunity—darkness such as tricksters are fond of and honest men hate. Give daylight to Indian affairs, and while the honest men will do their work vastly better, the tricksters will slink away. Secrecy is a distinctive character of despotism, and often the very soul of its doings; and yet East India directors and members of the Board of Control would think it strange to be told that, in the midst of London, and with reference to English affairs, they are verily despots. There are twenty-four directors,—enough for parties to exist amongst them with all the ill effects of party spirit, but not enough for publicity and the fair advantages of discussion. In our Imperial Government legislation and justice are in hands separate from the executive business. In the two former we have complete publicity; and in the latter we have the effect of publicity in the possibility that any single act of the executive may be made matter of parliamentary discussion. It is not so in Indian affairs. Nobody knows what is done at the India House; and however bad it may chance to be, nobody cares, just for want of understanding it, and of having interest in it.

4. The proprietors' quarterly meetings are a farce, sometimes indeed worth seeing. Parliament is deaf and mute on Indian subjects, except at times, such as the renewal of the charter: it has no such sustained interest in Indian affairs as is requisite to make it of much avail towards the good government of India, and it never can have until a real interest in India is much further extended amongst the people of England. The sleep has this time lasted about twenty years; and it is most likely when the present noise is over, England in general will go to sleep again;—certainly it will do so, without considerable changes.

5. The separation of the legislative, judicial, and executive functions, is one of the fundamental Indian reforms most needed; at present these functions are huddled together in one duplicate set of offices.

6. If any men expert in Indian affairs now dread a change, as men in office commonly do, they may remember that our connection with and interest in India are not an eighth part so great as they ought to be; and that the organization of which they themselves form a part is one of the obstructions to the growth of that interest. If our commerce with India were eight or even four times as great as it now is, there would be far greater demand than now for able and experienced men in the Government of India, whatever its form, as well as in Indian commerce. Our Indian organization is most like a splendid team, every horse excellent, but altogether so abominably harnessed as to be deprived of half its strength, insomuch indeed as hardly to be able to draw home even the harvest on which it is itself to live.

X.—Effect of Roads on Industry, and of Industry on Peace.

1. India, under her native Governments, was dreadfully harassed by wars, both national and local, tyrannies and rebellions, besides insecurity to person and property of lesser forms. Some of the grossest of these evils have been put an end to; others have been diminished; others remain. Everybody agrees that, on the whole, person and property are much safer now than formerly, in parts which have come under British rule. In many native districts, people yet continue to go habitually armed.

2. Suppose a hundred men in one village to spend three days a week in working and three in fighting amongst themselves. That was the state of India under native rule.

3. Suppose a strong-handed man to come in amongst these hundred men and keep the peace,—in fact, making them

keep it by a police drawn from amongst themselves. If now they work six days a week instead of three, they will soon become richer than before, although they pay the keeper of the peace the value of one day's work out of the three for his services. That is the case of India with England to keep the peace for her.

4. Suppose now this village to be surrounded with mountains impassable to traffic. The three days a week redeemed from fighting would at first be spent in labour, until it was found that the production exceeded the consumption fixed by the then existing customary standard of enjoyment. After that, these redeemed days would be spent in idleness. That is the condition of the greater part of India, with the peace kept, but without roads.

5. Break through the surrounding mountains, and you would soon find the whole six days a week employed industriously, and the earnings of the two days, formerly idle, would be spent on better houses, better clothes, machinery for making still better of their labour, books, and a thousand conveniences and enjoyments unthought of before. That would be the case of India with sufficient means of internal transit.

6. Probably at least half of the human time, thought, and capabilities in India, and also half of the physical capabilities of the country, are now idle from sheer want of opportunity and inducement to exertion.

7. Some may doubt whether a change from fighting to idleness is any improvement. There can be no doubt, however, that of all minds, idle minds in large masses are the most dangerous. Unfounded hopes and fancies are produced by real evils, in the absence of the means of effort and of the tests of experience; they are just such dreams that set on foot the most sudden, daring, and unexpected enterprises. Vast heaps of humanity, festering in compulsory idleness, encumber the soil of India.

Idle India, *let alone*, may change in time to a mountain of gunpowder, which any wild spark may ignite.

Idle India, *set to work*, would soon be our treasure, our glory, our inseparable friend.

The difference lies in this, roads or no roads,—for there are ample means of employment for the people, if only the produce could be carried away.

8. This is said chiefly of the interior, not so much of the presidential cities and some other secure seats of commerce. A rebellion is almost as little likely in the city of Bombay as in Liverpool. Tumults in Bombay are always of one part of

the native population against another, the British Government being the common ruler and umpire; and even these tumults are not frequent. But why are tumults *against the Government* so much less likely there than in most native States? Just because the people have plenty else to do, and feel safe in doing it.

XI.—India burdened, while her idle Capabilities would pay all her Taxes.

1. India now pays to England 630,000*l.* per annum, the interest of the money employed in her Government. It may be a just and necessary payment; but still it is clearly an unmitigated deduction from her annual earnings; and she pays it while she possesses, *standing absolutely idle*, men, lands, and every requisite for earning probably sixty times that sum every year.

2. If India had to lay herself, for a time, under an additional obligation in order to obtain the means of setting her idle capabilities to work, she would gain, in exchange, advantages equal probably to the entire abolition of all her present taxes. For suppose the compulsory idleness of India to amount to only one-third of her capabilities, her population to be 150,000,000, the working men of her idle 50,000,000 to amount to 10,000,000, and these, without the women, to be employed at the rate, low even for India, of six shillings per month each, the resulting sum of 36,000,000*l.* sterling per annum is 50 per cent. more than the taxes paid to the British Government in India, and is probably more than equal to the taxes paid to all the Indian Governments together.

XII.—Proposed Plan for improving the Constituency of the East India Company, and for promoting Indian Public Works.

Taking, then, all foregoing facts and principles into account, let the following plan be considered, remembering that while it interferes with no other reforms whatever which may be devised for the better government of India, in which a body independent of the Imperial Government is retained, its powerful indirect effect would probably give greater vigour and efficiency to all other improvements.

1. Let the holders of India stock have permission to spend the capital it represents in the construction of territorial works in India,—with a guarantee equal in effect to that they now have, although, if necessary, somewhat different in form,

—and without losing their rights of participating in the Government of India;—and let the following be the regulations under which the application of the capital shall take place, or others to the same general effect.

2. When any number of East India proprietors, holding stock enough for the purpose, shall agree on a public territorial work of any kind which they will undertake, let them submit the plan to the Imperial Government (as the immediate guaranteeing party), and, if it be approved, let the Government cause to be paid to this body of proprietors so much of the "Security Fund" accumulated in the Bank of England, as shall bear the same proportion to the whole fund, as the said proprietors' nominal stock bears to the whole nominal stock of 6,000,000*l.* On receipt of this, the claim of these proprietors on the Security Fund will cease, and they will receive instead such a guarantee in respect of the works they undertake and execute, as is hereinafter provided.

3. When this sum has been expended to the satisfaction of the Imperial Government, let the remainder of the stock due to these proprietors be advanced in sums, from time to time, from the Imperial Exchequer, and laid out in like manner.

4. Let the Imperial Government give a guarantee for a dividend derivable from the works, at the rate of — per cent. per annum, and a guarantee for the capital until the excess of the actual dividends over the guaranteed dividend, with compound interest, shall have amounted to half (perhaps two-thirds) of the capital; let the guarantee of the Imperial Government apply at any time to only so much of the capital as shall remain unredeemed by the excess of the actual above the guaranteed dividend. When the half, or two-thirds, has thus been redeemed, let the guarantee of the Imperial Government entirely cease.

5. Let the proprietors continue to receive their dividends from the resources of India as at present (if the works shall proceed to the satisfaction of Government), until the works themselves produce dividends; and, when the works do produce dividends, then let the dividends, out of the taxes of India, which would have been paid to the proprietors, be paid to the Imperial Exchequer, in reimbursement of the advances made; and, when the advances shall have been repaid, let the taxes of India be relieved of the amount.

6. Let such an additional sum be drawn from India, *by authority of Parliament*, each year, if any, as its resources at the time may seem to warrant, towards the speedier re-

payment of the advances made from the Imperial Treasury, and calculated so that the whole be repaid in thirty years.

7. Let the proprietors associate themselves, as they please, for the prosecution of different works, so that each work be approved by the guaranteeing Government; and, if they break up into several companies, let each be a separate and independent company, on the footing of its own arrangement with the Government, with its own powers, and with its own directors, officers, and establishment; let it be accountable to the Government of India only as other parties are accountable to it. Nevertheless, let these proprietors retain all their privileges in respect of the Government of India, just as though their capital had not been converted.

8. Let the accountability, in respect of the commercial relations of the undertaking, always be to the Imperial Government, while that in respect of law and justice in India is to the Court of Directors and the authorities in India.

9. In 1874, let the outstanding interests be valued, and let all future liability of the British Government, if any remain, be commuted for a fixed annuity, for a number of years to be agreed on in each case, and determined by Parliament, to be repaid by India, regard being had, in each case, to the circumstances, conduct, and public value of each undertaking on which capital has been expended under the approval of the Government.

XIII.—Position of all Parties under the proposed Arrangement.

The foregoing plan would place all parties as follows:—

1. *The proprietor of India stock* would obtain an opportunity of employing his capital, so as to avoid the fall in effective value, which it is otherwise certain to suffer, and so as to obtain any greater profit which may accrue from judicious active participation in the improvement of India.

2. *The people of India* would pay for the use of living public works, instead of paying interest on dead capital. The same sum which now forms the annuity of the East India Company would suffice, with some annual addition, for a final extinction of the debt; while the works themselves would set in motion as much of labour and of physical capabilities, *now absolutely idle*, as would pay the annuity many times over, so that the extinction of the debt would be *no* burden on the energies of the country *as they stand at present*.

3. *The Exchequer of Great Britain* would be called on for advances, or, what is the same thing, would be called on to contract a loan, to be repaid from the resources of India.

The extent of that obligation might possibly reach, but could not exceed 8,000,000*l.*; that is, 12,000,000*l.* less the 4,000,000*l.* of the "Security Fund" now in the Bank of England.

4. *The people of England* would have to make advances on the faith of being repaid by *the people of India*; such as they have often made to English and Irish landowners, merchants, &c., &c., and even to the East India Company itself; and, in return for this, they would receive an accession to their markets which would probably, in some single years, avert commercial calamities equal to the greatest extent to which these advances could extend. The narrowest view of the question for England is this, Can she trust India to repay the advances? The next narrowest is, Would not the consequent advantages much more than repay the risk?

5. The present *Indian constituency* would soon be converted into a body having a living and active interest in the prosperity of India. After a time discontent would arise, that the proprietors of these particular works should be the sole Indian constituency, to the exclusion of the proprietors of other works, distinguishable from them in no respect but in the history of their capital. The admission of the proprietors of other works fixed to the soil of India, would then create an extended and varied constituency, deeply interested in the welfare of the country governed by their representatives.

6. *Parliament* would have a perpetually recurring occasion for discussing the condition and budget of India for at least thirty years to come, in determining the sum to be drawn every year from India towards repayment of the advances.

XIV.—Progress of Constitutional Government in India.

A notion lies at the bottom of much discussion on Indian subjects, that there is one kind of human nature in England, which requires constitutional government, and another kind in India, which requires despotism. There is, however, only a single kind of human nature; if, therefore, constitutional government is best for us, it is best for the Hindoos, the difference being that we have learned to some extent how to use it, and they are only just beginning the same lesson.

We confuse the question by taking representation as the exclusive characteristic of constitutional government, instead of viewing it only as a part, and to some extent a consequence of it; and if we find ourselves compelled to admit that a representative government for India is not yet possible, we straightway imagine no progress has been made, or is prac-

ticable, towards our own system of freedom. Constitutionalism is rather a habit than either an institution or a document, though not exactly any of them. The Government of a country will be good or bad, like its people. India, with the rough voice of battles, has asked us to show her the way to govern herself, as far as we know it for ourselves. Intuitively and empirically, yet with little consciousness of the task, we have tried to teach her. Let us see what progress has been made. I will take the chief elements of our own system, except its representative parts, and state how far each has been advanced by us in India.

1. *A recognised present fountain of law.* There was little of this under the native Governments. Mahommedan and Hindoo law were both derived from ancient sources, and there was no power always recognised and existing to improve their provisions or to adapt them to new circumstances. They were burdened and corrupted by traditions, but there was no living legislature to amend them. The attempt to remedy this was forced on us 60 or 70 years ago; the progress yet made is insufficient, according to our views; yet the existence of a living legislature at all is a new element in Indian government. That living legislature needs amendment, and also needs emancipation from the trammels of an executive deeply entrenched in office.

2. *Fixity of law, and application of law to all alike.* Considerable progress has been made in this respect. The principle has been laid down, and large classes of the natives formerly favoured so as to do as they pleased, or nearly so, towards other classes, have advanced so far as to approve, or at least to tolerate easily, the new equality of legal rights. We are advanced so far beyond the mere assertion of the principle as to see how to find fault, and justly so, with the details of the application. In respect of the application of the *same* law to all alike, the difficulty is not on the side of the English Government, but of the native population, which is divided into classes, each deriving from former times its own law. Some progress, however, has been made towards uniformity as well as impartiality of law, and at least its importance is practically exhibited to the public mind of India. There is an exception still remaining in favour of Europeans, who are subject only to courts of their own; but this last distinction is attacked.

3. *Separation of the judicial from other functions—trial by jury—independence of judges and juries.* This is in a backward state, chiefly in consequence of the novelty of these

principles in India. Under the native Governments, and as far as the Governments were concerned, the administration of justice was, for the most part, only an incumbrance on the revenue service. Whoever collected the revenues (whether for the prince, or for his master who farmed them of the prince) had charge of the police, and of civil and criminal justice. On our taking possession of a district with a very few Europeans, we could only step into the places of the former chief officers, and so were obliged to retain the system. Nor would the people have been capable of any other. Gradually a change has been effected. It is not yet complete, nor is the present condition of the judicial system satisfactory. We have advanced far enough to see great faults, which could not be said when no separate judicial system of any account existed. Juries are worked to some extent in the presidential cities. Observers not disposed to decry the natives say, that in the interior they would be made the means of extortion and wrong. Independence of the judges is established in respect of the Queen's courts, but not in respect of the Company's; perhaps, indeed, if many of the present British judges in India are what some are said to be, it is too soon to make them independent; and we may have to mend the judges before we can fully confer on India this great element of constitutional freedom.

4. *The right of habeas corpus.* This presupposes fixity of law and independence of judges. There is nothing of it in the native system. In our presidential cities it exists. But in the interior personal liberty depends mainly on "the British character," and not either on law or on the capability of the people to work constitutional rights and maintain them. The people in our territories are becoming accustomed to the practical advantage of immunity from imprisonment, except on breach of law, and may be expected to require, before long, that it shall be established as a legal principle, with the needful machinery for working it out.

5. *Subordination of the military to the civil power.* This was reversed in the times of native rule; and is rectified in the main under ours. I ought here to add two considerations which will hardly be comprehended in England: the first is *the restriction of the use of armed force to the Government.* In India any person who pleases hires armed men. This practice, as well as that of going habitually armed, declines where there is the security of English administration. The other is, the *immediate connection with and responsibility of every individual of the armed force to the State.* In the

native Indian system, the private soldiers, and all subordinate officers, are much more nearly connected with the immediate commander than with the Government: this has been remedied.

6. *Freedom of discussion.* It was rather wrangling and intrigue under the native rule. Adverse discussion, like any other matter of offence, risked a man's life with any adversary strong enough to take it with impunity; and there must always be many such where Government at best is only the strongest amongst many discordant heads of armed bodies, and not always that. This right of discussion is pretty fully established under our Government, although it is sometimes interfered with by British officials, who do not understand its constitutional value. It wants, however, that machinery for its exercise which the people must chiefly supply for themselves.

7. *Publicity of legislation, justice, taxation, and Government accounts.* Here is our chief practical defect, except as to justice. Everything is done privately; the dishonest, therefore, intrigue, the thoughtful are discontented, the lowly suffer; England learns nothing of India, and the rulers of India work in the dark. Paper, paper, paper; desks, desks, desks; and not a living voice, or a truth-laden witness amongst them; stirring thoughts, when they intrude, are stifled. Indian affairs in English hands move at a pace which no other country in the world would tolerate, and are often decided inconsiderately at last.

8. *Taxation, ascertained periodically in its gross amount by the expenses of the State, and assessed by fixed rules applying to all persons alike.* Here we have retained in full the native principle, viz. take all you can get for taxes, or at least all you think it prudent to take. The fundamental questions of English taxation are, What are the costs of our various public objects for the year? and by what rules shall we each contribute to these costs? In India the fundamental questions are, How much can we take, or is it prudent to take from this, that, or the other village? by what means can we best get it? and when we have got it, how shall we spend it? The British principle at home is reversed in India; and we are trying to establish English principles of expenditure and credit along with Indian principles of revenue. We debate zemindary, ryotwarry, and mouzawarry just as our predecessors did, without reflecting that there are still deeper questions, from which the difficulty of these matters of management in great part flow. When India begins to ask, as our fathers did, or when England begins to ask for India, what do you want this money for? and what

is the rule for sharing the burden? the questions of agency will naturally fall into their right place.

9. *Freedom of enterprise, commerce, and locomotion, exempt from protective and discriminative duties.* As far as free trade goes (except two or three monopolies for fiscal purposes), India has the full application of the English principle. But as to public works, the Government longs to retain the old Indian principle by keeping these works in its own hands, and Manchester abets them by reproaching them for not doing more in this respect. If cotton mills will not flourish under a Government, neither will roads; and if a Government cannot secure a supply of corn by law, neither can it a supply of carriage,—that is, in the general and for a length of time together. We have here taken up the native principle—one of the principles chiefly concerned in making India, rich as it is by nature, so poor by art.

10. *Religious equality as to civil rights.* This is quite new to India, but is becoming gradually established under our rule. Mussulman, Parsee, Brahmin, Koly, and Mhar stand equal before our law, and are becoming accustomed to it. There is reason, indeed, to complain that all are not treated alike as to actual admittance to office; but any such unequal usage as to offices under a Government, are of far less importance than the principles of the Government itself. It is of little avail that all Turks or Persians are equally eligible to the office of Prime Minister, if he who happens to hold the post can imprison his neighbours or bowstring them at his pleasure. The people at large would be far better off, and far more likely to acquire a just independence of individual character, under a constitutional government of foreigners, than under an indigenous one of despots,—that is, supposing them obliged to choose between those alternatives.

11. In addition to these positive points of comparison, I ought to notice a negative one—the *excessive tendency to hereditariness of offices* in India is mitigated under our Government. With us hereditary succession to office is rather a device than a principle, as the American modification of our system shows; but in India it is a result of strong social tendencies. In the purely native system it applies to every office as well as to royalty; a minister's son expects to be a minister, as well as a king's son a king, and the violence which often sets aside the hereditary tendency in high offices seems less to affect, although not altogether to spare, those of all lower degrees. I found a case, not an extreme one, in which a village accountantship was held by twenty-two persons to whom the office had descended, and who fulfilled its

duties, and held the rent-free land which paid for them, each for a year in turn. This tendency we have broken in upon, in forming our own establishments; and India, at some not very distant time, may have choice of the best men for all offices.

12. Reviewing these particulars, it is obvious, that we have made great changes in India, whether we intended it or no. In truth, Englishmen ruling India try, of necessity, on the whole, to approach to their own system, with whatever difficulty and in however clumsy a manner. We are dissatisfied, and in many respects justly so, with the progress made; the way to advance is to know accurately what has been already done, to see what remains to be done, and to ascertain what it is which hinders.

13. The two chief faults of system seem to be want of the separation of the chief functions of Government, and want of publicity. To remedy the former would vastly promote improved working of the Government; to amend the latter would let in public opinion to operate to the benefit of Indian affairs, as it does to that of our own. As to the latter, indeed, the greater fault is the want of a public*.

14. Despite these hindrances, however, the seeds of constitutionalism in India will grow, for they are suited to the nature of men, and only need defence from violence during their feeble germination. From the principles already in action, representative government must arise in time, as a consequence, not a cause, of other liberties,—of liberties so used as to have grown into the hearts and habits of the people. Meanwhile we need publicity and a public, and roads for the sake of both.

XV.—Employment of Natives in Government.

1. Efforts are being made to obtain for the natives of India a larger participation in the Government of their own country,

* One considerable fault, not of system, but of actual administration, is that we do not practically hold ourselves bound to make protection coextensive with, and faithfully converge to, allegiance: we subject this relation to the policy of convenience. We go to war with Burmah for comparatively small infringements of British rights, while we suffer British subjects to be defrauded, robbed, beaten, and killed in Hydrabad, and refuse to interfere. It suits *our policy* to act in one case and not in the other;—it suits a most questionable policy, and it denies most unquestionable duties. The policy is most questionable, because it diminishes greatly the reasons the natives have for preferring British government: the duties are most unquestionable, inasmuch as they belong to all times, all countries, and all governments, springing in fact out of the relation which every man creates when he undertakes to govern another.

and admission into its higher offices. The facts of the Baroda narrative, as well as others which might easily be substantiated, will be adduced to show the untrustworthiness of native agency in Government. . No doubt the effect of any Government is much influenced by the moral qualities of the agents who administer it; and it is quite impossible that the Government of India should rise to a higher excellence in the hands of the natives, than that of their own moral qualities. While, as yet, the native principles of India were undisturbed by any European influence, the history of the country presented, with rare exceptions, a picture of short-lived dynasties, bloody competitions for safety or power, and suffering populations; and the permanence of its present escape from these calamities must depend on the extent to which an improved morality, whether imported or indigenous, can be secured for the service of the Government. To what extent that improved morality can be drawn from native sources is a problem of the highest interest.

2. But before the Baroda intrigues are quoted against the eligibility of the natives for public employment, let it be remembered that they form an extreme and singular case. A State under arrangements which tend more than in any other instance to the enervation of its Government, is suffered by our own authorities to become a focus and a profitable refuge for the worst of those who have been discarded for dishonesty from our own service. Such a Government can do nothing in its own interest, either by force or by manly representation; its whole resort must be to corruption; and the measures of our own Government have much promoted the credit for efficacy which that corruption may possess. Whatever, then, may be said elsewhere, this is an exceptional case, from which no argument against the employment of the natives can or ought to be drawn.

3. But more: our own mode of government in India omits the very provision which is elsewhere employed to neutralize, as far as may be, the effect of dishonesty. Nothing, it is true, can wholly do the work of that firm integrity which resists alike the temptations of lucre and of power. But this quality is rare in all countries, although, perhaps, unusually so in India. Every social system finds a kind of substitute for it in the mutual pressure of interests, and in the publicity through which those interests can make themselves attended to.

4. Shut up our Houses of Parliament, conduct our public proceedings in Greek, let us have a press at only five or six towns in the three kingdoms, and let a few foreigners rule

over all, and we should soon find that, whatever good men might chance to be in office, the worst amongst us, in far more than the present proportion, had also struggled through dirty obscurity to the same elevation. It is light and air which gives at home, if not due honesty, at least the means of making the best of such honesty as we have.

5. India has no publicity in some of the most important departments of her public business. With an unbroken descent from a commercial origin, its British Governments have retained the privacy and exclusion of the counting-house. They have thus missed the very device which, all over the world besides, provides for full disclosures and equal hearing, whether that device be found in the form of the council of a nomadic tribe, or in that of a parliament elaborated by the struggles and experience of ages. The natives of India under British rule have neither the Durbar of their own land, nor the parliament of ours. Debarred of just opportunities of statement or remonstrance, too many of them, even in seeking for just redress, crawl in and out of the dark pigeon-holes of office like some of their own snakes, while we, dreaming of constitutional *forms* and the apparent impossibility of applying those forms to India, forget that much of the good of constitutionalism and nearly all of its earliest advantages, spring from its equal and impartial publicity, and not exclusively, as we often think, from representation. If we analyze our concrete constitutionalism, we shall find that its principles afford us the means of initiating vast reforms in India, with small changes. Let us use those means, and then only will it be time for us to say how far the people of India cannot be employed in the Government of their own country.

XVI.—Treatment of the Native States.

1. Two opinions exist as to the mode in which the native Governments of India should be dealt with. One party, thinking they see India once populous, rich, and flourishing, lament the decay of her people and the fall of her kings: they would strengthen the native Governments which remain, by reverting to native principles, and make India again what they believe it was before. The other party see in native Governments nothing but corruption and ruin; they deem them the greatest obstructions to the improvement of the people, and, if they could, they would sweep them from the land. Whenever a reigning house fails of heirs, according to the strictest interpretation which can be put on the laws of

succession, they would seize the territory by some right not very well defined or established, which they consider that of the paramount power.

2. Except in the sincere desire I believe both these parties entertain for the improvement of India, it seems to me they are both in error. The history of India presents no such happy era as that on which one side founds its argument. When we get rid of the glare of general epithets, and the misleadings of opinions formed under prejudicial circumstances; when we ascertain facts for ourselves from original and varied authorities, and found on them our own conclusions and comparisons; when we descend from the massive groupings of history, to the details which relate to men, to tribes, and to actual daily life, we find that an illusion has passed away, and we cannot help concluding, that if India is to be raised at all, it will not be by going back to an imaginary past, but by steadily preparing for a better future.

3. It may be true that to the growth of that better future, the native Governments of India, protected from the consequences of their own despotism by our treaty engagements with them, are the greatest obstacle. It does not follow, however, that it is for us to break up those Governments. We are under bonds to them—bonds all the more stringent from our being able to break them with perfect impunity. No duty, rightly understood, was ever really done by beginning with a breach of known obligations: a duty rightly done as far as it is understood, always leads to clearer views, and commonly to higher duties. If the dissolution of the native Governments by us will be a general good, it will be found in our own straight path, and not by going aside to seek it

4. This would be quite true, although we could see nothing of the relation of our present duties to the future. But, in fact, our present duty is not plainer than its consequences. A few facts will guide us. India, in most parts, could maintain twice the population now settled on a given area: all the subjects of the native States could easily be supported, along with our own, on that part of the country which is under our rule. Let us govern our own territories well, and let the improvements of Europe find free, safe, and profitable occupation there, and the consequent competition for population will bring about any needful reforms in the native States, if they be capable of reform at all. Next,—these native States, dependent on us in some views, have the obligations as well as the rights of independent States in others. The higher necessity of peace compelled arrangements, in the last generation, which have operated to corrupt and debilitate the native

powers, always prone to debility and corruption. It is for us to seek heartily their establishment in health and soundness, if they are willing, or can be persuaded, to be so established. It is our duty to give them, *ex animo*, all the aid they will accept for the improvement of their own principles and practice; but, at the same time, we have a right,—nay, we are bound,—to call on them for the fulfilment of the same duties towards our subjects, in and near their territories, as though they were entirely independent of us. If they are barbarous, unfashioned, or corrupted despotisms, that, in this view, is nothing to us: we have to require of them the fulfilment of their obligations as Governments of whatever kind, so far as our own subjects are concerned. If they fail in these duties, we have, in all rightfulness, the same remedy as in any other case. If they learn to fulfil the just functions of Governments towards our subjects, they will learn, what some of them little think of now, their duties towards their own also, and how to fulfil them. If they are, or become, strong and faithful Governments, they will answer every desirable purpose, and it will be for us to rejoice in it; if they do not, they will fall in quarrels, in which, so long as our own duties are done, the right will be on our side, and the support of the people will be with us. We shall not find the solution of the "native princes" difficulty in questions of personal succession hypercritically treated; such questions may leave deep and dangerous discontent behind them. We shall find it, as has just been said, in the straight path of our own duty, and not to the right or left of it.

5. This is only part of a wider question of the same kind, viz. How shall the *débris* of India past be worked into the better system of India future? What are the right places of princes, jagheerdars, hereditary territorial officers, the village system, and all else? We lament the evils of India; its evils, however, came naturally of its ancient system. And yet we cannot willingly see her princes and her gentry decay, her people lose all traditional ties, and that which is really good in her institutions perish in the midst of inefficient innovations of ours. If we return to the past, we go again to a fountain of evil; if we pursue unmixed plans of our own, we shall as surely encounter evil of another form. Who does not see in this dilemma the necessity of a progress, in which native views and feelings shall have recognised and sufficient opportunities of participating in counsel, although, perhaps, not in decree, with European experience, suggestion, and leading?

XVII.—The End of our Rule in India.

1. That a handful of men from a distant land should rule, for ever, 150,000,000 people, is not to be expected. What we shall be in India when our actual power ends, depends on the use we make of our term of empire, and that again on the view we take of our position.

2. We are not lords of India in any other than a present practical sense. We do not and cannot rule it by force. We cannot colonize it, nor ought we. Our chief vocation is that of teachers; to this we join for the present the functions of judges and leaders.

3. Hitherto while we have imparted to India much that is good, we have really taught the natives to be soldiers more rapidly and thoroughly than we have taught them anything else; and if we do not change the proportion of the different parts of our teaching, we may justly expect to be expelled by the superior forces we ourselves have trained, before we have had time to infuse into the people so much of higher principles, and such a taste for other pursuits, as shall serve to mitigate the fanaticism of the military spirit.

4. As time elapses, India advances more or less from association with us, whether we will or no. That which lies to a great extent in our own power is the rate of advancement and the objects to which it shall be directed. If we are content with keeping India down, we shall be expelled in the end as intruders, whatever advantage India may have derived incidentally from connection with us. But if we join heartily our interests with theirs, then the longer we are united the more nearly will they approach to our own views and participate in our progress, the more will they find themselves capable of appropriating and working our own institutions, the more will they be drawn to seek from us the further enlightenment which advancing intelligence can best appreciate, the surer and the more durable will be our sway, and the more confidently may we expect that a dominion begun in discord, violence, and too often in fraud, will end in a friendship of peoples to which policy can give no additional advantages, and treaties afford no additional strength.

POSTSCRIPT ON PATRONAGE.

THE Indian debate of to-day is made to turn, like that of 1780, on patronage. Hitherto the difficulty of the question, as to our own political interests, has been met by maintaining a body independent of the Crown for the appointment of the persons to work the Government of India. It is now said, that this patronage enfeebles the body which possesses it. Another expedient is suggested in the form of an educational test for the candidates.

Here, as in every other part of the system of our Government of India, the real difficulty lies in the want of an extended public actively interested in Indian affairs.

An educational test, no certain index in any case of practical fitness, is likely to prove, in Indian affairs, a guide more than ordinarily delusive. Probably about 1500 Europeans, exclusive of clerks, are employed in the civil Government of India; that is, each European is on the average the centre of 100,000 natives, and is 30 miles from his nearest colleague or superior. In many cases these numbers are vastly exceeded. The European officer there has commonly to act on his own suggestion, to meet new contingencies with his own courage and resources, and to deal with the interests, rights, and feelings of a vast number of persons as well as he may on his own judgment. If the success of a student in an academical competition has arisen from a general energy of character devoted for a time to this particular object, it may be followed by equal success in Indian administration; but when, as it often happens, it is the result only of special aptitude, it can be only a precursor of failure in a career which requires qualities of a very different order.

Probably there is no single test which will effectually and correctly sift out of the mass of candidates for Indian office those who will eventually succeed. We have therefore to expect there will always exist a class of Indian appointees incompetent, or perhaps only inappropriate, to their duties.

Now, considering that when a young man gives himself up to Indian engagements, he renounces to a great extent, and often entirely for life, all chances of making his way at home, it is clear that few will consent to such a course except with some certainty of continued provision, however it may happen that climate, health, or proved inappropriateness, may interrupt his Indian progress. But this difficulty arises from the want of a general field of European interest and enterprise in India, into which such failing appointees

may be discharged to make their own way. We have made our Indian world peculiar to a small governing class, and the incubus of a number of inefficient officers cannot but remain as a consequence until we effectually remedy that great mistake.

The same error operates with equal severity in another way. Why are Indian qualifications so rare that a man must specially acquire them, and specially renounce all other prospects, if he entertain a design of giving himself up to Indian pursuits? If our Government wanted men versed in French, German, mathematics, or any other out of a thousand different subjects, they could easily find them at a day's notice; but to obtain a man tolerably fit for India, you must make him on purpose. Your field of selection is thus limited, and that where your interests, had they been rightly understood, would have led to the widest diffusion of the necessary qualifications. Measured by our interests, Hindoostanee ought to be at least as well known in England as German, and we should be as familiar with the constitution of an Indian State or village as with that of the Swiss Confederation.

Here, then, we arrive again at the single obstruction which stops us from whatever point we set out on our Indian investigations. We need a public,—for the sake of a public we need extended practical interests,—for the sake of extended practical interests we want roads.

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